Rich, (01)
We were talking about different issues. (02)
> But it looks like we simply can't and won't reach agreement
> on this issue of subjectivity in interpretation... (03)
There are three important issues that are worth discussing, but
they should be kept distinct when we're trying to analyze them: (04)
1. The technical question about how modal logic is related
to possible worlds and/or possible models of the world. (05)
2. The philosophy of science about the nature of physical laws,
and the criteria for accepting a hypothesis as a law. (06)
3. The psychological and sociological issues about how scientists
and engineers do their work and reach their conclusions. (07)
In this thread, I was focusing on #1, and you were talking about #3. (08)
I do have a great deal of sympathy for your points about how
engineers go about their work. That has an enormous effect
on which models they choose to develop and apply to a project.
But it doesn't affect how those models are related to the logic. (09)
> I still think Peirce did not go far enough in formulating
> multiple observers, i.e., multiple viewers of the same sign,
> each seeing it in distinct ways, and reaching distinct
> conclusions... (010)
That is a separate issue about the history of the philosophy
of #1, #2, and #3 and Peirce's positions about them. (011)
In his work at the US Coast and Geodetic Survey, CSP went on
an expedition to observe a total eclipse of the sun, which
crossed southern Europe. In that project, it struck him how
scientists from different nations collaborated -- gathering
as much information as possible about the same subject from
different points of view using different instruments. (012)
That led him to make some of the earliest remarks about how
science was shifting from independent experiments by lonely
experimenters to international collaboration on major projects. (013)
In his modal logic, CSP also distinguished five different kinds
of modalities. In his existential graphs, he used different
colors to represent them (he had a box of colored pencils): (014)
1. Logical possibility. A proposition p is possible iff it is not
provably false. Impossible means inconsistent or provably false. (015)
2. Subjective possibility. ◊p would mean that p is believable or
not known to be false. This interpretation is now called
epistemic logic. (016)
3. Objective possibility. ◊p would mean that p is physically
possible according to the laws of nature. (017)
4. Interrogative mood. ◊p would mean that p is questioned.
The equivalent of necessity would mean that p is not
questionably false. Peirce related this modality to the
method of inquiry in his philosophy of science. (018)
5. Social possibility. ◊p would mean that p is free or permissible.
The equivalent of necessity would mean that p is commanded --
i.e., obligatory or not permissibly false. ~◊p would mean that
p is not permissible or illegal, and ◊~p would mean that p is
permissibly false. This interpretation is now called deontic logic. (019)
In the following article, I discuss some issues in epistemic logic
and relate them to Peirce's modalities: (020)
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf (021)
John (022)
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