On Mar 31, 2015, at 4:10 PM, <rrovetto@xxxxxxxxxxx> <rrovetto@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote: (01)
> Notice that the glacier example seems to be extendable to all entities
>ontologically classified as continuant/endurants (objects, physical objects,
>etc.), a central point being that there is always some change, some processual
>aspect to all (?) existents. (02)
Actually the only possible counterexamples I have seen would be quarks and
leptons, so at normal energy levels, only electrons and neutrinos. Neutrons
decay, and protons are a buzzing confusion of quarks and gluons. (03)
Pat (04)
> These entities--from glaciers to the coffee mug--however, exhibit a stability
>(structural, compositional, material, persistence, etc.) that, in part,
>presumably is what makes them easily classifiable as objects.
>
> Robert Rovetto
>
> On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 4:58 PM, William Frank <williamf.frank@xxxxxxxxx>
>wrote:
> Thanks, Pat,
>
> This an your post just before this one answer the question I had, and in the
>way I hoped it would be answered.
>
> I think that a glacier is a great example, John. Everybody sticks with the
>falling of a drop of water, rainstorms and wateralls, but starting with
>waterfalls, we can move to glaciers, and from there to oceans, and finally we
>could go to stars and galaxies!
>
> Wm
>
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 2:52 PM, Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> Let me try to sum up the point I was trying to make.
>
> The distinctions between continuant and occurrent, or object and process and
>event, or between 3+1-d versus 4-d, are not ontological distinctions between
>kinds of entity in the world. They are distinctions between different ways of
>talking about the world. It is the same world in all these cases, with the
>same things in it, however they are described.
>
> In traditional logical syntax these ways of talking are mutually
>incommensurable, so there is a pressing practical need to keep the universe of
>discourse sorted into categories. But this is merely an accident of some
>traditional notational restrictions. They are eliminated in ISO Common Logic
>(and, by the way, in RDF) so now we can all stop arguing about the true nature
>of such things as flows in pipes, glaciers and ripening bananas, and leave
>such interminable debate to philosophers while we get on with ontology
>engineering. It has no more relevance to us than philosophical debates about,
>say, the difference between reduction and supervenience.
>
> Pat
>
> On Mar 31, 2015, at 10:23 AM, Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> >
> > On Mar 31, 2015, at 9:27 AM, William Frank <williamf.frank@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> >> Mathew,
> >>
> >> I would be very interested to know how you eliminate the boundaries
>between these categories. I think they must be eliminable, not to say,
>though, that things can't be categorized in one of these ways, depending on
>what aspect of a situation we want to look at.
> >>
> >> To me, philosophers and too many engineers seem moved to consider whether
>there 'really are' processes, objects, and events, and whether they are
>'really' different. I note in particular as a description of a paper
> >>
> >> "argues that processes are like objects, and distinct from events. "
> >>
> >> What is clear is that these are distinctions that **we are able to make**,
>as many do. We can give examples, even though the lines between things we
>might choose to classify one way or the other, as with most things, is fuzzy.
> >>
> >> The question for the engineer is, is it **useful* to make these
>distinctions?
> >>
> >> If one makes it critical to success to have 'correctly' classified
>everything, into its one true category, and uses a language and a logic that
>makes us have to repeat information in each category, then the answer is that
>however useful it **might be** to make the distinctions, we are doing it in a
>manner that is awkward.
> >>
> >> On the other hand, if we treat what we are doing when we classify things
>as *casting* them, rather than saying what they 'really are', and have a
>method by which things in one category can be *recast* in another, and
>information not repeated, then, what practical person, working say in business
>process design, would object <330.gif> being able reference events,
>processes, and objects. And, anything we would want to talk about, don't
>there need to be types for all those things, as well as individuals?
> >>
> >> So, if we can categorize things, we can recategorize them, as need be.
>Is there a reference in this thread as to how to do that that I missed, that
>is not alot of math about time series, or is that it?
