Wednesday, January 21, 2009 12:08 PM, Ian Bailey wrote:
"The IDEAS work is extensional, because it saves us arguing about what we're
modelling - it
always comes down to extent, which doesn't rely on words or logic."
"My main point was that if you stick to an extensional approach, you can be
pretty sure what you're referring to." (01)
Any meaning (significance) is composed of sense (connotation) and reference
(denotation), or intension and extension. If somebody insists on the special
view that meaning is either just content (intension) (like Leibniz) or just
the thing referred to (like Okham), he is ignoring the long history of
semantic studies. If there is a construct, then there is the reference
class and the sense (purport, intension, import) given in a context. The
first one is the totality of entities referred to; the second one is the
totality of associations and relationships (as logical and conceptual
relatives). The ordered pair of the sense and the reference makes the
meaning of the construct, be it a concept, statement or theory. The like
goes for symbols as words and their significance. (02)
Summing: neither intensional models nor extensional models (as set theory)
are separately correct, but only as integrated. (03)
Azamat Abdoullaev (04)
----- Original Message -----
From: "Ian Bailey" <ian@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "'Patrick Cassidy'" <pat@xxxxxxxxx>; "'[ontolog-forum] '"
<ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 12:08 PM
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Next steps in using ontologies as standards (05)
> Hi Pat (C),
>
> I agree (partially) about the logic of the ontology being key, but there's
> more to it than that. A model can be logically correct but still not refer
> to anything real or useful (e.g. "Blegd-A", etc.). It can also be
> logically
> correct and still be an awful model (see 99% of the world's data models).
> The point I was trying to get across is that you need to be sure what
> you're
> referring to - logical structure alone doesn't assure this. The IDEAS work
> is extensional, because it saves us arguing about what we're modelling -
> it
> always comes down to extent, which doesn't rely on words or logic.
>
> As for your other point, machine reasoning and inference don't really
> feature in the IDEAS work - we wanted an accurate model of the area of
> discourse we were covering - military capability. I like that IDEAS (and
> BORO and ISO15926) are extensional and higher order, because as a
> pragmatic,
> hairy-a**ed mechanical engineer I am comfortable that I know what I'm
> dealing with. I can see there are types of types in the real world, so it
> must be a higher-order world (why flatten in ?). And I can see that there
> are things with spatio-temporal extent, and that gives me a nice way to
> irrefutably identify stuff.
>
> Chris has this theory that a model has to be at least as complex as its
> subject in order to be useful (I've probably butchered this theory in one
> sentence). However I think it applies to human understanding too. BORO is
> really simple at its heart, and my simple mind isn't comfortable with
> anything else.
>
> Cheers
>
> Ian (B)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Patrick Cassidy [mailto:pat@xxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: 21 January 2009 05:19
> To: ian@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; '[ontolog-forum] '
> Subject: RE: [ontolog-forum] Next steps in using ontologies as standards
>
> Ian,
> Re:
> [IB]
>> nations. The initial approach we took is very similar to the one
>> suggested
>> by John below...and it was a miserable failure. If you try to work
>> concept-by-concept, it's doomed to failure. You can never be sure that
>> you
>> have full consensus between everyone in the room, because you can't be
>> sure
>> that one person's understanding of a concept is precisely the same as
>> another's (no matter how long you debate it). One of two things happen;
>> you
>> make no progress because you can't reach agreement, or one dominant
>> personality railroads the whole thing.
>
> I agree. That's why the "meaning" of an ontology element can only be
> its
> logical specification, and how that behaves in inference. People donlt
> "agree" or "disagree" on the meaning of an ontological specification, they
> observe (or do thought experiments) how it will behave in inference. Its
> inferential behavior is its only "meaning".
> If different competent ontologists (say, A, B, and C) want different
> logical structures to be labeled with the same label (say, "Blegd"), no
> problem. The different structures are given different labels. e.g.
