Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology similarity and accurate communication

[Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx>]

At 7:33 PM -0400 3/10/08, Patrick Cassidy wrote:

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> Responses to selected
> comments:
>  
> [[[1]]]
> [PH] >> Second, even a conceptual
> defining vocabulary is not a formal foundation ontology, since you are
> using 'defining' in the dictionary sense (which is of limited, if any,
> use when describing formal ontologies).
>        I
> have tried to explain several times that the word ?defining¾ in
> the phrase ?conceptual defining vocabulary¾ is used in an
> analogical way, and that the foundation ontology will consist mostly
> of concept specifications that use necessary conditions, not necessary
> and sufficient conditions.
>  
> Then it is not analogous to the
> dictionary case (which as far as I can see, is the only motivation for
> your entire proposal.) You can't have it both ways: if you are making
> an analogy based on definitions, but not meaning actual definitions,
> then you need to either elucidate the analogy more carefully or
> abandon it (I'd suggest the latter).
>  
> A definition is a description of the
> meaning of a term, whether it is a linguistic definition or a logical
> specification. That is the analogy.

Not good enough. First, tell me what you mean by 'meaning of a term' when we are talking about formal ontology languages.

> [[[2]]]<snip>
> [PC] >>  Of course, the
> process of language learning involves multiple clues, including
> possibly an innate ability to exclude certain combinatorially possible
> syntactic constructions from the grammar.  My point was that the
> language learning process is sufficiently *similar* in
> different people learning the same native language, that the process
> supports the ability of learners  to develop a common internal
> ontology (of unknown structure) that is very close.
>  
> [PH] > Again, that simply does not
> follow. You are begging the question entirely. I didn't bring up this
> whole topic of language learning, note: you did in order to justify
> this idea of a 99.9% common ontology, and I repeat, regardless of the
> psycholinguistic data, in fact, that is poppycock: nothing about
> language learning supports the claim that we all have 99.9% agreement
> on our mental models.
>  
> ÝÝÝ My opinion that our mental
> models for the basic terms are over 99.9% in agreement is based on
> personal observation of the high accuracy of communication, when using
> the basic words.ÝÝ ÝI believe that that level of accuracy
> requires common mental models, for the concepts represented by those
> basic words.Ý You donít.Ý Fine.Ý

I have offered (admittedly anecdotal) evidence which strongly suggests that people have different mental models. I don't think you have offered a scrap of evidence for your position: you have only repeatedly told us that you believe it. I don't find this a very convincing argument.

>  But you shouldnít assert that it
> has been disproven unless you can cite an accessible reference and
> point to the passage where the data is summarized.

The burden of proof is on you. Cite a reference explaining how we all come to have identical mental models.

> ÝÝ
> [[[3]]]  [PC] >> The question
> of whether people actually use an innate common ontology is a
> scientific question, but the methods for investigating that are likely
> to be horrendously complex, and I do not think that past efforts to
> create a foundation ontology at Cyc actually address this specific
> question.
>  
> [PH] I agree, and it would have save a
> lot of time if you had not brought it up.
> Ý ÝÝÝNow, this puzzles me.Ý It
> was you who brought up the experience at Cyc as evidence that we
> donít have common mental models.Ý

The experience in question happened while I was working at Cyc, but that is irrelevant. It was not part of what one might call the 'standard Cyc methodology' aimed at creating a foundation ontology. In fact, quite the contrary: it was so evidently counter to the basic assumptions of the entire Cyc project that further discussion of it was discouraged.

> Now you say that the Cyc experience
> doesnít address the question.Ý Can you reconcile these two
> assertions?Ý I canít find the bridging axioms.
>  
> Ý ÝÝOn the other hand, I think that
> trying to develop a foundation ontology *explicitly* as a
> Conceptual Defining Vocabulary *would* provide evidence for or
> against this hypothesis, and in the process may help develop a common
> foundation ontology that is more widely used than the existing ones.
> ÝÝYou donít think the answer is worth the effort?Ý Fine.Ý We
> just disagree.
>  
> [[[4]]] ]PC] >> ÝIf that process
> results in a **logical contradiction**, it is my expectation that one
> or more of the formalizations specifies a concept that is not
> primitive
>  
> [PH] > OK, let me immediately give you
> a counterexample. DOLCE and BOF both require the categories of
> continuant and occurrent to be disjoint: nothing can possibly be both
> a continuant and an occurrent in these ontologies. Other ontologies (
> I have one, and I think the same is true of Cyc) allow both categories
> with pretty much the same properties of the respective types, but
> allow them to overlap. These two categories of ontology are logically
> incompatible: adding a Cyc axiom to DOLCE will immediately produce
> inconsistencies. And yet this is all concerned with very basic topics
> of how to describe time and change, without which a nontrivial
> ontology can hardly be said to be possible.
> Ý
> Good example.Ý Here is a case where it
> seems that the disputants are using ìcontinuantí and ìoccurrentî
> terms in different senses.Ý

