Hi JohnB, (01)
Like all your points below. (02)
Can your (or the LOA's) qua individuals 'belong' to different
non-qua-individuals over time?
I think this is needed to deal with corporations sole in particular, and
positions in general. (03)
Regards,
Chris (04)
>
> JS:
>
> > > and then the need to recognise it as an individual
> > > becomes acute.
> >
> > What need? Car drivers have important responsibilities
> > as well. But the *person* who has the driver's license
> > is the *person* who has that responsibility, not some
> > legal entity. If that *person* drives while intoxicated,
> > it is the *person* who is fined or thrown in jail. And
> > that *person* remains in jail despite losing the right
> > to be a car driver.
>
> There is certainly in some sense an individual
> involved. That is the qua-individual. This is something
> that must exist since it has its own identity criteria,
> can be counted, engages in distinctive activities,
> etc. etc. That it is also necessarily in all cases dependent
> on a further individual, the one who gets thrown in jail
> (thereby becoming a further individual, the jailee), should
> also not be a problem. I don't see the confusion that is
> meant to arise---only the confusion that does arise when
> the notion of individuals is restricted.
>
> > But that legal entity is not the
> > human being, and it does not perform the official duties
> > of the bishop. The real flesh-and-blood bishop does.
>
> Same thing. The points referred to in my previous
> post with reference to the qua-individuals were not
> addressed. It is not that the airlines may have
> different numbers for their flights, it is the
> fact that a single person may be a passenger more
> than once. There is then an individual:
>
> person-who-is-travelling-on-flight-of-airline-X
>
> this is generally filled in each case of its
> existence by a real person (probably, but
> as with the mules as employees example, this might
> not be necessary in all cases). Then I can motivate
> curious derived calculations like:
>
> Airline-X has flown x-quadrillion passenger-miles
> in 2007.
>
> The passengers in this calculations are not
> (simply) people, since frequent flyers will be being counted
> numerous times. They are ontologically dependent
> on people as above.
>
> Now, whatever is left, can be counted and can be
> subjected to all sorts of other constraints or
> processes. It is not the *role* that is counted,
> it is the particular fillers of the roles: that
> is the instances involved, or participating
> in, the role's being instantiated.
>
> Perhaps it does not make any difference what this
> is called, as long as we can agree that there are
> such things. Counting 'the times that the person
> X has been carrying role Y' seems about the same
> but a long circumlocution, not compatible with
> bringing language and logic together (an aim that
> I am not quite convinced is sensible or necessary,
> but that's a different thread).
>
> John B.
>
> P.S. Most of the above is what I took away from
> a Bottazzi/Ferrario/Guizzardi/Masolo/Vieu
> paper on roles and qua-individuals; don't
> know if it has appeared anywhere as yet.
> I recommend it as required reading for this
> thread.
>
> P.P.S. (wild speculation alert:) Even the following:
>
> > of them ever imply that any human being who plays
> > those roles bifurcates into multiple individuals,
> > no matter how many simultaneous roles there may be.
>
> may actually be more unclear than it might
> at first glance seem. If we
> observe neuroactivity and affordances while an
> 'individual' is carrying out different activities, I
> wonder if we will see quite the integration that our language
> usage imposes.... To the extent that the activities
> overlap, there may be interference effects, but if the
> activities (i.t.o. of neuroprocessing), don't interact,
> then there may be radical multitasking.... one individual
> or two? When the activities of two roles are significantly
> at odds with one another, so that the 'individual' fails
> to reconcile them and needs psychotherapy or
> something: one individual or two?
> Linguistically and sociologically, one; but
> that is what language always does---throw together
> different ontological levels as if they weren't
> separate at all. The *assumption* of a single
> individual simply gives one ontological stratum
> the upper hand and denies the others: and that is probably
> one of those ontological choices that is best
> left to practice and requirements rather than
> being legislated away.
>
>
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