> Blegd-A, Blegd-B, and Blegd-C (each of which is mapped to "Blegd" in a
> different terminology). The results don't depend on consensus for
> terminology usage and the debates don't go on forever, they are resolved
> rapidly by voting if issues more complicated than that trivial one arise.
> In the consortium project I have suggested, all participants will be
> aware before starting of the procedures used to resolve disputes, and if
> they don't like the procedures, they don't participate. I am still
> certain
> that there will be enough willing participants to form a large enough user
> community for the resulting ontology to assure that it is more widely used
> than any other foundation ontology.
>
> Pat
>
> Patrick Cassidy
> MICRA, Inc.
> 908-561-3416
> cell: 908-565-4053
> cassidy@xxxxxxxxx
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
>> bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Ian Bailey
>> Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2009 8:23 AM
>> To: '[ontolog-forum] '
>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Next steps in using ontologies as
>> standards
>>
>> Folks,
>>
>> In the IDEAS Group we have a consortium of a reasonable size (with
>> representatives from the defence depts of Australia, Canada, Sweden, UK
>> &
>> US). We didn't actually set out to develop an ontology. What we wanted
>> to do
>> was share information (related to enterprise architecture) between the
> In my experience over several
>> standards projects, the loudest voice rarely belongs to the most
>> competent
>> person, so neither of these outcomes is favourable.
>>
>> Facing a lack of modelling progress in IDEAS, we went back to the
>> drawing
>> board and decided we'd try a formal method for analysis. We chose Chris
>> Partridge's BORO method, as a few of us had read his book and wanted to
>> give
>> it a try. It has the advantage of ignoring ideas such as "concepts" and
>> "terms". It's ruthlessly extensional - individuals are identified by
>> their
>> physical extent, classes by their members, and relationships by their
>> ends.
>> Once you've figured out something's extent, you can then apply whatever
>> names you want to it. The process can be achingly slow, but at least it
>> gets
>> results, and the results can't be refuted.
>>
>> Not so long after we started on IDEAS, I went to a NATO workshop on
>> terminology. It was facilitated by someone we were told was a guru at
>> this
>> sort of thing. His approach was to work concept-by-concept and we hit
>> the
>> same problems we'd just got over in IDEAS. In a three day workshop they
>> managed to produce three terms for the glossary. There were about
>> fifteen
>> people in the room, so that's fifteen man-days per concept. If you plan
>> to
>> work on Longman's dictionary, you'd better have plenty of time on your
>> hands
>> and the patience to deal with a room full of experts.
>>
>> Another tip is to sort out your ontic categories early on. I'm not sure
>> OWL
>> and RDFS give you a proper foundation for ontology development - there
>> are
>> some very strange things in the W3C spec about how an individual in one
>> ontology can be a class in another (bizarre even in an intensional
>> approach). We published the IDEAS foundation elements on the website -
>> http://www.ideasgroup.org/3Foundation/ - and you're more than welcome
>> to
>> re-use them.
>>
>> I'm not suggesting you use BORO if you set out to develop your
>> foundation
>> ontology, but I think you do need some very strong criteria about how
>> you
>> identify things. Going extensional solves the problem of identity, but
>> does
>> mean that the ontology developers have to think a lot harder about what
>> they're doing, and ground all their work in the real world. Not usually
>> a
>> problem if they're philosophers or logicians, but if they're computer
>> scientists, you're going to spend the first six months coaxing them out
>> of
>> the Matrix and back into the real world. Intensional approaches seem to
>> suit
>> information technology folks a bit better, but I'm not aware of any
>> water-tight methods in this area.
>>
>> The problem in standards development is one of personalities (and there
>> are
>> some very strong ones in information management disciplines).
