John, (01)
We seem to be going around in circles, maybe it is time to call a halt. (02)
>
> Chris,
>
> I never said that a purely extensional position was "congenial" --
> on the contrary, I believe it's untenable for a general ontology.
> (03)
I think you may have mis-read what I said - "an extensionalist position is
more congenial to a 4D one"
In other words, "Someone who holds 4D position will find an extensionalist
position more congenial".
This is a point often made in the literature, and one that seems sensible to
me. (04)
> > And, also as we have previously agreed, an extensionalist position
> > is more congenial to a 4D one, in other words, the choices are
> > entangled.
>
> I forget the exact words I used, but I meant "easier to state".
> So the issue is just a matter of convenience for the person who
> is writing definitions. That's not fundamental.
> (05)
Let's agree to disagree on 'fundamental'. (06)
> However, things like contracts, money, and anything dependent on
> contracts and money (such as the difference between a business and
> a nonprofit organization) cannot be defined in extensional terms. (07)
I thought we had dealt with this.
By "extensional terms" do you mean (a) by extensional definitions or (b) by
an extensional criteria of identity.
There seems to be confusion about these terms, so can we agree to try and be
clear which we are using? (08)
WRT (a) whether something is an intentionally constructed object makes no
difference to whether it can have an extensional definitions. The issue is
(as, for example the wiki entry I linked to in the original email says) that
these definitions are "only possible for finite sets and only practical for
relatively small sets." It also provides an examples of an intentionally
constructed objects with both types of definition - "So, for example, an
intensional definition of 'Prime Minister' might be the most senior minister
of a cabinet in the executive branch of government in a parliamentary
system. An extensional definition would be a list of all past, present and
future prime ministers." (09)
WRT (b) I and lots of others have been happily working on ontologies of
contracts, money, etc. for decades using an extensional criteria of identity
without any problems. Lewis, Heller, Sider and other philosophers working in
this area (also for decades) have not had any problems with these kinds of
entities. One would have expected someone to notice by now. So this claim
seem odd. You earlier made an argument that said as money, etc. were
extrinsic properties they were intensional - which I pointed out is
incorrect. So it is unclear to me what your argument here is. (010)
> In general, anything that involves society, organizations, people,
> animals, and their intentions cannot be defined in extensional terms.
>
> JFS>> The formulation of an extensional or intensional 3-D position
> >> could be mapped to or from an extensional or intensional 4-D
> >> position by the same methods used to map any 3-D statement to
> >> or from 4-D.
>
> CP> Though (as I pointed out) no-one has quite managed to do it yet
> > - despite talking about it for years.
>
> Physicists have been doing such transformations for the past century.
> Just look at the light cone, which maps the 4-D view to or from a
> view that can be expressed in terms of English tenses. (011)
And these physicists have "formulated an extensional or intensional 3-D
position and mapped it to and from an extensional or intensional 4-D
Position"? And if it was so easy and presumably reproducible, why has no-one
formally mapped a 4d to or from a 3d ontology? (012)
Just to be clear, my point is not that this is impossible for formal
ontologies, but that given no-one has done it, it probably is not easy. (013)
>
> JFS>> An ontology for UoM does not depend in any way on the
> >> of assumptions of extensional vs. intensional, 3-D vs. 4-D,
>
> CP> I really cannot see how you can arrive at this conclusion,
> > especially given the simple example provided by me in the
> > mail to Ingvar.
>
> I don't have the example in front of me now, and I deleted it
> because it didn't seem to be relevant. But if you send another
> copy, I'd be happy to analyze it and show exactly why it's
> irrelevant. (014)
Copy below. (015)
"Ingvar, (016)
Take two spatiotemporal points in a four-dimensional
> manifold,
> ascribe to both exactly the same mass density, then you have (on my
> view)
> two 4D-points, one property, and two property insstances. (017)
For some 4D extensionalists, you only have two 4D-points (also called
property instances) and one property.
So we have two different (mainstream) views to reconcile. (018)
>
> Ingvar J" (019)
>
> CP> When Matthew, David and I have worked on UoM's over the last
> > decade, we have come across ways in which these choices affect
> > the ontology.
>
> Please send the examples, and I'd be happy to show how to
> revise the ontology to eliminate any dependency.
>
> CP> There are examples in the history of science where measures
> > are affected by advances. Kuhn has a nice example of how the
> > Aristotelian notion of weight helped to support the chemist's
> > notion of calorific in the late 18th century - until weight
> > changed from being an accidental to an essential property
> > of matter.
>
> That was a change in their theory of matter. In any case,
> weight is still an accidental property. Mass is essential.
> In any case, that observation did not change their units of
> measure. (And by the way, note that the kilogram is the only
> unit of measure whose definition has not been replaced by
> anything more fundamental than the same lump of metal they
> used for the past few centuries.)
>
> CP> "Brute facts"? So, for example, Popper's notion that observation
> > is theory laden does not apply (or Quine's (who I know you do not
> > like) web of belief?).
>
> I certainly recognize the influence of theory on terminology and
> on many kinds of facts. But the most common units of measure were
> chosen at very early dates, and they survived many redefinitions
> stated in a wide range of theoretical formulations. Furthermore,
> the definitions of the measuring procedures can be stated in terms
> that do not use the theoretical terms.
>
> Re Quine: I never said I didn't like Quine. I heard him speak,
> but I didn't know him personally. I've read almost all of his
> writings, but he had a very narrow point of view. He ignored
> anything outside that narrow perspective.
>
> John
>
>
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