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Re: [ontolog-forum] intangibles (was RE: Why most classifications are fu

To: "[ontolog-forum] " <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "Matthew West" <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "'[ontolog-forum] '" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: "Avril Styrman" <Avril.Styrman@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 18:02:33 +0300
Message-id: <20110804180233.98544mdebt2jrj49.astyrman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
John and Matthew,    (01)

> MW: I'm sure you would. However, the fact is that modal realism is an
> alternative approach to modality to the one you take. That much the same
> things can be achieved with either confirms that. So your saying that you
> can do the same things is not a reason to choose your approach.
>> But using the word "actually" with possible worlds seems to suggest
>> that they're actual.  If you want to use them as a Gedanken experiment
>> or heuristic to stimulate the imagination, I can't complain.  But I
>> would claim that they can always be eliminated.
> MW: I've said before I make no commitment to the reality or otherwise of
> possible worlds, it makes no difference to their utility, and as far as I
> can see there is no way to prove it one way or another. Lewis obviously
> considered they were "really real". I only claim they exist because I have
> made an ontological commitment to them, so I can talk about them.    (02)

The necessarily inaccessible Lewis' modal realist worlds are fine  
examples of something that the principle of economical  
understandability PEU can clear-cut away, without robbing anything  
away from the intellects. This is because one can get by exactly as  
well or even better without them; if one can get by as well without  
them, then they are not required, and what is not required is an  
unwanted weight.    (03)

Sure, PEU and this-worldly physicalism are my pet doctrines, but it  
seems that with many issues, consensus or agreement just cannot be  
achieved. With many of these cases, PEU is a fine judge I think, or I  
see no better judges around.    (04)

... there are enough examples of men, or of whole groups, who are not  
prepared to admit that they have been mistaken. ... even death may not  
be a sufficient reason for changing ideas which have led to it. Quite  
on the contrary, we often find, even in our times, that ill success of  
an ill-conceived undertaking,
and death resulting from it are both regarded as values... From all  
this we have to conclude that nature can never force us to admit that  
we have been mistaken. Nor can it force us to recognize our mistakes.  
A mistake will be recognized as such only if first the conscious  
decision has been made not to make use of ad hoc hypotheses and to  
eliminate theories which do not allow of falsification. It is true  
that as a matter of historical fact this decision has been made by  
nearly all great scientists.... What is of importance here is that  
they never were, and never could be forced to proceed in that way,  
either by
nature or by society. Paul K. Feyerabend. Professor bohm’s philosophy  
of nature. in Stephen Toulmin (ed.) physical reality. pages 173–196,  
1970 (originally published in Physical Review vol 47, 1935).    (05)

-Avril    (06)

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