> >
> > That is exactly what I was trying to explain at the start of this thread.
>Yes, there is such a way, if we can use the syntactic freedom available in ISO
>Common Logic. Suppose we are talking about a relation R between two things A
>and B: (R A B) in the CLIF dialect of CL, which uses a LISP-like prefix
>syntax. (Or R(A, B) in a perhaps more familiar notation. I will stick to the
>CLIF style to keep things coherent.) But things change with time, so this
>relationship may be true at one time but not at another, or have a temporal
>parameter, or be thought of as holding between temporal 'parts' of the
>objects. Respectively:
> >
> > 1 (ist (R A B) T) where 'ist' is the modal 'is true at' operator.
> >
> > To be strict, this cannot be expressed directly in CL but requires the IKL
>extension, and should be written using the IKL 'that' operator to make the
>embedded atomic sentence into a term: (ist (that (R A B)) T) See
>http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes/IKL/GUIDE/GUIDE.html for details, especially
>#ContextsModalities.)
> >
> > 2 (R A B T)
> > 3 (R (A T)(B T))
> >
> > 2 treats the objects as continuants: they exist through time, retaining
>their identity (so they can be referred to by simple names even in a temporal
>framework) but their relations are time-dependent fluents (using McCarthy's
>old terminology), so we see a ubiquitious time-argument in most relational
>atomic sentences, typically by convention the last argument, as here.
> > 3. treats the objects as occurrents: they have temporal parts, indicated
>here by treating the names as functions from times to temporal parts, and
>relationships between temporal sections of entities are asserted timelessly.
> >
> > So, there are various ways to do it. But my original point was that one can
>COMPLETELY IGNORE all philosophical speculation about the metaphysical nature
>of these things, and simply treat all these various options as purely
>syntactic variations on how to say a fact. There is ONE SINGLE FACT being
>expressed here: that R holds between the things A and B at time T. That is
>really all that matters, and arguments about whether A and B are continuants
>(and so must not be spoken of in style 3, because the holy texts assert that
>continuants do not have temporal parts) or are occurrents (and so should not
>be spoken of in style 2) is basically just noise. You can view them either
>way, if it suits your way of thinking. Nothing of ontological importance turns
>on that decision. You can also completely ignore the question, and the
>metaphysical distinction it presumes. All it boils down to is where you like
>to see your temporal parameters. Do you want to see them attached to abitrary
>sentences? (Use a modal language or IKL, see style 1.) Or to relations in
>atomic sentences? (Style 2) Or to referring terms? (Style 3) There really are
>no other options in first-order logical syntax, so you have to choose one (or
>more) of these. So go ahead, choose whichever one makes you comfortable. It is
>easy to translate between these variations, given a certain minimal discipline
>about where temporal parameters are placed. In ISO CL, one can even write
>axioms which will do the translation, along the lines of
> >
> > (forall (r x y (T time))(iff (r x y T)(r (x T)(y T)) ))
> >
> > although it takes a few more lines to do this for every possible number of
>arguments; and in any case, you might want to be more picky about where you
>put the temporal parameters in some cases. I do not recommend actually using
>axioms to make the translation, but the fact that is is possible, and even
>easy, surely suggests that the distinctions are not as deep as many have
>assumed.
> >
> > But to return to your question, such translation axioms are exactly the
>'recategorization' to which you refer. x and y here are treated as continuants
>on the LHS of the iff and as occurrents on the RHS. And yet they are both
>identically the same thing on both sides of the equivalence.