Only one of the disputants use these terms at all, and their sense is quite precisely laid out and formalized.

>  Clearly, if some entity is an
> instance of one ìoccurrentî but not an instance of another
> ìoccurrentî,

That does not make sense. Occurrents do not have instances.

> the meanings differ ñ they are using
> the terms in different senses.

No, this is completely muddled. You do not know what you are talking about.

> Ý Once this is recognized, it is
> necessary to explore the intended meanings of those terms in more
> detail in order to decide why it is that one ontologist believes that
> ?X is an instance, but the other doesnít think so.Ý I would be
> delighted to explore any such example in detail, and believe it likely
> that the problem will be shown to be at basis a terminology
> dispute.

Im sure you do believe this, yes. But in this case you are wrong. As, based on your other postings, I think you are naturally (like me) a 4-d thinker, let me list for you some of the properties of continuants, and you tell me how you will model these things in your ontology: what kind of thing you take them to be.

Continuants are 3-d, not 4-d. They do not have a temporal extent.

Continuants last for a time (or if you prefer, continue to exist for a time).

Each continuant is identically the same continuant throughout its lifetime.

Continuants do not have temporal parts or slices. Either it is meaningless to speak of (C at t) as an entity when C is a continuant and t is a time; or else, (C at t) = C for all times t.

> Ý In order to discover the problem, one
> needs to analyze the intended meanings of those terms in more detail
> than can be achieved by merely pointing to subclasses or instances.Ý
> The subclass/instance tactic clearly fails in this case to resolve the
> intended meanings. ÝIt will be necessary to continue dissecting the
> intended meanings into increasingly finer parts and formalizing them,
> until the part of the intended meaning that differs between the two
> ontologists become clear.Ý Then it will be possible to recompose the
> basic categories (which may have to change, but now for a good reason)
> to allow each ontologist to specify the intended meanings, without
> causing a logical contradiction.Ý

This whole process is a fantasy. This simply does not happen. This is like assuming that if you get two people together and they do enough careful exegesis of one another's beliefs, they will eventually agree that they have the same religion.

>  Such a process would in fact help
> discover what the true fundamental elements of meaning
> are.

Were such things to exist, it might. But there is no reason to suppose that they do.

> ÝMy expectation would be that if the
> analysis reveals that there are things that can be reasonably labeled
> as ìcontinuantî and ìoccurrentî and that the two are truly
> disjoint, then the ontology that has instances that are considered to
> be of both types may in fact be a merger of two different views of the
> same entity.

Actually, it appears that there are two kinds of 3-d entity: those that can be meaningfully considered to be time-slices of 4-d entities, and those that aren't. Unfortunately, this is not a common-sense distinction. Take a person such as you or me. In one view, there is a fundamental, necessary distinction between me, the continuant, and my lifespan, or my life, or some such, a 4-d entity or perhaps an occurrent. One is the real, solid, living me and the other is something like a movie of my life from start to finish. On the other view, there is simply no possible distinction to make here: or, possibly, there only are the movies, and these 'continuants' are impossible.

> Ý We would need to look at the
> specifics of the representations to determine what the problem is.Ý
> Perhaps not something that can be done in an on-line discussion, but
> maybe worth trying.

There are entire libraries written on this division of perspective. It has been done to death on various archived ontology forums, also. But when you say this is a 'problem', what do you mean, exactly?

>  
> ÝÝÝÝ You may not think that such
> a process is practical, but I think it is the most plausible path to
> achieving true semantic interoperability.Ý ