Pat,
> On Aug 7, 2009, at 5:33 PM, Chris Partridge wrote:
>
> > Pat,
> >
> > I am not sure this is going anywhere, but ...
> >
> >>>>>> The assumption of property instances is orthogonal to the
> >>>>>> assumption of a 4-D ontology.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> How do you arrive at this conclusion? It does not seem obvious to
> >>>>> me.
> >>>>
> >>>> Seems obvious to me. How do you see them as being related?
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> Isn't there some logical mistake here?
> >>> JS> Conclusion X
> >>> CP> Not obvious how you arrived at conclusion X
> >>> PH> X is obvious, how do you prove not X?
> >>>
> >>> In other words, I do not see where I make any claims about X or not
> >> X.
> >>
> >> I completely fail to follow your point. I did not even mention
> proof.
> >> You doubted John's claim of orthogonality, which implies that you
> >> perceive a relationship of some kind. I asked you to say what you
> >> thought it was.
> >
> > As I read it, I said I did not see a way (certainly not an obvious
> > way) of
> > John supporting his claim. I certainly did not say that I perceived a
> > relationship (if I did please indicate it, I did not intend to) - I
> > am not
> > sure how you arrived at the conclusion.
>
> Apparently we are not speaking the same language. John said A and B
> are orthogonal, which I take to mean, have nothing to do with one
> another. On the face of it, since the two topics are clearly
> different, this hardly seems to be a claim that needs to be justified.
> You questioned this assertion, which seems to imply that your view is
> that they do have something to do with one another. I agree with John,
> so am puzzled by what you (seem to) say, and ask you to say how you
> see them as being related. Since you apparently do, and since they
> seem on the surface to not be, surely the burden of explanation lies
> with you.
>
> But, for the record, I reach the conclusion from the observation that
> anything that can be said in a 4D ontological framework can be
> transcribed into a 3D framework based on the continuant/occurrent
> distinction, and vice versa. The differences between them, I have
> concluded, are really nothing more than a matter of notational choice.
> Philosophical positions such as extensionalism (or not) are therefore
> orthogonal to the 4D/3D distinction.
> (01)
The reason I asked is that I have worked with Matthew (and David Leal) on
and off over the last decade on a general framework for UoMs - sometimes as
part of Matthew's ISO 19526 exercise (Matthew and David have been working on
the UoM issue far more consistently and for much longer). What we found is
that the choice of 3D/4D and extensionalism had a big effect on how we
crafted our ontology, including property instances. I think this is why
Matthew made his comment. For a simple example, see my earlier response to
Ingvar, who nicely provided us with an example. (02)
I am not aware of any definitive proof that property instances, 3D/4D and
extensionalism are either independent or dependent. It does seem as though
4d + extensionalism (for which Matthew sometimes uses the shorthand '4d')
does have implications for property instances. However, these things are so
entangled that there is always wriggle room. I interpreted your and John's
comment that you had some way of showing that they were independent
simpliciter. So, to be clear I have no way of showing these are orthogonal
or not and would be interested in any such proof as my experience is that
these matters are entangled - so some such proof would be useful. (03)
I am not sure how to interpret your comments - you say that "The differences
between them, I have concluded, are really nothing more than a matter of
notational choice." In these terms, the issue becomes whether the notation
choice of 3d/4d, extensionalism/intensionalism and property instances are
independent. I still see no answer. (04)
> > However, you have said that this is obvious, so I presume you have a
> > way of
> > showing it.
> > If you (or John) can explain, I'd be interested.
> >
> >>
> >>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> In other discussions, you have consistently argued for an
> >>>>>> ontology
> >>>>>> that is strictly extensional. That is also an assumption that
> is
> >>>>>> orthogonal to the 3-D vs. 4-D viewpoint.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Are you sure orthogonal is the right word here?
> >>>>> As far as I can tell (and others say the same) the views are
> >>>>> interestingly
> >>>>> intertwined. So, for example, it is rather difficult to be an
> >>>>> extensionalist
> >>>>> and not be 4D. Orthogonal seems to imply that there is no kind of
> >>>>> dependence
> >>>>> between the two.
> >>>>
> >>>> Indeed; and there is not. Of course it is possible to be a 3-d
> >>>> extensionalist. You believe in continuants, and you say that two
> >>>> continuants which share the same 3-d extension at every point of
> >>>> their
> >>>> common life, are identical.
> >>>
> >>> Not quite the traditional definition of extensionalism. But
> >>> illustrates my
> >>> point that it is difficult - but not impossible.
> >>
> >> There is nothing difficult about this, surely. It is easy to be an
> >> extensionalist and not be 4D, is the point. The relevant form of
> >> extensionalism has to be stated in 3D terms, of course.