> >
> > Pat Hayes
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >> Tx
> >>
> >> Wm
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 9:59 AM, Obrst, Leo J. <lobrst@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> Matthew,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Yes, this does not break down the distinction between continuant and
>occurrent, but instead argues that processes are like objects, and distinct
>from events. They are following and building on [1], and of course other
>papers in that vein, including other papers of Galton.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >>
> >> Leo
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> [1] Stout, R. (1997). Processes. Philosophy, 72, 19–27.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Matthew West
> >> Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2015 2:27 AM
> >> To: '[ontolog-forum] '
> >> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some
>Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Dear Leo,
> >>
> >> Whilst this is a paper that does a good job of showing how interdependent
>continuants and occurrents are. It still maintains the dichotomy of continuant
>and occurrent, and even explicitly states that this means a duplication of an
>occurrent and its life. So it has not actually taken the step of breaking down
>the barriers between them and picking up that interdependence might point to
>something common underlying them both.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Regards
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Matthew West
> >>
> >> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
> >>
> >> +44 750 338 5279
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Obrst, Leo J.
> >> Sent: 25 March 2015 19:45
> >> To: [ontolog-forum]
> >> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some
>Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> One interpretation (process, event) that Robert may be referring to is the
>“waterfall” paper:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Galton, Antony, and Riichiro Mizoguchi. 2009. The water falls but the
>waterfall does not fall: New perspectives on objects, processes and events.
>Applied Ontology 4 (2009), pp. 71–107, DOI 10.3233/AO-2009-0067, IOS Press.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >>
> >> Leo
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Matthew West
> >> Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 3:12 PM
> >> To: '[ontolog-forum] '
> >> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some
>Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Dear Robert,
> >>
> >> If you get something going with this, I’ll be interested in the outcome.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Regards
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Matthew West
> >>
> >> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
> >>
> >> +44 750 338 5279
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
>rrovetto@xxxxxxxxxxx
> >> Sent: 23 March 2015 17:21
> >> To: [ontolog-forum]
> >> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some
>Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 5:21 AM, Matthew West <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx>
>wrote:
> >>
> >> Dear Robert,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Replies below after [RR] (= Robert Rovetto)...
> >>
> >> [MW>] I think it is more useful to think of being a process or a physical
>object are different views on things, rather than being entirely different
>things or just eliminating the physical object view
> >>
> >> [RR] Agreed. A colleague not long ago mention this vis-a-vis bfo: that it
>should return to the idea that the continuant-occurent (or snap-span)
>distinction are two perspectives on the world.
> >>
> >> [MW>] The key is whether it is one object with two perspectives, or one
>object per perspective with the perspectives being mutually exclusive (as BFO
>requires). Changing between these two might seem simple, but it is a change to
>a core commitment of the ontology. I’d rather not be around when you suggested
>it to Barry Smith.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> For sure I think the perspectives are ours and can be many. I question,
>and others should as well, whether the mutual exclusivity (I think some have
>here) of any given two or more perspectives--speaking of any ontology,
>now--should be. Right, changing b/w them for that particular ontology would be
>an issue, but no one should have any consternation to suggesting it, not if
>the intention is to contribute, help and ensure that the ontology or system in
>question itself helps the communities it serves. And if people have
>consternation then something is wrong.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> It is also more help, and perhaps less stressful, to think of them as
>perspectives rather than one or the other being metaphysically (objectively)
>reflective of reality.
> >>
> >> [MW>] I would not see these different perspectives as not being reflective
>of reality, just reflective of different aspects of it.
> >>
> >> Some have metaphysical views, and there may be a fact of the matter, but
>when it comes to solving real-world problems (to the extent that applied
>ontologies can even do so!) taking the perspective approach appears better
>since, again, the goal is to solve problems.
> >>
> >> [MW>] The question is, if there is one object, with a physical object and
>process perspective, what sort of thing is it that allows those two
>perspectives? I suppose you could just say that they are particulars without
>saying anything more. My answer would be chunks of space-time (or
>spatio-temporal extents). A chunk of space time might be the spatio-temporal
>extent of a person, or it might be the spatio-temporal extent of a meeting, or
>of a person whistling.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> My intuition is that a given physical object is more than s-t extent/c,
>but since this question delves into space-time, it might be wise to consult
>physicists. A number of interesting issues come up here with the question:
>implicit (perhaps outdated/naive-physics sense) conceptions of space and time
>(e.g. container view), s-t boundaries of, say, a meeting (event), etc.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Some have held that processes (but not events) endure.
