On Jun 29, 2012, at 2:56 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
On 6/29/2012 8:29 AM, Chris Menzel wrote:
"p" is true if and only if p.
This observation does not deny that there are true statements.
It merely defines the adjective 'true' without claiming that there
is an abstract entity called Truth.
Well, now that doesn't follow at all. The schema above is completely
independent of how one understands truth, as all (or nearly all)
instances of the schema should turn out to be consequences of *any*
understanding of truth, whether deflationist or platonic.
I said that the statement defines how the adjective 'true' is used
without making any claims about an abstract entity called truth.
You said that it is independent of any way of talking about truth.
Those two statements are consistent.
Well, OK, fair enough. My point was that whether or not the above schema— often referred to as Convention T — commits you to a property of truth depends on one's theory of truth. In the context of some theories, the schema (more exactly, instances thereof) most definitely "makes a claim about an abstract entity called 'truth'". But you are entirely correct in the sense that there are also non-platonic theories of truth that contain the schema as well that make no such claim.