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Re: [ontolog-forum] Past, Present, and Future of Ontology

To: "[ontolog-forum] " <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Cyclify Austin <cyclify-austin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, KR-language <KR-language@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: "Richard H. McCullough" <rhm@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 27 May 2009 21:31:32 -0700
Message-id: <16E7513575814F29BEB4C96729F1546D@rhm8200>
All of your "problems" can be summarized in one word: CONTEXT.
The "solutions" are readily available: use a CONTEXT LANGUAGE.
mKR is a CONTEXT LANGUAGE.    (01)

Dick McCullough
http://mkrmke.org    (02)

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "John F. Sowa" <sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, May 27, 2009 8:05 PM
Subject: [ontolog-forum] Past, Present, and Future of Ontology    (03)

> Before proposing new ontologies and projects for developing them,
> I suggest that we review past proposals and developments. People
> often say that artificial intelligence is a new field.  But I
> remind them that the founding workshop for the field of AI was
> held in 1956, ten years before Alan Perlis established the first
> computer science department at Carnegie Tech (now CMU).
> The basic ideas of ontology are much older.  Aristotle began the
> systematic study of the categories of existence, their organization
> in a hierarchy, and their definition and analysis in terms of formal
> logic.  I keep reminding advocates of OWL and other description
> logics that the most widely used subset of OWL happens to be
> identical with Aristotle's syllogisms.
> For a brief review of this history, I recommend the slides for
> my talk, "The Challenge of Knowledge Soup":
>    http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/challenge.pdf
> For an even shorter summary, see the slide at the end of this note.
> Note the acronym SRKB (Shared Reusable Knowledge Bases) in the
> projects of the 1990s.  That goals of that project were similar
> to those of the SUO email list and ontolog forum.  Following are
> the SRKB archives from 1991 to 1996:
>    http://ksl.stanford.edu/email-archives/srkb.index.html
> The most discouraging observation is that most of the position papers
> written in 1991 would be just as appropriate today.  At the end of
> this message is a copy of my position paper from 1991.
> Other position papers on that list are also relevant.  In note #12,
> Mark Fox made the following point:
> MF> What has been called "upper level" ontologies would of course be
> > useful but the sharing of the lower level, more domain specific terms
> > and instances is also necessary.  The problem here is that different
> > parts of the organization do not use the same terms even when
> > referring to the same concept.  Any attempt to standardize terminology
> > fails.  Secondly, enforcing the use of the same terminology can lead
> > to inefficient problem solving for a particular function. Thus arises
> > the distinction between the language of communication and the language
> > used by a function to reason.
> From note #13 by Lewis Johnson,
> LJ> ... we must support multiple models of concepts.  The form of
> > represented knowledge depends upon the intended use of that knowledge,
> > and Aries users inevitably use concepts for different purposes.  For
> > example, when monitoring the progress of a flight it is sufficient
> > to model a flight plan as a sequence of flight segments, each along
> > a straight line.  When defining radar tracking systems, it is
> > important to model aircraft maneuvers in detail, in order to predict
> > the position of the aircraft at the next point in time; the overall
> > flight plan of the aircraft is unimportant... Analysts will need to
> > specialize general models to their particular concerns; they also
> > will need to adapt reusable knowledge to remove assumptions that
> > turn out to be unwarranted.
> From note #14 by Jintae Lee and Tom Malone,
> JL&TM> As applied to the problem of shared reusable KBs, or shared
> > ontologies, the relevant questions are:  Do we want a canonical set
> > of primitives?  When do we want to allow them to be customized?
> > Is translation among the customized or specialized primitives
> > feasible, desirable?  What kinds of translation mechanism are possible
> > and what are the dimensions along which tradeoffs occur?
> >
> > If we proceed to work on a single shared ontology, without considering
> > these broader issues, then we might make the mistake of having a
> > technology that solves no real problems.
> That cautionary remark at the end is critical.  I believe that many
> of the ontologies that are being proposed or built today do not even
> recognize those critical issues.  As a result, they are solutions
> in search of nonexistent problems.
> From note #16 by Bill Mark,
> BM> My belief is that we *can* have lots of knowledge to share, but
> > only if we start building it to be sharable.  Knowledge can be worth
> > sharing for a variety of reasons: it may be a repository of problem
> > solving know-how; an integral record that supports reasoning about
> > a set of decisions (e.g., that comprise some design); a medium of
> > communication to be used by people cooperating to solve a problem;
> > and so on.  I think that we don't know much at all about how we will
> > share knowledge, but I suspect that the different reasons for sharing
> > knowledge will require different technologies in their support.