> >>
> >> [MW>] I’m not sure what you mean by this last statement.
> >>
> >> [RR] What I meant was this. In the traditional sense...
> >> Endurance is the form of persistance attributed of endurants/continuants
>(objects).
> >> Perdurance is the form of persistance attributed of perdurants/occurrents
>(processes, events).= temporal extension, temporal parts, etc. Some in
>philosophy and applied onto hold that processes are different from events, the
>former enduring (no temporal parts), with the latter perduring (having
>temporal parts).
> >>
> >> [MW>] So an event has zero thickness in time? That would be how I use the
>term, as a temporal boundary. But many use it as a synonym for activity or
>process.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> [MW>] No, I disagree here. I (and I think Pat) would consider that having
>an upper level ontology like that of OBO is better than no upper level at all,
>even though neither of us would want to use it ourselves. It is important that
>different parts of an ontology are consistent, or you just end up in all kinds
>of mess.
> >>
> >> I’ve said it before, but it’s worth repeating. The problems arise in the
>constraints that an ontology imposes. You need to be very critical of any
>constraint that is proposed. Leave it out unless you are certain it is one
>that always applies, no exceptions ever
> >>
> >> [RR] I did not say no upper level at all. I said ontology projects, such
>as obo foundry, should not have *as a rule/requirement* the adoption of this
>or that particular top-level. Certainly not for projects dealing with socially
>critical data and subject matters such as health. There are too many risks.
> >>
> >> [MW>] The risks however, compare to the certainty that if you use
>different upper level ontologies, you will have work to do to get them to
>interoperate.
> >>
> >> We want the models to be helpful, match the helpful domain
>conceptualizations and domain knowledge, and we do not want the ontological
>systems or ontologists to impost this is or that philosophical view that may
>in fact distort the domain knowledge, or worse distort the way domain
>scientists think! (an interesting research project, yes. Interested parties,
>please contact me). Some in the foundry have agreed on no rule/requirement,
>even prior to me even thinking about it (independent of knowing their sharing
>this point).
> >>
> >> [MW>] So how are you going to determine your upper level ontology, i.e.
>the top level commitments and constraints you are going to accept?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> You're right. But I think you might be missing the point. I did not
>say--nor did I mean to imply--that multiple top-level ontologies should be
>used for a given domain ontology or for a project like obo. I said, again, it
>should NOT be a rule or requirement (of potential ontology members of the
>project or of ontologies being subsumed) to use this or that particular
>ontology. That's all. The point is that in making it a rule, you take steps
>toward monopolization, and greater risk of what some people in this thread
>have concerns about also, e.g., imposition, forcing, constraints, syntax
>issues, etc. The goal is to solve real-world problems, and if there happens to
>be a different upper-level that can help accomplish them (or even better
>captures the domain), then such a rule would stand in that way. This does not
>mean change top-levels haphazardly. In fact I would hope that any top-level
>has checks and balances in place to ensure those risks are not realized and
>that it is open to change in the light of discovery and error-finding. The
>concern is largely ensuring that the system solves real-world problems it's
>intended to (to the extent ontologies will/have even prove useful to do
>that!), and that the domain science be represented faithfully without any
>distorting affects on domain scientists thinking (assuming their thinking is
>rational).
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Regards
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Matthew West
> >>
> >> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
> >>
> >> +44 750 338 5279
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> [MW] I’ve said it before, but it’s worth repeating. The problems arise in
>the constraints that an ontology imposes. You need to be very critical of any
>constraint that is proposed.
> >>
> >> [RR] I agree.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Best,
> >>
> >> Rob
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Sat, Mar 21, 2015 at 2:57 PM, Matthew West <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx>
>wrote:
> >>
> >> Dear Roberto
> >>
> >> <snip>
> >>
> >> Two good points:
> >> 1a) Questioning the mutual exclusivity of the object-process
>endurant-perdurant distinction.
