Dear
Chris
Menzel
You
quoted me:
RS: In our MEASUR methods we use only the
words of the users. All
invented
vaguely word-like strings one finds in OWL, for example,
are
not permitted.
CM: For some purposes, that might be quite
appropriate. However,
something
like the "vaguely word-like strings one finds in OWL" are
indispensable
if you are interested in (a) sharing your ontologies in
a
standardized fashion on the Web or (b) being able to take advantage
of
powerful computer-based tools to manage and reason upon ontologies
generally.
Are you not interested in these things?
RS: Indeed I am but the human users take
precedence, in my opinion.
RS: 'Listening in' to the ontolog
discussions I sense a widespread
belief
that logic and formal methods will solve the problems of
ontology
development.
CM:
I doubt there is a single person who participates in this forum who
thinks
that. What many here do believe is that logic and formal
methods
are *necessary* to the solution of the problems of ontology
development.
No one believes they are sufficient in and of
themselves.
RS: I take your word for that but the tone
of some discussions made me suspicious.
I am accustomed to using ‘ontology’ in the metaphysical sense where
formal methods are of secondary importance.
RS: I am all for formal precision once we
are sure we have fully grasped
what
we need to be formal and precise about.
CM: Well, sure, if all that means is that we
have to clearly circumscribe
the
intended domain of an ontology. But a major point of introducing
formal
methods, once we are clear about the domain, is to make
concepts
out of ordinary discourse that are initially vague and
ambiguous
clear and precise.
RS:
That suggests that we can clear up the meanings we find in ‘ordinary discourse’
(which naturally is defective?) using formal methods. I find that, although formal methods
help during the intermediate stages of analysis, they cannot finally remove all
defects and ultimately one must rely upon the relevant people for their
judgements.
I
thought that the age of logicism had closed by mid-20th
century.
CM:
Logicism, a creation of the German mathematician Gottlob Frege in the
late
1800s, was an attempt to "ground" all of mathematics on logical
principles
alone. Bertrand Russell torpedoed Frege's attempt around
the
turn of the 19th century by showing that it was possible to deduce
his
famous paradox in Frege's system. Russell's own attempt to
resurrect
logicism in Principia Mathematica (1910-1913, with co-author
A.
N. Whitehead) also largely ended in failure, a fact widely
acknowledged
by the mid-1920s. "Logicism" is also sometimes used to
refer
to the logic-based approach to AI and knowledge engineering,
which
didn't even exist until the mid-20th century. And this movement
is
of course still very robust.
RS: True! But the tone of much ontolog discussion
suggests that the attitudes of the logicists are still
influential.
The
generic-specific hierarchies that play such an important role in OWL
'ontologies' play only a minor role in our schemas because they are forms of
cognitive norms without ontological importance. We use them to make some
schemas rather more succinct.
CM: Why the ironic quotes around
'ontologies'?
RS: Because of a deep personal prejudice
against using ‘ontology’ in the ontolog sense I would feel dishonest to omit
them. Putting ‘ontology’ before
ontology is putting the cart before the horse.
CM: Do you have any arguments (beyond the
mere observation that they simply have no role to play in your own approach) to
suggest that OWL ontologies, even those that are only type hierarchies, don't
deserve the label?
RS: I’m sure they deserve the label if
understood in its established ontolog sense. But I would like to see a clear,
explicit statement of the ontological assumptions on which OWL is based. Can you provide
one?
I
have placed two papers on a very amateurish website: www.rstamper.co.uk
CM: This URL is
broken.
RS: And I am mortified and full of
apologies. When I have the chance I
shall attend to the problem.
Ronald
Stamper