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[ontology-summit] Are there primitive concepts? (Was ontology driven int

To: ontology-summit@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
From: John F Sowa <sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Sun, 09 Feb 2014 21:44:58 -0500
Message-id: <52F83D2A.5010602@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Pat,    (01)

I changed the name of this thread to emphasize the critical issues:    (02)

PC
> I think you missed the important qualification - "all of the domain
> concepts *in the communicating ontologies*".  For any *given set*
> of ontologies there will indeed be some foundation ontology that
> includes all of the primitive elements that can specify all of
> the concepts in those ontologies.    (03)

That can only be true if there is a bottom (foundation) where
the analysis of meaning ends.    (04)

For example, let's consider physics.  If you can't find a bottom
for a subject as precise as the hardest of the "hard" sciences,
the claim that you can find a bottom for anything else is hopeless.    (05)

But look at Newtonian mechanics.  Physicists still use the same
words:  mass, energy, force, momentum...  For many applications,
engineers choose Newton's definitions, even though they know that
physicists have radically different and more precise definitions.    (06)

PC
> I have always warmly welcomed suggestions for primitive concepts
> that appear necessary and are not already in COSMO.    (07)

I have always considered that the work you have done in designing
the COSMO ontology is good.  My primary criticism is that the terms
you have chosen *are not* and *cannot be* primitive.    (08)

PC
> there will always be some ambiguity in the meanings, but there has
> always been even more ambiguity in human use of language.    (09)

No.  Ambiguity is *not* inherent in human language.  It is the result
of the subject matter.  When chess players talk about a chess position,
their natural language about the placement of the pieces is just as
precise as any artificial notation.  But when they talk about the
"brilliance" of a combination, no version of language or logic can
be precise.    (010)

PC
> We can aim for intercomputer communication that is more accurate
> than interhuman communication, but it will still not be perfect,
> just good enough for our practical purposes.    (011)

No.  Human languages are the *best choice* for practical purposes.
For special purposes, you can take a subset of some NL, edict narrow
definitions, and assign special symbols:  'NaCl' = 'sodium chloride'.
But you get exactly the same precision when you use the same
definitions in English or in chemical symbols.    (012)

Furthermore, engineers use different definitions of the same words
for different aspects of the same project -- e.g., chemical reactions
inside an engine (described in quantum mechanics) and mechanical
motions of the pistons (described in Newtonian mechanics).    (013)

Precise definitions are brittle -- like a stone building that collapses
in an earthquake.  Ambiguity promotes flexibility -- like a wooden
building that creaks and groans, but remains standing.    (014)

For special purposes, brittleness may be a requirement.  But in
general, ambiguity *facilitates* communication.  Without tolerance
for the inevitable variations (i.e., ambiguity), communication
among independently developed systems would be impossible.    (015)

John    (016)

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