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Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some Comments on

To: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, rrovetto@xxxxxxxxxxx
From: Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2015 16:46:45 -0500
Message-id: <4D00EC2B-41E4-4D21-8A52-50EE6768F496@xxxxxxx>

On Mar 31, 2015, at 4:10 PM, <rrovetto@xxxxxxxxxxx> <rrovetto@xxxxxxxxxxx> 
wrote:    (01)

> Notice that the glacier example seems to be extendable to all entities 
>ontologically classified as continuant/endurants (objects, physical objects, 
>etc.), a central point being that there is always some change, some processual 
>aspect to all (?) existents.    (02)

Actually the only possible counterexamples I have seen would be quarks and 
leptons, so at normal energy levels, only electrons and neutrinos. Neutrons 
decay, and protons are a buzzing confusion of quarks and gluons.     (03)

Pat    (04)


> These entities--from glaciers to the coffee mug--however, exhibit a stability 
>(structural, compositional, material, persistence, etc.) that, in part, 
>presumably is what makes them easily classifiable as objects.  
> 
> Robert Rovetto
> 
> On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 4:58 PM, William Frank <williamf.frank@xxxxxxxxx> 
>wrote:
> Thanks, Pat, 
> 
> This an your post just before this one answer the question I had, and in the 
>way I hoped it would be answered. 
> 
> I think that a glacier is a great example, John.    Everybody sticks with the 
>falling of a drop of water, rainstorms and wateralls, but starting with 
>waterfalls, we can move to glaciers, and from there to oceans, and finally we 
>could go to stars and galaxies! 
> 
> Wm
> 
>  
> 
> On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 2:52 PM, Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> Let me try to sum up the point I was trying to make.
> 
> The distinctions between continuant and occurrent, or object and process and 
>event, or between 3+1-d versus 4-d, are not ontological distinctions between 
>kinds of entity in the world. They are distinctions between different ways of 
>talking about the world. It is the same world in all these cases, with the 
>same things in it, however they are described.
> 
> In traditional logical syntax these ways of talking are mutually 
>incommensurable, so there is a pressing practical need to keep the universe of 
>discourse sorted into categories. But this is merely an accident of some 
>traditional notational restrictions. They are eliminated in ISO Common Logic 
>(and, by the way, in RDF) so now we can all stop arguing about the true nature 
>of such things as flows in pipes, glaciers and ripening bananas, and leave 
>such interminable debate to philosophers while we get on with ontology 
>engineering. It has no more relevance to us than philosophical debates about, 
>say, the difference between reduction and supervenience.
> 
> Pat
> 
> On Mar 31, 2015, at 10:23 AM, Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> >
> > On Mar 31, 2015, at 9:27 AM, William Frank <williamf.frank@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> >> Mathew,
> >>
> >> I would be very interested to know how you eliminate the boundaries 
>between these categories.  I think they must be eliminable, not to say, 
>though, that things can't be categorized in one of these ways, depending on 
>what aspect of a situation we want to look at.
> >>
> >> To me, philosophers and too many engineers seem  moved to consider whether 
>there 'really are' processes, objects, and events, and whether they are 
>'really' different.   I note in particular as a description of a paper
> >>
> >> "argues that processes are like objects, and distinct from events. "
> >>
> >> What is clear is that these are distinctions that **we are able to make**, 
>as many  do.  We can give examples, even though the lines between things we 
>might choose to classify one way or the other, as with most things, is fuzzy.
> >>
> >> The question for the engineer is, is it **useful* to make these 
>distinctions?
> >>
> >> If one makes it critical to success to have 'correctly' classified 
>everything, into its one true category, and uses a language and a logic that 
>makes us have to repeat information in each category, then the answer is that 
>however useful it **might be** to make the distinctions, we are doing it in a 
>manner that is awkward.
> >>
> >> On the other hand, if we treat what we are doing when we classify things 
>as *casting* them, rather than saying what they 'really are', and have a 
>method by which things in one category can be *recast* in another, and 
>information not repeated, then, what practical person, working say in business 
>process design, would object <330.gif>  being able reference events, 
>processes, and objects.  And, anything we would want to talk about, don't 
>there need to be types for all those things, as well as individuals?
