uom-ontology-std
[Top] [All Lists]

Re: [uom-ontology-std] uom-ontology-std - strawman UML

To: "'uom-ontology-std'" <uom-ontology-std@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: Chris Partridge <partridgec@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Sat, 8 Aug 2009 14:22:41 +0100
Message-id: <003101ca182b$4fab7ee0$ef027ca0$@co.uk>
John,
> 
> Chris,
> 
> I agree with everything that Pat said in his last note,
> and he agreed with me.
> 
> In summary,
> 
>   1. The assumption of an extensional or intensional position
>      is independent of, but compatible with either a 3-D or
>      a 4-D ontology.    (01)

And, also as we have previously agreed, an extensionalist position is more
congenial to a 4D one, in other words, the choices are entangled.
And, extensional and intensional definitions are orthogonal to extensional
and intensional positions.    (02)

> 
>   2. The formulation of an extensional or intensional 3-D
>      position could be mapped to or from an extensional or
>      intensional 4-D position by the same methods used to map
>      any 3-D statement to or from 4-D.    (03)

Though (as I pointed out) no-one has quite managed to do it yet - despite
talking about it for years.    (04)

> 
>   3. The methods of measurement have improved enormously from
>      the 19th to the 21st centuries, and the units such as meter,
>      second, ampere, volt, etc., are specified with far greater
>      precision, but they are independent of any changes in the
>      physical theories.  (The kilogram, by the way, hasn't
>      changed in any way -- it's still defined by the same lump
>      of metal stored in a vault in Paris.)    (05)

I am afraid I do not see the relevance of this to any part of our previous
discussion. However, I see nothing I disagree with.    (06)

> 
>   4. An ontology for UoM does not depend in any way on the
>      assumptions of extensional vs. intensional, 3-D vs. 4-D,    (07)

I really cannot see how you can arrive at this conclusion, especially given
the simple example provided by me in the mail to Ingvar.
I also find this at odds with some of your (much) earlier comments. I recall
you sending to the list a comment by Peirce on how metaphysics helps one to
see ones assumptions - and that if you ignore it you are unaware of the
assumptions you make. I cannot see why the comment does not apply here.    (08)

BTW, as I said in an earlier email to Pat, this is not my personal
experience. When Matthew, David and I have worked on UoM's over the last
decade, we have come across ways in which these choices affect the ontology.
However, Matthew and David have done much more work than me in this area,
and so can provide better examples (indeed, I believe some of the examples
David has already submitted are motivated by this insight).    (09)

BTW, just to be clear, I am not trying to persuade anyone to adopt a
particular position, merely to point out that one is making the choices and
it would seem sensible to be aware of it, so one can assess whether that is
what one wants to do.    (010)

>      or Newtonian vs. relativistic vs. quantum mechanical vs.
>      quantum electrodynamical vs. string theory or many other
>      hypotheses, assumptions, and theories.    (011)

I suspect this is false. There are examples in the history of science where
measures are affected by advances. Kuhn has a nice example of how the
Aristotelian notion of weight helped to support the chemist's notion of
calorific in the late 18th century - until weight changed from being an
accidental to an essential property of matter. However, given that we are
starting with current theories, I do not see its relevance here. I also do
not see what this has to do with what we have been discussing.    (012)

> 
>   5. Therefore, a microtheory about units of measure can and
>      should be stated in a way that it can be used with any
>      consistent set of assumptions in point #4 plus many
>      others that may be proposed in the future.
> 
> Comment about point #3:  The reason why the units of measure
> are independent of any theory is that they are defined in terms
> of repeatable physical experiments.  The theories that interpret
> the results of those experiments have changed drastically over
> the past 150 years, but every new theory must be consistent
> with the brute facts observed in any repeatable experiment.    (013)

"Brute facts"? So, for example, Popper's notion that observation is theory
laden does not apply (or Quine's (who I know you do not like) web of
belief?). 
As I said earlier, the history of science has provided us with examples of
changes. But, I'd rather not discuss this, as I do not have the time - I
also do not see its relevance as there is unlikely to be major change in
theory while the UoM ontology is being devised.    (014)

> 
> John    (015)


_________________________________________________________________
Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/uom-ontology-std/  
Subscribe: mailto:uom-ontology-std-join@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Config/Unsubscribe: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/uom-ontology-std/  
Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/work/UoM/  
Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?UoM_Ontology_Standard    (016)

<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>