On Aug 7, 2009, at 5:33 PM, Chris Partridge wrote: (01)
> Pat,
>
> I am not sure this is going anywhere, but ...
>
>>> Pat,
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The assumption of property instances is orthogonal to the
>>>>>> assumption of a 4-D ontology.
>>>>>
>>>>> How do you arrive at this conclusion? It does not seem obvious to
>>>>> me.
>>>>
>>>> Seems obvious to me. How do you see them as being related?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Isn't there some logical mistake here?
>>> JS> Conclusion X
>>> CP> Not obvious how you arrived at conclusion X
>>> PH> X is obvious, how do you prove not X?
>>>
>>> In other words, I do not see where I make any claims about X or not
>> X.
>>
>> I completely fail to follow your point. I did not even mention proof.
>> You doubted John's claim of orthogonality, which implies that you
>> perceive a relationship of some kind. I asked you to say what you
>> thought it was.
>
> As I read it, I said I did not see a way (certainly not an obvious
> way) of
> John supporting his claim. I certainly did not say that I perceived a
> relationship (if I did please indicate it, I did not intend to) - I
> am not
> sure how you arrived at the conclusion. (02)
Apparently we are not speaking the same language. John said A and B
are orthogonal, which I take to mean, have nothing to do with one
another. On the face of it, since the two topics are clearly
different, this hardly seems to be a claim that needs to be justified.
You questioned this assertion, which seems to imply that your view is
that they do have something to do with one another. I agree with John,
so am puzzled by what you (seem to) say, and ask you to say how you
see them as being related. Since you apparently do, and since they
seem on the surface to not be, surely the burden of explanation lies
with you. (03)
But, for the record, I reach the conclusion from the observation that
anything that can be said in a 4D ontological framework can be
transcribed into a 3D framework based on the continuant/occurrent
distinction, and vice versa. The differences between them, I have
concluded, are really nothing more than a matter of notational choice.
Philosophical positions such as extensionalism (or not) are therefore
orthogonal to the 4D/3D distinction. (04)
> However, you have said that this is obvious, so I presume you have a
> way of
> showing it.
> If you (or John) can explain, I'd be interested.
>
>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> In other discussions, you have consistently argued for an
>>>>>> ontology
>>>>>> that is strictly extensional. That is also an assumption that is
>>>>>> orthogonal to the 3-D vs. 4-D viewpoint.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Are you sure orthogonal is the right word here?
>>>>> As far as I can tell (and others say the same) the views are
>>>>> interestingly
>>>>> intertwined. So, for example, it is rather difficult to be an
>>>>> extensionalist
>>>>> and not be 4D. Orthogonal seems to imply that there is no kind of
>>>>> dependence
>>>>> between the two.
>>>>
>>>> Indeed; and there is not. Of course it is possible to be a 3-d
>>>> extensionalist. You believe in continuants, and you say that two
>>>> continuants which share the same 3-d extension at every point of
>>>> their
>>>> common life, are identical.
>>>
>>> Not quite the traditional definition of extensionalism. But
>>> illustrates my
>>> point that it is difficult - but not impossible.
>>
>> There is nothing difficult about this, surely. It is easy to be an
>> extensionalist and not be 4D, is the point. The relevant form of
>> extensionalism has to be stated in 3D terms, of course.
>
> The difficulty is that of sticking to the traditional way of framing
> extensional identity where a single extension is used. (05)
But that is applied in a strictly presentist framework, where the
universe is conceptualized in three dimensions at a moment in time.
Obviously this must be adapted when we consider temporally extended
universes. (06)
> You have proposed a
> non-standard framing where a number (a set?) of extensions are used
> - so
> this may be called set-extensionalism, where an object is identified
> with a
> set of extensions. (07)
I would prefer to say that it is applied at each moment of time, and
not speak of sets. (08)
> If one wanted to be picky one could say you were using
> extensionalism but not providing an extensionalist criteria. In my
> view,
> this is a pseudo-extensional criteria. (09)
Not in mine. But in any case, regardless of its traditionalist merits
or demerits, it is not *difficult*. (010)
>
>>
>>>
>>> To be a 4-d nonextensionalist is also
>>>> easy, I am one myself. I believe there is a clear distinction
>> between
>>>> a plastic molded object, such as the 5-cent buddha on my desk, and
>>>> the
>>>> plastic from which it is composed, even though they share exactly
>> the
>>>> same 4-D extent (the plastic having itself formed by catalysis
>> during
>>>> the molding process).
>>>
>>> Ok, but do you have any criteria for identity or difference to back
>>> up your
>>> belief they are different.
>>
>> I do not need to provide any such criteria. All Im setting out to do
>> here is to claim that the position is coherent, not wanting to argue
>> for it or against it.
>
> I am in the same position - I would like to have a coherent view -
> then one
> can consider whether to argue for or against.
> However, I think your claim to being coherent (if you are using in the
> Wordnet sense of 'marked by an orderly, logical, and aesthetically
> consistent relation of parts') is far too strong. The problem is
> that you
> give no basis for deciding how many things share the 4-D extent -
> and how to
> we decide this. (011)
Seems to me that this is a question that would only occupy the mind of
an extensionalist. Why the obsession with 4-D extents? There may be
many criteria of identity, surely, not just the spatiotemporal extent
of something. (012)
> So, for example, if we assume this Buddha weighs 100g, is
> there also a 100g 4-d object as well, and a 100g weight of Buddha,
> and a
> 100g weight of plastic, and so on. Without that what one has is a
> bit of a
> mess. (013)
One has a more complex picture of the world, but I see no reason to
justify the term 'mess'. (014)
>
> This is a serious practical problem for semantic interoperability in
> systems. To continue with the same example, if one system thinks
> there are
> two of more 100g weights there (and possibly more) and another
> thinks there
> is only ever one - they need to know they hold different views to be
> able to
> inter-operate. (015)
Indeed. DIfferent conceptualizations need to be aligned carefully for
just this kind of reason. (016)
Look, for practical ontology engineering purposes, I agree that the 4D
view is preferable to the continuant/occurrent picture used in DOLCE,
in part for these reasons. But this is not to say that the DOLCE view
is *incoherent*. It is not. For some purposes, it is more intuitive,
in fact. (017)
> Or things would be even worse, if each system can arbitrarily
> decide how many things of what type there are.
>
> My guess is that the UoM work will need to arrive at, at a minimum,
> some
> local framework for this - if it is to make sense. (018)
I disagree. I don't think that UoM needs to get into these issues at
all. (019)
Pat (020)
>
>>
>> But as this discussion is completely irrelevant to the purposes of
>> this thread, let us drop the matter.
>>
>> Pat
>
> Chris
>
>
>
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> (021)
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