>Pat Hayes wrote:
>>> Reality doesn't exist in the absence of perspective. Reality is
>>> subjective, not objective.
>>
>> Absolute nonsense. Reality existed for billions
>> of years before there was anything that could
>> form a subjective view of it. If, as seems quite
>> possible, this planet contains the only life
>> capable of having a subjective view, and our sun
>> goes nova and wipes us all out, the universe will
>> carry on being objectively real without noticing
>> our passing.
>>
>>> When people speak, they speak the truth if
>>> they say what is real for them.
>>
>> No. They speak the truth when what they say is in
>> fact the case, in the actual world.
>>
>>> The *real* worlds are the worlds that
>>> are real *for persons*.
>>
>> No, the real world is the one that persons
>> inhabit and are part of. There is only one of it.
>
>haven't you just said that logical semantics is a theory of truth? what
>about the semantics of modal logics? isn't it a theory of truth which
>consists of multiple, concurrent so-called 'possible worlds'? (01)
Not necessarily concurrent. And as you say,
'so-called'. What these are depends on the
modality in question. Temporal logic for example
has 'possible worlds' being snapshots of a single
temporal plenum, which IMO is the single real
world. Alethic modalities (necessary and
possible) are often described as being about
entire possible worlds, but (as Kripke, the
inventor of these semantics, says) one can think
of these most usefully as being ways the actual
world might be, rather than fully-fledged
alternative worlds. IN fact, Lewis'
interpretation, which gives all possible worlds
the same status, is widely (and IMO correctly)
seen as an extreme and perhaps untenable
position. The Kripke view, expounded in his
"naming and necessity", is that alethic talk is
really about lack of information. We don't know
exactly how the world actually is, and so there
are many ways it might be consistent with the
information we have. These ways it might be are
the 'possible worlds' that the Kripke semantics
envisions. (02)
But in any case, I was referring to Tarskian
semantics for non-modal languages earlier in the
thread. Most ontology languages aren't modal. (03)
Pat (04)
>
>vQ
>
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