> >>
> >> So, if we can categorize things, we can recategorize them, as need be.   
>Is there a reference in this thread as to how to do that that I missed, that 
>is not alot of math about time series, or is that it?
> >
> > That is exactly what I was trying to explain at the start of this thread. 
>Yes, there is such a way, if we can use the syntactic freedom available in ISO 
>Common Logic. Suppose we are talking about a relation R between two things A 
>and B: (R A B) in the CLIF dialect of CL, which uses a LISP-like prefix 
>syntax. (Or R(A, B) in a perhaps more familiar notation. I will stick to the 
>CLIF style to keep things coherent.) But things change with time, so this 
>relationship may be true at one time but not at another, or have a temporal 
>parameter, or be thought of as holding between temporal 'parts' of the 
>objects. Respectively:
> >
> > 1 (ist (R A B) T)   where 'ist' is the modal 'is true at' operator.
> >
> > To be strict, this cannot be expressed directly in CL but requires the IKL 
>extension, and should be written using the IKL 'that' operator to make the 
>embedded atomic sentence into a term: (ist (that (R A B)) T) See 
>http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes/IKL/GUIDE/GUIDE.html for details, especially 
>#ContextsModalities.)
> >
> > 2 (R A B T)
> > 3 (R (A T)(B T))
> >
> > 2 treats the objects as continuants: they exist through time, retaining 
>their identity (so they can be referred to by simple names even in a temporal 
>framework) but their relations are time-dependent fluents (using McCarthy's 
>old terminology), so we see a ubiquitious time-argument in most relational 
>atomic sentences, typically by convention the last argument, as here.
> > 3. treats the objects as occurrents: they have temporal parts, indicated 
>here by treating the names as functions from times to temporal parts, and 
>relationships between temporal sections of entities are asserted timelessly.
> >
> > So, there are various ways to do it. But my original point was that one can 
>COMPLETELY IGNORE all philosophical speculation about the metaphysical nature 
>of these things, and simply treat all these various options as purely 
>syntactic variations on how to say a fact. There is ONE SINGLE FACT being 
>expressed here: that R holds between the things A and B at time T. That is 
>really all that matters, and arguments about whether A and B are continuants 
>(and so must not be spoken of in style 3, because the holy texts assert that 
>continuants do not have temporal parts) or are occurrents (and so should not 
>be spoken of in style 2) is basically just noise. You can view them either 
>way, if it suits your way of thinking. Nothing of ontological importance turns 
>on that decision. You can also completely ignore the question, and the 
>metaphysical distinction it presumes. All it boils down to is where you like 
>to see your temporal parameters. Do you want to see them attached to abitrary 
>sentences? (Use a modal language or IKL, see style 1.) Or to relations in 
>atomic sentences? (Style 2) Or to referring terms? (Style 3) There really are 
>no other options in first-order logical syntax, so you have to choose one (or 
>more) of these. So go ahead, choose whichever one makes you comfortable. It is 
>easy to translate between these variations, given a certain minimal discipline 
>about where temporal parameters are placed. In ISO CL, one can even write 
>axioms which will do the translation, along the lines of
> >
> > (forall (r x y (T time))(iff (r x y T)(r (x T)(y T)) ))
> >
> > although it takes a few more lines to do this for every possible number of 
>arguments; and in any case, you might want to be more picky about where you 
>put the temporal parameters in some cases. I do not recommend actually using 
>axioms to make the translation, but the fact that is is possible, and even 
>easy, surely suggests that the distinctions are not as deep as many have 
>assumed.
> >
> > But to return to your question, such translation axioms are exactly the 
>'recategorization' to which you refer. x and y here are treated as continuants 
>on the LHS of the iff and as occurrents on the RHS. And yet they are both 
>identically the same thing on both sides of the equivalence.