> >>
> >> There is, at least to me, something odd about conceptualizing a process as
>distinct from the participant, at least in any objective or metaphysical
>sense. In reality whatever we call 'process' and their 'participant' (or
>'object') are mutually interrelated. The distinction, the separation, may at
>most be an artificial one. The question is, what are symbolisms or
>representations that better capture that?
> >>
> >> [MW>] The way that I do it is that an activity/process consists of its
>participants, where a participant is the state of a particular whilst it
>participates in the activity/process. This works both for things like a banana
>ripening, where there is only one participant, and for things like meetings,
>or a game of football, where there are multiple participants.
> >>
> >> 1b) And opening the door to other conceptualizations of these categories.
> >>
> >> We also read: "I see no strong or principled difference between things
>undergoing change and processes of change in things"
> >> This intuition is shared by others and should be explored and formalized.
>But it need not mean that things are processes in the traditional perdurantist
>sense.
> >>
> >> [MW>] I think it is more useful to think of being a process or a physical
>object are different views on things, rather than being entirely different
>things or just eliminating the physical object view.
> >>
> >> Some have held that processes (but not events) endure.
> >>
> >> [MW>] I’m not sure what you mean by this last statement.
> >>
> >> 2) Questioning and preventing the formalization (or the symbolism/logic)
>from distorting or misrepresenting the world (or the conceptualization of it
>we want to formalize)
> >>
> >> - "axiom-bloat"
> >> - "I meant decisions such as whether to treat a concept as a relation or a
>function or an individual, where to locate the temporal parameters, whether or
>not one uses a discipline to keep differently typed parameters distinct, and
>if so what it is, and so on. There are many alternative ways to express a
>given set of facts in a given formal language"
> >>
> >> A question to ask is how much do philosophical theories/views affect the
>treatment of the concepts and the symbolism.
> >> For example, the concern about forcing the distinction or requiring a
>specific syntax--a concern I've expressed elsewhere--is important. The obo
>foundry and other similar projects should not have as a rule/requirement a
>particular upper-level ontology. This might seem contrary to the goal of
>interoperability in the domain, but it is simply to ensure that the forcing
>does not take place, that monopolies are avoided, and that alternative
>representations that might better serve the biomedical community are sought
>and available/open to be sought and created.
> >>
> >> [MW>] No, I disagree here. I (and I think Pat) would consider that having
>an upper level ontology like that of OBO is better than no upper level at all,
>even though neither of us would want to use it ourselves. It is important that
>different parts of an ontology are consistent, or you just end up in all kinds
>of mess.
> >>
> >> I’ve said it before, but it’s worth repeating. The problems arise in the
>constraints that an ontology imposes. You need to be very critical of any
>constraint that is proposed. Leave it out unless you are certain it is one
>that always applies, no exceptions ever.
> >>
> >> The goal is (should be) *the solving of real-world problems*, and health,
>biomedicine, privacy, etc. are most certainly domains where we should keep
>that in mind. The particular upper-level (or otherwise) views and symbolisms
>should not hinder that goal. The point about the limits of owl is also worth
>repeating.
> >>
> >> Finally, I find what Avril S. said interesting. But there may be mistake
>in: "a particular at one time is called an occurrent; a sequence of two or
>more particulars at two or more consecutive times is called a continuant."
> >> In the traditional endur-perd/contin-occur sense, a partiular *at a time*
>would be a continuant, i.e., a wholly-present persisting entity. If parts of
>occurrents are particulars, then it could be a temporal part (slice) of an
>occurrent, but not the whole occurrent. And I think a particular over a time
>interval would be an occurrent.
> >>
> >> [MW>] Traditional occurrents don’t have temporal parts of course, and at
>each time it exists you have all of it. Probably better to use another name if
>you mean something different.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Regards
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Matthew West
> >>
> >> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
> >>
> >> +44 750 338 5279
> >>
> >>
> >>
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