>> Additionally,
>> there are issues of reputation and commercial interests to consider (if
>> a
>> standard goes a certain way, it could close the market for a vendor, or
>> negate ten years of academic research). One way to bypass the egos and
>> hidden agendas is to get them all to sign up to a method that
>> guarantees
>> results. They might not all like the results they get, but at least
>> they're
>> defensible. My old job was developing ISO data standards (esp. in
>> ISO10303)
>> and I've got to say that if we'd had a method like BORO when developing
>> some
>> the data models there, we'd have done it in half the time and saved a
>> lot of
>> arguing (some of the people involved still don't speak to each other).
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Ian Bailey
>> www.modelfutures.com
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John F.
>> Sowa
>> Sent: 20 January 2009 07:35
>> To: [ontolog-forum]
>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Next steps in using ontologies as
>> standards
>>
>> Pat,
>>
>> I know *exactly* what you are trying to do, and your comments
>> show that you haven't seriously examined the definitions in
>> Longman's dictionary, which you keep citing as a paradigm.
>>
>> PC> It is clear that you have completely misinterpreted the
>> > proposal I have been making.
>>
>> I'll summarize your proposal:
>>
>> 1. Find a set of primitive concepts that are common to all
>> natural languages. These would be similar to the defining
>> vocabulary of Longman's dictionary for students who are
>> learning English as a second language.
>>
>> 2. Use those primitives to define a much larger vocabulary of
>> terms and thereby relate them by means of those primitives.
>>
>> This idea is not bad for writing a dictionary that is intended
>> to be used by students who *already* learned the concepts in
>> their native country and just need to learn the English words
>> for them. Just look at a typical definition:
>>
>> energy. The power which does work and drives machines:
>> atomic/electrical energy | the energy of the sun.
>>
>> If the students had already learned the concept, this kind
>> of definition would enable them to relate the English word
>> 'energy' to their previous knowledge. But for an ontology,
>> this definition is worthless. In physics, the words 'energy',
>> 'work', and 'power' express three different, but related
>> concepts that are defined by different formulas. For an
>> ontology, the above definition would be worse than useless
>> -- because it happens to be false. Almost every definition
>> in that dictionary is either false or hopelessly vague.
>>
>> PC> The whole point of creating an FO by a large consortium
>> > is precisely to be certain that the views representing many
>> > different interests and ways to express knowledge are taken
>> > into account...
>>
>> A consortium or committee is good for evaluating proposals,
>> but they can't solve the unsolvable. Just look at the way
>> the Newtonian concepts of space, time, mass, and energy
>> evolved in the progression to relativity and quantum mechanics.
>>
>> Those words are used in all three theories (and many other
>> variations). But those words are *not* defined in terms of
>> primitives. They are related to one another by various
>> equations. Furthermore, the equations in the three theories
>> are not only different; they are contradictory. There is
>> nothing that remotely resembles defining primitives.
>>
>> That observation is true for every formal ontology. There
>> are no primitives. There are just equations (or other
>> kinds of formulas) that relate the terms. The words in
>> one theory and its successors are frequently the same
>> or similar. But the equations that relate them are
>> very different.
>>
>> There's a fundamental reason why it's impossible to use any
>> subset of natural language vocabulary as ontological primitives:
>> NL words are intended to be used in a open-ended number of ways,
>> but ontological terms are absolutely precise within the scope
>> of a particular theory.
>>
>> That distinction creates an inherent conflict:
>>
>> 1. There are common ideas expressed in the basic vocabularies
>> of many different languages, as many people such as Len Talmy
>> and Anna Wierzbicka have shown. But the corresponding words
>> are vague, with many different *microsenses* that vary from
>> one "language game" to another.
>>
>> 2. Formal ontologies and scientific theories require sharply
>> defined terms that denote values that can be measured
>> precisely. Those terms are defined only within a formal
>> theory (or language game), and any paraphrase in the words
>> of #1 is at best a vague approximation.
>>
>> The Longman's defining terms (or anything similar, such as
>> Wierzbicka's primitives) are inherently vague. They cannot
>> be used to define ontological terms that must have a precise,
>> formally defined sense.
>>
>> John
>>
>>
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