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Re: [ontolog-forum] Re Foundation ontology, CYC, and Mapping

To: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: Ron Wheeler <rwheeler@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2010 07:30:01 -0500
Message-id: <4B9A33C9.6@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
John F. Sowa wrote:
> Chris,
>
> CM> As you note, a 3D ontology is in fact fully 4D -- "3+1 D" as
>  > you put it -- in the sense that time is not ignored (the way the
>  > "z-axis" of R3 is ignored in R2, say).  Rather, the difference
>  > between the two ontologies concerns how they conceive the relation
>  > between individuals and time.
>
> Yes.  The difference between a 3D and a 4D ontology is not in the
> geometry, because every point in a 3+1 D ontology can be mapped
> to and from every point in a 4D ontology by an isomorphism.
>
> The critical issues for ontology arise with the nature of individuals,
> the question of temporal "parts" of individuals, and the nature of
> changes to individuals.  Those go beyond the geometry of space-time
> to the issues of how to represent physical things that reside, move
> around, and change in that geometry
>
> CM> ... the endurantist ontology doesn't "embed" isomorphically in any
>  > obvious way into the perdurantist ontology (unless, perhaps, you also
>  > introduce temporal parts into the endurantist ontology, which seems
>  > sort of self-defeating).
>
> I agree.
>
> CM? So what, exactly, are you proposing?
>
> I am definitely *not* proposing any kind of embedding of a 3+1 D
> theory into a 4D theory or vice-versa.
>
> As many people who use a 4D approach have observed, it is possible
> to exchange data among different computer systems based on different
> ontologies.  But then we have to ask:  "How can they exchange names
> of people and their addresses, dates of birth, etc., and use that
> data successfully in systems that have different and inconsistent
> theories about the nature of the individuals?"
>
> What I am proposing, as I have said many times, is a lattice of
> theories -- or at least a finite subset (hierarchy) of theories
> that have actually been defined and stored in a repository).
>       (01)

Are these ideas sufficiently well-formed that we could start to talk 
about the metadata required to support the lattice?    (02)


> To illustrate the issues, let me consider a particular individual
> named Kermit.  Somebody who talks in ordinary English with a
> 3+1 D ontology might make the following observations:
>
>   1. At time t1, Kermit was an egg.
>
>   2. Later, at time t2, Kermit was a tadpole.
>
>   3. Later, at time t3, Kermit was a frog.
>
> Another person who uses a 4D ontology might say that the individual
> named Kermit has temporal parts.  His egg part has a range of times
> that includes t1, his tadpole part includes t2, and his frog part
> includes t3.
>
> This example shows that the problem arises with talk about parts.
> There is a simple way to avoid that problem:  don't talk about
> parts.  Just talk in simple observation terms:
>
>     at t1, Kermit egg.
>     at t2, Kermit tadpole.
>     at t3, Kermit frog.
>
> A theory that can express just these observations would be
> very underspecified.  It couldn't express or reason about
> the many things one might want to say about frogs and their
> spatial and/or temporal parts.  But any data that can be
> expressed in simple, observational terms can be shared among
> more detailed theories that do detailed reasoning about
> those observations.
>
> But somebody might ask, "How can you explain your detailed
> reasoning in therms of that simple observation theory?"
>
> The answer is that you can't.  You don't even try.
>
> Another person might object, "But what if two incompatible
> theories do different kinds of reasoning that cannot be
> expressed in terms of each others terminology?"
>
> The answer is that you don't attempt to explain one theory
> in terms of the other.  You only share data in simple
> observational terms.
>
> But someone might object, "How can you be sure that their
> theories are consistent."
>
> The answer is that the world itself is consistent.  Any
> theory that reasons correctly about the world must make
> predictions in terms of observation statements.
>
> The basic test of any physical theory is consistency with
> observations.  If two different theories are both consistent
> with observations, they can share data about those observations.
> Any differences in their detailed axioms and terminology are
> irrelevant, as long as their predictions are accurate.
>   
Does this imply that a reasoning engine can read the metadata from both 
theories and automatically map data from one to another to actually 
implement the sharing process?    (03)

> John
>
>
>
>
>  
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>       (04)


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