Pat, (01)
I am not sure this is going anywhere, but ... (02)
> > Pat,
> >
> >>>>
> >>>> The assumption of property instances is orthogonal to the
> >>>> assumption of a 4-D ontology.
> >>>
> >>> How do you arrive at this conclusion? It does not seem obvious to
> >>> me.
> >>
> >> Seems obvious to me. How do you see them as being related?
> >>
> >
> > Isn't there some logical mistake here?
> > JS> Conclusion X
> > CP> Not obvious how you arrived at conclusion X
> > PH> X is obvious, how do you prove not X?
> >
> > In other words, I do not see where I make any claims about X or not
> X.
>
> I completely fail to follow your point. I did not even mention proof.
> You doubted John's claim of orthogonality, which implies that you
> perceive a relationship of some kind. I asked you to say what you
> thought it was. (03)
As I read it, I said I did not see a way (certainly not an obvious way) of
John supporting his claim. I certainly did not say that I perceived a
relationship (if I did please indicate it, I did not intend to) - I am not
sure how you arrived at the conclusion.
However, you have said that this is obvious, so I presume you have a way of
showing it.
If you (or John) can explain, I'd be interested. (04)
>
> >
> >>>
> >>>> In other discussions, you have consistently argued for an ontology
> >>>> that is strictly extensional. That is also an assumption that is
> >>>> orthogonal to the 3-D vs. 4-D viewpoint.
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> Are you sure orthogonal is the right word here?
> >>> As far as I can tell (and others say the same) the views are
> >>> interestingly
> >>> intertwined. So, for example, it is rather difficult to be an
> >>> extensionalist
> >>> and not be 4D. Orthogonal seems to imply that there is no kind of
> >>> dependence
> >>> between the two.
> >>
> >> Indeed; and there is not. Of course it is possible to be a 3-d
> >> extensionalist. You believe in continuants, and you say that two
> >> continuants which share the same 3-d extension at every point of
> >> their
> >> common life, are identical.
> >
> > Not quite the traditional definition of extensionalism. But
> > illustrates my
> > point that it is difficult - but not impossible.
>
> There is nothing difficult about this, surely. It is easy to be an
> extensionalist and not be 4D, is the point. The relevant form of
> extensionalism has to be stated in 3D terms, of course. (05)
The difficulty is that of sticking to the traditional way of framing
extensional identity where a single extension is used. You have proposed a
non-standard framing where a number (a set?) of extensions are used - so
this may be called set-extensionalism, where an object is identified with a
set of extensions. If one wanted to be picky one could say you were using
extensionalism but not providing an extensionalist criteria. In my view,
this is a pseudo-extensional criteria. (06)
>
> >
> > To be a 4-d nonextensionalist is also
> >> easy, I am one myself. I believe there is a clear distinction
> between
> >> a plastic molded object, such as the 5-cent buddha on my desk, and
> >> the
> >> plastic from which it is composed, even though they share exactly
> the
> >> same 4-D extent (the plastic having itself formed by catalysis
> during
> >> the molding process).
> >
> > Ok, but do you have any criteria for identity or difference to back
> > up your
> > belief they are different.
>
> I do not need to provide any such criteria. All Im setting out to do
> here is to claim that the position is coherent, not wanting to argue
> for it or against it. (07)
I am in the same position - I would like to have a coherent view - then one
can consider whether to argue for or against.
However, I think your claim to being coherent (if you are using in the
Wordnet sense of 'marked by an orderly, logical, and aesthetically
consistent relation of parts') is far too strong. The problem is that you
give no basis for deciding how many things share the 4-D extent - and how to
we decide this. So, for example, if we assume this Buddha weighs 100g, is
there also a 100g 4-d object as well, and a 100g weight of Buddha, and a
100g weight of plastic, and so on. Without that what one has is a bit of a
mess. (08)
This is a serious practical problem for semantic interoperability in
systems. To continue with the same example, if one system thinks there are
two of more 100g weights there (and possibly more) and another thinks there
is only ever one - they need to know they hold different views to be able to
inter-operate. Or things would be even worse, if each system can arbitrarily
decide how many things of what type there are. (09)
My guess is that the UoM work will need to arrive at, at a minimum, some
local framework for this - if it is to make sense. (010)
>
> But as this discussion is completely irrelevant to the purposes of
> this thread, let us drop the matter.
>
> Pat (011)
Chris (012)
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