> >
> > The difficulty is that of sticking to the traditional way of framing
> > extensional identity where a single extension is used.
>
> But that is applied in a strictly presentist framework, where the
> universe is conceptualized in three dimensions at a moment in time.
> Obviously this must be adapted when we consider temporally extended
> universes. (05)
I do not understand your comment. As has been pointed out a number of times,
3d/4d is shorthand for positions on the reality of change.
I am not sure presentists see any problem in including change over time - in
fact, I would think they would claim presentism is precisely the best way of
dealing with it. I bet they would think it odd to temporally extent their
strict framework. (06)
>
> > You have proposed a
> > non-standard framing where a number (a set?) of extensions are used
> > - so
> > this may be called set-extensionalism, where an object is identified
> > with a
> > set of extensions.
>
> I would prefer to say that it is applied at each moment of time, and
> not speak of sets. (07)
But is applied a number of times, and to check identity you need the set of
such applications. (08)
>
> > If one wanted to be picky one could say you were using
> > extensionalism but not providing an extensionalist criteria. In my
> > view,
> > this is a pseudo-extensional criteria.
>
> Not in mine. But in any case, regardless of its traditionalist merits
> or demerits, it is not *difficult*. (09)
We are plainly not going to agree. (010)
>
> >
> >>
> >>>
> >>> To be a 4-d nonextensionalist is also
> >>>> easy, I am one myself. I believe there is a clear distinction
> >> between
> >>>> a plastic molded object, such as the 5-cent buddha on my desk, and
> >>>> the
> >>>> plastic from which it is composed, even though they share exactly
> >> the
> >>>> same 4-D extent (the plastic having itself formed by catalysis
> >> during
> >>>> the molding process).
> >>>
> >>> Ok, but do you have any criteria for identity or difference to back
> >>> up your
> >>> belief they are different.
> >>
> >> I do not need to provide any such criteria. All Im setting out to do
> >> here is to claim that the position is coherent, not wanting to argue
> >> for it or against it.
> >
> > I am in the same position - I would like to have a coherent view -
> > then one
> > can consider whether to argue for or against.
> > However, I think your claim to being coherent (if you are using in
> the
> > Wordnet sense of 'marked by an orderly, logical, and aesthetically
> > consistent relation of parts') is far too strong. The problem is
> > that you
> > give no basis for deciding how many things share the 4-D extent -
> > and how to
> > we decide this.
>
> Seems to me that this is a question that would only occupy the mind of
> an extensionalist. Why the obsession with 4-D extents? There may be
> many criteria of identity, surely, not just the spatiotemporal extent
> of something. (011)
The reality is the other way around. Intensionalists write volumes about
their search for criteria of identity (see Eli Hirst or David Wiggins'
books) and offer a variety and analyse how they are unsatisfactory. For an
extensionalist the matter is solved. What is odd (for me) about your
position is that you do not seem to see any need to a criteria of identity,
while arbitrary applying your own intuitive judgements on this. Hence my
comments. (012)
My use of 4d examples here is because you provided them as examples of your
4d intensional position - so I tried to find in that context examples of the
issue. (013)
>
> > So, for example, if we assume this Buddha weighs 100g, is
> > there also a 100g 4-d object as well, and a 100g weight of Buddha,
> > and a
> > 100g weight of plastic, and so on. Without that what one has is a
> > bit of a
> > mess.
>
> One has a more complex picture of the world, but I see no reason to
> justify the term 'mess'.
>
> >
> > This is a serious practical problem for semantic interoperability in
> > systems. To continue with the same example, if one system thinks
> > there are
> > two of more 100g weights there (and possibly more) and another
> > thinks there
> > is only ever one - they need to know they hold different views to be
> > able to
> > inter-operate.
>
> Indeed. DIfferent conceptualizations need to be aligned carefully for
> just this kind of reason.
>
> Look, for practical ontology engineering purposes, I agree that the 4D
> view is preferable to the continuant/occurrent picture used in DOLCE,
> in part for these reasons. But this is not to say that the DOLCE view
> is *incoherent*. It is not. For some purposes, it is more intuitive,
> in fact.
>
> > Or things would be even worse, if each system can arbitrarily
> > decide how many things of what type there are.
> >
> > My guess is that the UoM work will need to arrive at, at a minimum,
> > some
> > local framework for this - if it is to make sense.
>
> I disagree. I don't think that UoM needs to get into these issues at
> all. (014)
Well, let us see. For me the issue is whether people working on the UoM
recognise they are getting into these issues, when they do. (015)
>
> Pat
>
>
> >
> >>
> >> But as this discussion is completely irrelevant to the purposes of
> >> this thread, let us drop the matter.
> >>
> >> Pat
> >
> > Chris
> >
> >
> >
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>
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> (016)
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