> From note #18 by Brian Williams and Danny Bobrow,
> BW&DB> It is easy for our knowledge sharing efforts to fall into a
> > knowledge representation black hole.  Its important to avoid the
> > urge to represent knowledge in an absolute, use independent manner.
> > Many of us have learned this lesson painfully...
> >
> > The notion of domain dependent and domain independent are misguided.
> > ... The concepts of domain dependence/independence are too black and
> > white to be useful.  Each theory has a range of applicability
> > somewhere in the vast middle between case specific and all
> > encompassing....
> >
> > Knowledge sharing should respect the different granularities of
> > knowledge and reasoning about that knowledge.
> From note #19 by Mark Tuttle,
> MT> I believe that "systems which are used tend to get better".
> > Therefore trying to create a path which would both allow early success
> > and at the same time lay the groundwork for more ambitious success
> > later should be a high priority.  Thus "incrementalism" should be
> > an important part of the vision.
> From note #20 by Pat Hayes,
> PH> ... to suggest that there should be a standard ontology for natural
> > language and common sense is nothing short of irresponsible for anyone
> > competent in AI.  Cyc is the only attempt to even try this idea out
> > thoroughly, and it is discovering all sorts of difficulties and
> > complexities, and doesnt even claim to have got it right or even to
> > know for sure whether it can really be done: its an experiment.  And
> > you want to set a Standard??  Fortunately, the idea is so ridiculous
> > that it hasn't a hope in hell of getting anywhere.
> Pat made that point in 1991, and he was right.  In response, Bob Neches
> made the following point:
> BN> Well, my personal view is that shared ontologies are possible with
> > today's knowledge representation technology -- but they will *evolve*
> > rather than being legislated.  That is, standard shared ontologies
> > will emerge out of a marketplace -- people will use and refine ones
> > that seem useful, and they will become more useful in the process.
> > I think they'll start small and specific, rather than broad and
> > general.
> >
> > Thus, the only successful "standard" ontologies will be *de facto
> > standards*.  I don't think it will happen by fiat.
> In note #62, Doug Lenat and R. V. Guha made the following comments
> about the search for a set of "primitives":
> DL&RVG> The problems... are (a) there is no small set, and (b) it's
> > almost impossible to nail down the meaning of most interesting terms,
> > because of the inherent ambiguity in whatever set of terms are
> > "primitive."
> >
> > So what did we do?
> >
> > (1) For one thing, we insist only on local coherence.  I.e., groups
> > share most of the meaning of most of the terms with other groups,
> > but within a group (working on a particular micro-theory) they strive
> > for complete sharing.
> >
> > (2) For another thing, both kinds of sharing are greatly facilitated
> > by the existing KB content --- i.e., if the terms involved are already
> > used in many existing axioms.
> >
> > While (2) can be achieved through massive straightforward effort,
> > (1) is more subtle, and has required certain significant extensions
> > to the representation framework. More specifically, we had to
> > introduce the whole machinery of contexts/micro-theories into Cyc
> > (which is why "divergence" has been much less of a problem, since
> > 1990.)
> All these points are important.  But the most discouraging point is
> that they were stated in 1991, they are just as relevant today, and
> people are still proposing projects that ignore these principles.
> I believe that anybody with a new proposal should review those
> notes from 1991 (and other related writings) and demonstrate how
> their proposed system will address those issues.
> John Sowa
> ___________________________________________________________________
> Proposals for a Universal Ontology
> * 4th century BC:  Aristotleís categories and syllogisms.
> * 3rd century AD:  The Tree of Porphyry for organizing Aristotle's
>   categories in a familiar tree diagram.
> * 17th century: Universal language schemes by Descartes, Mersenne,
>   Pascal, Leibniz, Newton, Wilkins, and others.
> * 18th century: More schemes, the Grand Academy of Lagado, Kant's
>   categories.
> * 19th century: Rogetís Thesaurus, Oxford English Dictionary.
> * Early 20th century: Many terminologies in many different fields.
> * 1960s: Computerized versions of the terminologies.
> * 1970s: ANSI/SPARC Conceptual Schema.
> * 1980s: Cyc, WordNet, Japanese Electronic Dictionary project.
> * 1990s: SRKB, ISO Conceptual Schema, Semantic Web, many workshops.
> * 2000s: Many proposals, no consensus.
> Informal terminologies and dictionaries have been extremely successful.
> Formal systems are still research projects.