> >
> > Pat Hayes
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >> Tx
> >>
> >> Wm
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 9:59 AM, Obrst, Leo J. <lobrst@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> Matthew,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Yes, this does not break down the distinction between continuant and 
>occurrent, but instead argues that processes are like objects, and distinct 
>from events. They are following and building on [1], and of course other 
>papers in that vein, including other papers of Galton.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >>
> >> Leo
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> [1] Stout, R. (1997). Processes. Philosophy, 72, 19Ė27.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
>[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Matthew West
> >> Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2015 2:27 AM
> >> To: '[ontolog-forum] '
> >> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some 
>Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Dear Leo,
> >>
> >> Whilst this is a paper that does a good job of showing how interdependent 
>continuants and occurrents are. It still maintains the dichotomy of continuant 
>and occurrent, and even explicitly states that this means a duplication of an 
>occurrent and its life. So it has not actually taken the step of breaking down 
>the barriers between them and picking up that interdependence might point to 
>something common underlying them both.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Regards
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Matthew West
> >>
> >> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
> >>
> >> +44 750 338 5279
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
>[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Obrst, Leo J.
> >> Sent: 25 March 2015 19:45
> >> To: [ontolog-forum]
> >> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some 
>Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> One interpretation (process, event) that Robert may be referring to is the 
>ďwaterfallĒ paper:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Galton, Antony, and Riichiro Mizoguchi. 2009. The water falls but the 
>waterfall does not fall: New perspectives on objects, processes and events. 
>Applied Ontology 4 (2009), pp. 71Ė107, DOI 10.3233/AO-2009-0067, IOS Press.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >>
> >> Leo
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
>[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Matthew West
> >> Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 3:12 PM
> >> To: '[ontolog-forum] '
> >> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some 
>Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Dear Robert,
> >>
> >> If you get something going with this, Iíll be interested in the outcome.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Regards
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Matthew West
> >>
> >> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
> >>
> >> +44 750 338 5279
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
>[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of 
>rrovetto@xxxxxxxxxxx
> >> Sent: 23 March 2015 17:21
> >> To: [ontolog-forum]
> >> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some 
>Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 5:21 AM, Matthew West <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx> 
>wrote:
> >>
> >> Dear Robert,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Replies below after [RR] (= Robert Rovetto)...
> >>
> >> [MW>] I think it is more useful to think of being a process or a physical 
>object are different views on things, rather than being entirely different 
>things or just eliminating the physical object view
> >>
> >> [RR] Agreed. A colleague not long ago mention this vis-a-vis bfo: that it 
>should return to the idea that the continuant-occurent (or snap-span) 
>distinction are two perspectives on the world.
> >>
> >> [MW>] The key is whether it is one object with two perspectives, or one 
>object per perspective with the perspectives being mutually exclusive (as BFO 
>requires). Changing between these two might seem simple, but it is a change to 
>a core commitment of the ontology. Iíd rather not be around when you suggested 
>it to Barry Smith.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> For sure I think the perspectives are ours and can be many. I question, 
>and others should as well, whether the mutual exclusivity (I think some have 
>here) of any given two or more perspectives--speaking of any ontology, 
>now--should be. Right, changing b/w them for that particular ontology would be 
>an issue, but no one should have any consternation to suggesting it, not if 
>the intention is to contribute, help and ensure that the ontology or system in 
>question itself helps the communities it serves. And if people have 
>consternation then something is wrong.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> It is also more help, and perhaps less stressful, to think of them as 
>perspectives rather than one or the other being metaphysically (objectively) 
>reflective of reality.
> >>
> >> [MW>] I would not see these different perspectives as not being reflective 
>of reality, just reflective of different aspects of it.
> >>
> >> Some have metaphysical views, and there may be a fact of the matter, but 
>when it comes to solving real-world problems (to the extent that applied 
>ontologies can even do so!) taking the perspective approach appears better 
>since, again, the goal is to solve problems.
> >>
> >> [MW>] The question is, if there is one object, with a physical object and 
>process perspective, what sort of thing is it that allows those two 
>perspectives? I suppose you could just say that they are particulars without 
>saying anything more. My answer would be chunks of space-time (or 
>spatio-temporal extents). A chunk of space time might be the spatio-temporal 
>extent of a person, or it might be the spatio-temporal extent of a meeting, or 
>of a person whistling.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> My intuition is that a given physical object is more than s-t extent/c, 
>but since this question delves into space-time, it might be wise to consult 
>physicists. A number of interesting issues come up here with the question: 
>implicit (perhaps outdated/naive-physics sense) conceptions of space and time 
>(e.g. container view), s-t boundaries of, say, a meeting (event), etc.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Some have held that processes (but not events) endure.
