Kathryn Blackmond Laskey wrote:
>
> Waclaw seems to be articulating a many-worlds ontology. In a
> many-worlds ontology, there are multiple concurrent "possible
> worlds." For each of us, it seems as if there is one "actual world,"
> but it is because we cannot see the other "possible worlds". There
> are quantum physicists who subscribe to such an ontology. They don't
> think quantum events "actually happen." Rather, we experience the
> events that "seem to" happen in our local world, but all the possible
> events "actually happen" in some world.
> (01)
just to clarify: i did not say *that*. i guess the answer to my
question would be 'the semantics of modal logic as seen by a possibilist
is wrong', perhaps. i do not subscribe to the view attributed to me
above, and, personally, i prefer the realist ontology. but, sure
enough, this is just a matter of opinion. (02)
on the side, i think the discussion between pat and patric might be the
result of different interpretations of the term 'reality'. while pat
pretty clearly seems to mean *the real world*, patric may mean *a view
of the real world*. after all, we do use the term 'virtual reality',
which is suggestive of there being alternative realities created (in our
mind?) by whatever technology is used for that purpose. on the realist
view and the corresponding reading of 'reality', there can be no virtual
reality. (03)
vQ (04)
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