On 1/9/2013 8:36 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
> Sjir,
>
>> I would just have said that a datum is a proposition that is taken to
>> be, or asserted to be, true. The context for that role is any context
>> in which the proposition is taken to be true.
> I agree.
>
> I would also add that not all data is propositional. For example,
> the list of names and numbers in a telephone book consists of paired
> instances of two kinds of data. Each pair becomes a proposition
> when the instances are inserted in an appropriate schema:
>
> "The person named _________ has the telephone number ________." (01)
I disagree. That is, the meaning of each pair in the telephone
directory is a proposition of that form, and the pair is a datum. It is
not necessary to express the sentence per se. (02)
Is John saying that the name of the person is not by itself a
proposition? I would argue that, if one considers the name of the
person alone to be a datum, then it expresses a different proposition,
to wit: There exists a person whose name is X. Further, the presence of
the name in the telephone book implies the proposition: There exists a
telephone number N such that the person named X has telephone number N.
Both of these follow from the proposition that is the meaning of the
pair (datum). (03)
The distinction I am making is in what the datum is. I argue that a
datum is a proposition. A value without any interpretation is not a
datum. It is a child without a meaning. (04)
> And of course, all phone books contain errors at the moment they're
> printed. Over time, the errors increase until a new phone book is
> issued. A computerized phone book can be updated more quickly,
> but it still contains inevitable errors. (05)
Which only says that not all of the thousands of propositions expressed
in the phone book are true, even though all of them are apparently asserted. (06)
> More generally, every kind of data is some kind of sign. (07)
I disagree completely. Every representation of data is some kind of
sign, yes. But the datum itself is the meaning of the sign. (Thank
you, Frege, even if Peirce did get there first.) (08)
-Ed (09)
'I'm sure I didn't mean--' Alice was beginning, but the Red Queen
interrupted her impatiently. 'That's just what I complain of!
You SHOULD have meant! What do you suppose is the use of a child
without any meaning?'
-- Lewis Carroll, "Through the Looking Glass" (010)
--
Edward J. Barkmeyer Email: edbark@xxxxxxxx
National Institute of Standards & Technology
Systems Integration Division, Engineering Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8263 Tel: +1 301-975-3528
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263 Cel: +1 240-672-5800 (011)
"The opinions expressed above do not reflect consensus of NIST,
and have not been reviewed by any Government authority." (012)
> My two-way
> distinction of natural type and role type, which I wrote in 1984,
> is a special case of Peirce's much more detailed semiotics. Since
> then, I have studied and used his distinctions more systematically.
>
> For example, Peirce's widely quoted type-token distinction is actually
> two thirds of a triad:
>
> 1. A *mark* is anything observable. It might be interpreted
> in an open-ended number of ways by different observers
> for different reasons.
>
> 2. A *token* is a particular interpretation of a mark.
>
> 3. A *type* is general pattern that some sentient being
> (human, animal, plant, robot, alien, God, angel, ...)
> uses for some reason to interpret a mark as a token.
>
> This triad leads to my preferred definition of ontology:
>
> A semiotic system for interpreting marks as tokens
> of various types.
>
> This definition provides more guidance than just saying
> "Ontology is the study of existence." It also avoids
> the more problematical term 'conceptualization'.
>
> John
>
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