> >>
> >> [MW>] Iím not sure what you mean by this last statement.
> >>
> >> [RR] What I meant was this. In the traditional sense...
> >> Endurance is the form of persistance attributed of endurants/continuants 
>(objects).
> >> Perdurance is the form of persistance attributed of perdurants/occurrents 
>(processes, events).= temporal extension, temporal parts, etc. Some in 
>philosophy and applied onto hold that processes are different from events, the 
>former enduring (no temporal parts), with the latter perduring (having 
>temporal parts).
> >>
> >> [MW>] So an event has zero thickness in time? That would be how I use the 
>term, as a temporal boundary. But many use it as a synonym for activity or 
>process.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> [MW>] No, I disagree here. I (and I think Pat) would consider that having 
>an upper level ontology like that of OBO is better than no upper level at all, 
>even though neither of us would want to use it ourselves. It is important that 
>different parts of an ontology are consistent, or you just end up in all kinds 
>of mess.
> >>
> >> Iíve said it before, but itís worth repeating. The problems arise in the 
>constraints that an ontology imposes. You need to be very critical of any 
>constraint that is proposed. Leave it out unless you are certain it is one 
>that always applies, no exceptions ever
> >>
> >> [RR] I did not say no upper level at all. I said ontology projects, such 
>as obo foundry, should not have *as a rule/requirement* the adoption of this 
>or that particular top-level. Certainly not for projects dealing with socially 
>critical data and subject matters such as health. There are too many risks.
> >>
> >> [MW>] The risks however, compare to the certainty that if you use 
>different upper level ontologies, you will have work to do to get them to 
>interoperate.
> >>
> >> We want the models to be helpful, match the helpful domain 
>conceptualizations and domain knowledge, and we do not want the ontological 
>systems or ontologists to impost this is or that philosophical view that may 
>in fact distort the domain knowledge, or worse distort the way domain 
>scientists think! (an interesting research project, yes. Interested parties, 
>please contact me). Some in the foundry have agreed on no rule/requirement, 
>even prior to me even thinking about it (independent of knowing their sharing 
>this point).
> >>
> >> [MW>] So how are you going to determine your upper level ontology, i.e. 
>the top level commitments and constraints you are going to accept?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> You're right. But I think you might be missing the point. I did not 
>say--nor did I mean to imply--that multiple top-level ontologies should be 
>used for a given domain ontology or for a project like obo. I said, again, it 
>should NOT be a rule or requirement (of potential ontology members of the 
>project or of ontologies being subsumed) to use this or that particular 
>ontology. That's all. The point is that in making it a rule, you take steps 
>toward monopolization, and greater risk of what some people in this thread 
>have concerns about also, e.g., imposition, forcing, constraints, syntax 
>issues, etc. The goal is to solve real-world problems, and if there happens to 
>be a different upper-level that can help accomplish them (or even better 
>captures the domain), then such a rule would stand in that way. This does not 
>mean change top-levels haphazardly. In fact I would hope that any top-level 
>has checks and balances in place to ensure those risks are not realized and 
>that it is open to change in the light of discovery and error-finding. The 
>concern is largely ensuring that the system solves real-world problems it's 
>intended to (to the extent ontologies will/have even prove useful to do 
>that!), and that the domain science be represented faithfully without any 
>distorting affects on domain scientists thinking (assuming their thinking is 
>rational).
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Regards
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Matthew West
> >>
> >> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
> >>
> >> +44 750 338 5279
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> [MW] Iíve said it before, but itís worth repeating. The problems arise in 
>the constraints that an ontology imposes. You need to be very critical of any 
>constraint that is proposed.
> >>
> >> [RR] I agree.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Best,
> >>
> >> Rob
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Sat, Mar 21, 2015 at 2:57 PM, Matthew West <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx> 
>wrote:
> >>
> >> Dear Roberto
> >>
> >> <snip>
> >>
> >> Two good points:
> >> 1a) Questioning the mutual exclusivity of the object-process 
>endurant-perdurant distinction.
