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Re: [ontolog-forum] {Disarmed} Re: OWL and lack of identifiers

To: Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Ontolog Forum <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: Waclaw Kusnierczyk <Waclaw.Marcin.Kusnierczyk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 30 Apr 2007 09:34:45 +0200
Message-id: <46359C15.7080004@xxxxxxxxxxx>

Pat Hayes wrote:
>> Pat Hayes wrote:
>>>>  Reality doesn't exist in the absence of perspective.  Reality is
>>>>  subjective, not objective.
>>>  Absolute nonsense. Reality existed for billions
>>>  of years before there was anything that could
>>>  form a subjective view of it. If, as seems quite
>>>  possible, this planet contains the only life
>>>  capable of having a subjective view, and our sun
>>>  goes nova and wipes us all out, the universe will
>>>  carry on being objectively real without noticing
>>>  our passing.
>>>>   When people speak, they speak the truth if
>>>>  they say what is real for them.
>>>  No. They speak the truth when what they say is in
>>>  fact the case, in the actual world.
>>>>  The *real* worlds are the worlds that
>>>>  are real *for persons*.
>>>  No, the real world is the one that persons
>>>  inhabit and are part of. There is only one of it.
>> haven't you just said that logical semantics is a theory of truth?  what
>> about the semantics of modal logics?  isn't it a theory of truth which
>> consists of multiple, concurrent so-called 'possible worlds'?
> Not necessarily concurrent. And as you say, 'so-called'. What these are 
> depends on the modality in question. Temporal logic for example has 
> 'possible worlds' being snapshots of a single temporal plenum, which IMO 
> is the single real world. Alethic modalities (necessary and possible) 
> are often described as being about entire possible worlds, but (as 
> Kripke, the inventor of these semantics, says) one can think of these 
> most usefully as being ways the actual world might be, rather than 
> fully-fledged alternative worlds. IN fact, Lewis' interpretation, which 
> gives all possible worlds the same status, is widely (and IMO correctly) 
> seen as an extreme and perhaps untenable position. The Kripke view, 
> expounded in his "naming and necessity", is that alethic talk is really 
> about lack of information. We don't know exactly how the world actually 
> is, and so there are many ways it might be consistent with the 
> information we have. These ways it might be are the 'possible worlds' 
> that the Kripke semantics envisions.    (01)

agree.  but, as you yourself say, there are those who disagree, and the 
best thing you can say is that IYO (note the 'O') they are incorrect.    (02)

> But in any case, I was referring to Tarskian semantics for non-modal 
> languages earlier in the thread. Most ontology languages aren't modal.    (03)

yes.  one problem that i can see with tarskian and the like semantics as 
a theory of truth is that it requires you to take a snapshot of the 
world, necessarily excluding its dynamics.    (04)

vQ    (05)

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