Waclaw Kusnierczyk schrieb:
> Ingvar Johansson wrote:
>> Waclaw Kusnierczyk schrieb:
>>> My point is that logic is a theory, and thus it is, in principle, as
>>> good as any other theory, in that it may well be incorrect.
>>
>> I have once in this forum, in relation to statements like these,
>> urged people to read Thomas Nagel's "The Last Word". Unhappily,
>> Waclaw has not made it. So I guess I have to try to give a very
>> condensed presentation of Nagel's central argument against complete
>> skepticism.
>
> Unhappily (or not) I have joined this forum quite recently, and regret
> I haven't picked up your argument from the archives.
>
>> Compare the two propositions (a) <1+1=2> and (b) <I doubt that
>> <1+1=2> is true>, and assume that some of your actions (e.g., as a
>> teacher in a primary school) depends on whether you act on (a) or
>> (b). Which one should you choose? I would choose (a), since as Nagel
>> says: "The thought itself dominates all thoughts about itself." When
>> considered seriously, the thought <1+1=2> *dominates* the thought <I
>> doubt that <1+1=2> is true>. Or, with another formulation:
>> Action-relevant skepticism cannot be produced entirely *from the
>> outside*. But this is the way Waclaw and many others produce it.
>>
>> Here is the structure of the argument a second time; now applied to
>> an example that I think figured in this forum not too long ago.
>>
>> Compare the two propositions (a) <if I jump from the 60th floor I
>> will die> and (b) <I doubt that <if I jump from the 60th floor I will
>> die> is true>, and assume that one of your actions depends on whether
>> you act on (a) or (b). Which one should you choose? I would choose
>> (a), since as Nagel says: "The thought itself dominates all thoughts
>> about itself." When considered seriously, the thought <if I jump from
>> the 60th floor I will die> *dominates* the thought <I doubt that <if
>> I jump from the 60th floor I will die> is true>.
>
> Fancy that: I compare <If I jump from the 60th floor I will land on
> my feet and drink some beer> and <I doubt that <If I jump from the
> 60th floor I will land on my feet and drink some beer> is true>, and,
> following Nagel (according to you), I choose to jump (so I may never
> post here again, good for you, we'll see).
>
> I do not know what Nagel really meant; (01)
He is *not* saying that it is *always* the case that a thought dominates
thoughts about itself; as you seem to interpret my presentation of him.
Sometimes it does and sometimes, it doesn't. Everything depends on what
the thought happen to be *about*. In your example (but not in mine), the
thought in question does not dominate the thought that is about it. (02)
> for now, I have no other choice than to trust you. But perhaps what
> 'the thought itself dominates all thoughts about itself' means only
> that a thought about a thought can only follow that thought it is
> about *in time*,
No; see comment above.
> which in itself does not seem to propose or impose any serious
> criterion for choosing which thought to follow. Or maybe it means
> that our minds are made so that in critical situations when we need to
> make a quick decision, we follow simpler ('dominating') thoughts
> because they are easier to process without invoking complicated
> machinery of logical reflexive thinking.
No; see comment above.
>
> In the example you give, I could see your choice of (1) rather than
> (2) as analogous to a simple reflex vs a reaction mediated by higher
> levels of the central nervous system. And with this analogy, I could
> read Nagel's words as
Perhaps you could, but you shouldn't.
> a statement about how we are: we process (and react according to)
> thoughts before higher-order thoughts about the former.
> (Which is quite arguable.)
>
> In any case, I remain ignorant as to how your argument relates to my
> (possibly naive) earlier statements. (03)
Statements are *about* something. Some statments are about other
statements. Let me call them 'second order statements'. A second order
statement can (but need not necessarily) have an interesting relation to
what its first-order statement is about. Your view that "logic is a
theory, and thus it is, in principle, as good as any other theory, in
that it may well be incorrect" expresses in isolation only fallibilism
with respect to logic - and that's fine for me. But you seem to use it
to say that it is a mere convention whether or not a contradiction is
true or false. In my opinion, the thought < 'p and not-p' is false >
dominates (in Nagel's sense) the thought < I cannot firmly believe that
'p and not-p' is false > . (04)
Ingvar J (05)
> vQ
>
>
>>
>> best wishes,
>> Ingvar
>>
>>
> (06)
--
Ingvar Johansson
IFOMIS, Saarland University
home site: http://ifomis.org/
personal home site:
http://hem.passagen.se/ijohansson/index.html (07)
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