> Source:  Slide 4 of http://www.jfsowa.com//talks/semtech2.pdf
> ____________________________________________________________________
> Source: http://ksl.stanford.edu/email-archives/srkb.messages/17.html
> Date: Wed, 20 Mar 91
> From: sowa@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> To: SRKB@xxxxxxx
> Subject: Position Paper
> AI has been most successful on small domains:  the microworlds of
> early AI demos; the highly specialized expert systems for commercial
> applications; and the machine translation systems like METEO, which
> require no human editing, but are restricted to the very narrow topic
> of weather reports.  Such knowledge bases can be shared and reused, but
> only for other projects that are similarly restricted.  The position
> taken in this paper is that such compartmentalization is inevitable:
> all deep knowledge is domain dependent.  Only superficial, syntactic
> knowledge carries over from one domain to another.  A serious question
> to consider is whether such superficial knowledge can provide a
> framework in which the deeper domain-dependent knowledge can be shared.
> The answer given in this paper is maybe:  some things can be shared,
> but the research needed to support a significant amount of sharing of
> knowledge representations across multiple domains is still in a
> primitive stage of development.
> Examples of Domain-Independent Knowledge
> Many different projects have surface similarities that seem to suggest
> that shared knowledge representations are possible.  Expert systems
> designed to assist automobile drivers, airplane pilots, ship captains,
> and locomotive engineers, for example, would seem to have a lot in
> common.  All of them must deal with time, speed, and distance as well
> as fuel consumption, equipment condition, and passenger safety.
> Programming languages also have a great deal in common, as the
> following assignment statements seem to indicate:
>    APL:         X <- A + B
>    FORTRAN:     X = A + B
>    PL/I:        X = A + B;
>    Pascal:      X := A + B;
> Yet these surface commonalities mask serious differences in detail.  A
> deeper analysis indicates that the similarities are more syntactic than
> semantic:  the concepts required for each domain are so tightly bound
> to that domain that they cannot be mapped from one to the other.
> Generalizations that cover multiple domains have so little detail that
> it is not clear whether they can contribute anything significant to the
> development of a new knowledge base in any of the more detailed domains.
> First consider the possibility of common knowledge bases for
> automobiles,  airplanes, ships, and trains.  A major difference between
> these domains is the number of degrees of freedom in the motion.  A
> train's motion is purely one dimensional because of the rigid tracks.
> At a gross level, a car's motion is also one dimensional, but at a
> detailed level, the driver must maneuver in two dimensions to keep the
> car in lane and avoid other cars and obstacles.  A ship's motion is also
> two dimensional, but its greater inertia causes a change in course to
> take minutes instead of the split-second changes that are possible with
> a car.  An airplane's motion is three dimensional, but changes in
> attitude introduce three more degrees of freedom.  Besides differences
> in motion, there are different kinds of signals to consider and
> different ways of planning a course and following it.  As a result, a
> driver, a pilot, a captain, and an engineer have totally different ways
> of thinking and reacting.  A person who is both a driver and a pilot
> would have two independent modes of thought with little or nothing in
> common.  Expert systems designed for each of these domains would also
> have few common concepts and practically no common rules.
> For the programming languages, the similarities in syntax mask major
> differences in semantics.  If A, B, and X were all integers or all
> floating-point numbers, the results would be the same for each of the
> languages.  But differences arise when the data types are different.
> FORTRAN and PL/I allow type conversions to or from integer and
> floating-point, but Pascal only does automatic conversion from integer
> to floating and would print an error message if A+B happened to be
> floating-point and X were integer.  APL also does automatic conversions
> in evaluating A+B; but in doing the assignment, it could change the type
> of X instead of converting the result of A+B to X's previous type. PL/I
> does many other kinds of automatic conversions and would even convert
> character strings to and from numbers.  APL and PL/I both allow A, B,
> and X to be arrays as well as simple scalars; but PL/I places more
> restrictions on the dimensions of the arrays, while APL has fewer
> restrictions and APL2 has even less.
> Because of these differences, terms like 'assignment statement' can be
> given a precise definition only for a single programming language.  In
> some cases, the language standards are so loose that the definition may
> change with every compiler or even every modification of a compiler.
> An ontology might include ADDITION as a concept type, but it would also
> require subtypes APL-ADDITION, FORTRAN-ADDITION, and so on for every
> programming language and dialect.
