John, (01)
Many thanks for your impressively comprehensive review (below). We are
indeed privileged to have such learned treatises/treats from you on such
a regular basis. (02)
But while I must confess that I have not exhaustively studied any - let
alone all! - of the works you cite, may I ask if with your background
you can contradict a rather blanket hypothesis from me? It is this: (03)
They are all - literally all of them - suffering from the very nature of
the problem they are trying to address, which is how to talk about any
posited 'ultimate reality' at all without the result inevitably being
contaminated and in the end corrupted by the dissonances induced by our
merely human conceptual processes. Even to talk of an "object" in a
Peirce or other such triangle, or an individual in a representation, or
even a significatio (signification) or Bedeuting (reference), is to beg
the original question. The cat is already out of the bag. The horse
has bolted so it's no good closing the door. (04)
The basic problem is that there is an inevitable nonsense in trying to
conceive the raw material (as it were) of the conceptualization process
itself. (05)
So what can we possibly do to escape the conundrum? Well, the answer
hides in my previous paragraph's "(as it were)": we can do nothing more
than try to use images which more or less adequately - depending on the
context, of course - address the relevant aspect of the problem in
whatever situation we find ourselves. (06)
Even the use of the word "reality" in phrases auch as "unconceptualized
reality" is already a nonsense but does implicitly express the hope that
the familiar and meaningful real/illusive dichotomy shares something
with the basic problem of Ontology. And even "Ontology" itself is a
figurative use of an ancient word that has more directly given us
"ontogeny". (07)
Hence (of course...) the image that I believe has helped me since 1966,
as mentioned and linked to in my previous post. If there is any
interest from this list, I could probably set it out more succinctly and
more appropriately to this list's needs (as I perceive/conceive
them...), and try to show what kinds of uses my particular Ontological
image and terminology can serve. (In my case, the general area of
application is information system architecture for system
interoperability and human collaboration.) (08)
But first, John, does my blanket hypothesis stand up to your so informed
critical eye? (I rather suspect your answer might be that yes, it does,
more or less, but that all my words are merely yet another verbal
hotch-potch from the by now rather clichéed background to all your
eminent authors' endeavours?) (09)
Christopher (010)
----- Original Message -----
From: "John F. Sowa" <sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Tuesday, December 25, 2007 10:41 PM
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] CL, CG, IKL and the relationship between
symbols in the logical "universeofdiscourse" and individuals in the
"real world" (011)
Pat, Christopher, and Azamat, (012)
As I said in my note about Tarski's model theory, I believe it is
only one part, but an important part of the semantic puzzle. (013)
To relate it to the other parts, I'd like to mention the 'meaning
triangle', which is the term that Ogden and Richards (1923) used
for their diagram that relates a symbol, a concept, and an object. (014)
However, the triangle (without the diagram) is as old as Aristotle,
whose terms for the three nodes were symbolon (symbol), pathema
tes psyches (affection of the psyche), and pragma (object). (015)
The medieval Scholastics used the terms signum (sign),
significatio (signification), and suppositio (supposition). (016)
Frege's terms were Zeichen (sign), Sinn (sense), and Bedeutung
(reference). (017)
Peirce's terms were sign, interpretant, and object. (018)
Instead of recognizing the full triangle, Tarski's model theory
relates the sign directly to the object, while ignoring the
concept, pathema, significatio, Sinn, or interpretant. (019)
Most linguists are unhappy with model-theoretic semantics
(AKA formal semantics) as the primary or even only version
of semantics, and they have developed two other, sometimes
competing branches: lexical semantics and cognitive semantics. (020)
1. Lexical semantics, according to Cruse (1986), is a “contextual
approach,” which derives “information about a word’s meaning from its
relations with actual and potential linguistic contexts.” That
definition corresponds to the left side of the meaning triangle, which
omits the connection between words and the objects they refer to. It is
compatible with Saussure’s definition of language (langue) as “the whole
set of linguistic habits, which allow an individual to understand and be
understood” (1916). Lexicographers analyze a corpus of contextual
citations and catalog the linguistic habits in lexicons, thesauri, and
terminologies. (021)
2. Formal semantics studies the logical properties of words and
sentences and relates them to objects and configurations of objects. The
first logic-based systems were designed as computer implementations
(Bohnert & Backer 1967; Woods 1968; Winograd 1972), but Montague’s
theories were more influential among philosophers and logicians. Other
formalisms include discourse representation theory (Kamp & Reyle 1993)
and situation semantics (Barwise & Perry 1983). Yet despite 40 years of
sustained research, none of the implementations can translate one page
from an ordinary textbook to any version of logic. Lexical semantics
covers a broader range of language than the formal versions, and it
addresses more aspects of syntax and vocabulary that affect meaning. But
unlike the logic-based theories, lexical semantics does not define a
mapping from language to objects or a method of reasoning about them. (022)
3. Cognitive semantics studies the concepts and patterns of concepts
that relate language to perception and action. Locke’s associations
influenced many 19th-century psychologists, but Kant’s schemata led to
more structured theories by Selz (1913) and Bartlett (1932). Other
versions included Gestalt theory (Wertheimer 1925), activity theory
(Vygotsky 1928), and cognitive maps (Tolman 1948). The earliest computer
implementations, called semantic networks, were designed for machine
translation; among the first were the correlational nets by Ceccato
(1961). Other highly influential computational versions include
conceptual dependencies by Schank (1975), chunks by Newell and Simon
(1972), who cited Selz as an inspiration, and frames by Minsky (1975),
who cited Bartlett. Robotics applications use concepts and cognitive
maps to relate a robot’s language interface to its sensory and motor
mechanisms. Among linguists, Lakoff (1987), Langacker (1999), Talmy
(2000), and Wierzbicka (1996) devoted their careers to analyzing
cross-linguistic cognitive patterns and their relationship to
extralinguistic objects and activities. The term conceptual structure is
commonly used for those patterns, both in linguistics (Jackendoff 1983)
and in artificial intelligence (Sowa 1976, 1984). (023)
A full treatment of semantics must recognize all three sides of the
meaning triangle as essential to the meaning of 'meaning'. But even
that does not get into all the issues of pragmatics. That, however,
is an even more complex issue. (024)
For references in the above note, see my combined bibliography: (025)
http://www.jfsowa.com/bib.htm (026)
John Sowa (027)
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