On Monday, December 24, 2007 10:11 PM, John observed:
''"The following are outside the scope of this standard: ... Computer-based
operational methods of providing relationships between symbols in the
logical 'universe of discourse' and individuals in the 'real world'". This
topic, the operational relationship between symbols in logic and individuals
in the world, happens to be my particular interest of late.'' (01)
John, your suspicion upon efficiency of CL as well as other logical
languages has a good reason. The issues mentioned are rather the matters
(''the universe of discourse'') of real ontology and semantics, both
concerned with a true meaningful representation of reality (its domains,
parts, pieces, or portions). Such representation comes up as a triple
relationship between language-like entities (expressions), mental entities
(concepts) and material entities in the real world, like as denotation,
designation, reference, sense, meaning, evidence, relevancy, or truth.
Covering logical models as well as material models, mathematical models, and
theoretical models, ontology yields the most consistent and comprehensive
principles of the world, its fundamental categories, invariant patterns and
rules. (02)
So the ontological principles inform all sorts of particular
representations, interpretations, wordlviews, theories, laws, and models:
theoretic, conceptual, semantic, logical, computational, mathematical,
formal, instrumental, imaginary, scientific, heuristic, etc. (03)
To conclude: It is the scope of computing ontology: machine-based
operational methods of providing relationships between symbols in the
'universe of discourse' (a domain of knowledge) and entities (kinds and
individuals) in the real world. (04)
Azamat Abdoullaev (05)
http://www.eis.com.cy (06)
----- Original Message -----
From: "John Black" <JohnBlack@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "[ontolog-forum] " <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Monday, December 24, 2007 10:11 PM
Subject: [ontolog-forum] CL, CG,IKL and the relationship between symbols in
the logical "universeof discourse" and individuals in the "real world" (07)
> Please forgive me, in advance, for my spotty knowledge of some of the
> topics
> in this post. My interest in these ideas often exceeds my understanding.
>
> First, congratulations to all on the ISO adoption of CL as a standard. I
> believe it will prove to be an invaluable addition to the spread of
> interoperable knowledge representation technology. It is an important
> achievement. I am doubly excited by this because it includes, at long
> last,
> an ISO standard for Conceptual Graphs. CGs was the first knowledge
> representation formalism I encountered. I read the CG1984 book several
> times, worked on an implementation in prolog of a linear form, and then
> had
> the pleasure to participate for a short time in 1997 on work towards the
> CGIF standard specification. More recently, having decided that semantics
> is
> heavily dependent on contexts, and searching for material concerning that
> subject, I came across IKL and the startling claim that "Every occurrence
> of
> an IKL name has the same meaning." This is something I find highly
> desirable, but which as I said, I had just recently decided was not
> possible.
>
> The topic I am particularly interested in discussing here now, is this
> claim
> and a similar statement in the CL requirements section 5.1.4.b., "Any
> piece
> of Common Logic text should have the same meaning, and support the same
> entailments everywhere on the network. Every name should have the same
> logical meaning at every node of the network." Yet in the version of the
> Common Logic (CL) specification I have, in section 1 I read "The following
> are outside the scope of this standard: ... Computer-based operational
> methods of providing relationships between symbols in the logical
> 'universe
> of discourse' and individuals in the 'real world'".
>
> This topic, the operational relationship between symbols in logic and
> individuals in the world, happens to be my particular interest of late.
> Actually, come to think of it, I have been interested in this for some
> time
> and I recall that one of the many things that impressed me about John
> Sowa's
> first book on Conceptual Structures in 1984 was the chapter on
> Psychological
> Evidence, including the discussion of perceptrons. That section was, at
> least an initial attempt, to address the question.
>
> So here is my first question: If the semantics of CL starts out with a
> mapping from the vocabulary of a CL text to individuals in the universe of
> discourse, but this mapping is nowhere encoded or included in the CL text,
> then how can you be sure that one agents mapping to individuals at one
> node
> of the network will be the same as the mapping of another agent at some
> other node of the network?
>
> John Black
> www.kashori.com
>
>
>
>
>
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