> >>
> >> There is, at least to me, something odd about conceptualizing a process as 
>distinct from the participant, at least in any objective or metaphysical 
>sense. In reality whatever we call 'process' and their 'participant' (or 
>'object') are mutually interrelated. The distinction, the separation, may at 
>most be an artificial one. The question is, what are symbolisms or 
>representations that better capture that?
> >>
> >> [MW>] The way that I do it is that an activity/process consists of its 
>participants, where a participant is the state of a particular whilst it 
>participates in the activity/process. This works both for things like a banana 
>ripening, where there is only one participant, and for things like meetings, 
>or a game of football, where there are multiple participants.
> >>
> >> 1b) And opening the door to other conceptualizations of these categories.
> >>
> >> We also read: "I see no strong or principled difference between things 
>undergoing change and processes of change in things"
> >> This intuition is shared by others and should be explored and formalized. 
>But it need not mean that things are processes in the traditional perdurantist 
>sense.
> >>
> >> [MW>] I think it is more useful to think of being a process or a physical 
>object are different views on things, rather than being entirely different 
>things or just eliminating the physical object view.
> >>
> >> Some have held that processes (but not events) endure.
> >>
> >> [MW>] Iím not sure what you mean by this last statement.
> >>
> >> 2) Questioning and preventing the formalization (or the symbolism/logic) 
>from distorting or misrepresenting the world (or the conceptualization of it 
>we want to formalize)
> >>
> >> - "axiom-bloat"
> >> - "I meant decisions such as whether to treat a concept as a relation or a 
>function or an individual, where to locate the temporal parameters, whether or 
>not one uses a discipline to keep differently typed parameters distinct, and 
>if so what it is, and so on. There are many alternative ways to express a 
>given set of facts in a given formal language"
> >>
> >> A question to ask is how much do philosophical theories/views affect the 
>treatment of the concepts and the symbolism.
> >> For example, the concern about forcing the distinction or requiring a 
>specific syntax--a concern I've expressed elsewhere--is important. The obo 
>foundry and other similar projects should not have as a rule/requirement a 
>particular upper-level ontology. This might seem contrary to the goal of 
>interoperability in the domain, but it is simply to ensure that the forcing 
>does not take place, that monopolies are avoided, and that alternative 
>representations that might better serve the biomedical community are sought 
>and available/open to be sought and created.
> >>
> >> [MW>] No, I disagree here. I (and I think Pat) would consider that having 
>an upper level ontology like that of OBO is better than no upper level at all, 
>even though neither of us would want to use it ourselves. It is important that 
>different parts of an ontology are consistent, or you just end up in all kinds 
>of mess.
> >>
> >> Iíve said it before, but itís worth repeating. The problems arise in the 
>constraints that an ontology imposes. You need to be very critical of any 
>constraint that is proposed. Leave it out unless you are certain it is one 
>that always applies, no exceptions ever.
> >>
> >> The goal is (should be) *the solving of real-world problems*, and health, 
>biomedicine, privacy, etc. are most certainly domains where we should keep 
>that in mind. The particular upper-level (or otherwise) views and symbolisms 
>should not hinder that goal. The point about the limits of owl is also worth 
>repeating.
> >>
> >> Finally, I find what Avril S. said interesting. But there may be mistake 
>in: "a particular at one time is called an occurrent; a sequence of two or 
>more particulars at two or more consecutive times is called a continuant."
> >> In the traditional endur-perd/contin-occur sense, a partiular *at a time* 
>would be a continuant, i.e., a wholly-present persisting entity. If parts of 
>occurrents are particulars, then it could be a temporal part (slice) of an 
>occurrent, but not the whole occurrent. And I think a particular over a time 
>interval would be an occurrent.
> >>
> >> [MW>] Traditional occurrents donít have temporal parts of course, and at 
>each time it exists you have all of it. Probably better to use another name if 
>you mean something different.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Regards
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Matthew West
> >>
> >> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
> >>
> >> +44 750 338 5279
> >>
> >>
> >>
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IHMC                                     (850)434 8903 home
40 South Alcaniz St.            (850)202 4416   office
Pensacola                            (850)202 4440   fax
FL 32502                              (850)291 0667   mobile (preferred)
phayes@xxxxxxx       http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes    (06)







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