John,
I think my third point about ontological engineers
points to your third point (C):
Mine: "For ontological engineers, of course, it could be
moot [interjection: i.e., the A and B sides], since we
have application fish to fry. But to be better
ontological engineers, I think it is not moot.
Especially if the best engineering ontologies
approximate (or intend to) the best scientific
theories."
However, I think the real fight is between A and B in
your trichotomy. The A-direct folks are generally
ontologists/metaphysicians/some semanticists, The
B-direct folks are generally logicians/some
semanticists. B folks describe/represent what the
A-folks say.
Without B, A folks wander in an ambiguous morass,
talking past each other for generations, e.g., as we do
here. Without A, B folks generate better ways to says
things unambiguously and more expressively without
(worrying about) grounding in reality.
By the way, this is why I've always objected to the
definition of: ontology df= a logical theory. Why?
Because it takes no consideration of reality (or
approaches to reality). Anything can be a logical
theory. In a separate discussion, this is why I object
to particular neo-scholastic Chomskyan mainstream
linguistic theories, beyond considerations of
imprimatur: they are not sufficiently grounded. Sorry:
my intent is not to open up the ontology definition wars
once again! I'd like to keep it focused on A and B.
This is why I don't post here often (beyond vast lack of
time): I don't want to muddy the already muddy waters,
but every step in does that, alas.
Thanks,
Leo
>-----Original Message-----
>From:
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[
mailto:ontolog-forum-
>
bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of John F Sowa
>Sent: Friday, April 03, 2015 4:24 PM
>To:
ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and
Perdurantism - Re: Some
>Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
>
>On 4/3/2015 3:19 PM, Obrst, Leo J. wrote:
>> This is a point of disagreement, I think,
between logicians and
>> ontologists (qua metaphysicians). The former
think that expressing
>> / representing something is equivalent to it
being so, and that
>> the "being so" doesn't matter that much. The
latter think not.
>
>But there are three things to distinguish, not just
two. Following
>is an excerpt from a previous note I wrote on this
thread:
>
>> We have to distinguish
>>
>> A) The way the world (or universe) actually
happens to be
>> -- about which all of us have some shared
opinions and
>> scientists have more detailed analyses and
theories.
>>
>> B) The way people talk in everyday language
or in any
>> artificial notation, such as formal logic.
>>
>> C) An ontology about the world that happens
to be useful
>> for some particular task or group of
related tasks.
>
>Category B includes any kind of language or logic.
Category C
>includes any theory about the world by ontologists,
by scientists,
>or by engineers who apply ontology or science to a
particular task.
>
>But we have to recognize that the world A is not
identical to
>the way B we talk about it or the way C that some
scientists,
>engineers, or ontologists characterize it.
>
>Every mapping to the world A from any language B or
any theory C
>is an *approximation* whose usefulness depends on
the application.
>When the application changes, we may need to use a
different
>approximation -- i.e., different theory of ontology
or science.
>
>John
>