> Even the same physical object may be represented in totally different
> ways for different purposes.  A highway, for example, is one-dimensional
> on a map.  For an automobile driver, it is two-dimensional.  For the
> workers building the roadbed, it is three dimensional, but highly
> regular.  And for the surveyors who are planning a level road through
> hilly terrain, it is three dimensional with highly irregular amounts of
> cut and fill.  Any physical object or system can be represented at an
> unlimited number of levels of detail.  There is no stopping point that
> is natural to the object itself; the stopping point depends entirely on
> the purpose for which that object is being used.
> Is Natural Language Domain Independent?
> Natural languages can express knowledge about any topic in any domain.
> But that does not make them domain independent.  The syntax of language
> and the constraints at the level of case frames are largely domain
> independent, but the meaning of each word is highly dependent on the
> domain.  As an example, consider the following four sentences:
>    Tom supported the tomato plant with a stick.
>    Tom supported his daughter with $8,000 per year.
>    Tom supported his father with a decisive argument.
>    Tom supported his partner with a bid of 3 spades.
> These sentences all use the verb 'support' in the same syntactic
> pattern:
>    A person supported NP1 with NP2.
> Yet each use of the verb can only be understood with respect to a
> particular subject matter or domain of discourse: physical structures,
> financial arrangements, intellectual debate, or the game of bridge. For
> each of these domains, the concept type SUPPORT would require different
> SUPPORT.  Each of those subtypes could be subdivided further:  physical
> support by being tied to a stick could be distinguished from support by
> being propped up from below or being suspended from above; financial
> support by an allowance could be distinguished from support by a trust
> fund or support by payments at irregular intervals.
> Each difference in concept type makes a difference in reasoning and
> behavior:  a child with a regular allowance enjoys some measure of
> stability, while a child who gets irregular payments must be on good
> behavior, always hoping for another grant at any moment.
> The point of these examples is that vagueness and ambiguity do not
> result from the nature of language.  Instead, they result from the use
> and reuse of the same words in many different domains and applications.
> The same kinds of ambiguities that arise with a technical term like
> assignment statement also arise with a common verb like 'support'. The
> number of different concept types associated with a word is unlimited,
> and the totality of meanings may be inconsistent.  An interior
> decorator, for example, may think of walls as parts of a room, while a
> construction contractor may think of them as separators between rooms.
> Each view is correct for a certain purpose and point of view, but
> they are incompatible with one another.  The word senses listed in
> dictionaries represent the most common applications, and larger
> dictionaries list more of them.  But even the largest dictionaries fail
> to distinguish such nuances as addition in APL vs. addition in FORTRAN
> or support by an allowance vs. support by irregular payments.  Although
> the different meanings of addition, support, and wall are incompatible,
> they still have something in common.  It is easier for a person to learn
> and use a single word for them than to learn different words that change
> with every application.  But that implies that the only thing that is
> easily shared or reusable is the syntax, not the deeper semantics of the
> knowledge base.
> Language Games
> The traditional AI approach to knowledge representation resembles the
> early philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, as presented in the _Tractatus
> Logico-Philosophicus_.  In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein presented
> scathing criticisms of his earlier work -- all of which apply equally
> well to the current attempts to build shared, reusable knowledge bases.
> Yet his later work is not totally negative; it contains the basis for a
> solution.  His theory of language games suggests that the way to build
> large, flexible intelligent systems is to provide a framework that can
> use and reuse the same syntactic tokens in different language games for
> different domains.  Some of the implications of these ideas for AI were
> discussed in the last chapter of a book (Sowa 1984), two recent papers
> (Sowa 1990, 1991), and a workshop on large knowledge bases (Silverman
> and Murray 1991).
> References
> Silverman, Barry G., and Arthur J. Murray (1991) "Full-sized knowledge-
> based systems research workshop," _AI Magazine_, vol. 11, no. 5,
> January 1991, pp. 88-94.
> Sowa, J. F. (1984) _Conceptual Structures:  Information Processing in
> Mind and Machine_, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
> Sowa, J. F. (1990) "Crystallizing theories out of knowledge soup," in
> _Intelligent Systems:  State of the Art and Future Directions_, edited
> by Zbigniew W. Ras and Maria Zemankova, Ellis Horwood, New York,
> pp. 456-487.
> Sowa, J. F. (1991) "Lexical structures and conceptual structures,"
> in _Semantics in the Lexicon_, edited by James Pustejovsky, to be
> published by Kluwer Academic Press.
> Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1921) _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_,
> Routledge and  Kegan Paul, London, 1961.
> Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953) _Philosophical Investigations_, Basil
> Blackwell, Oxford.
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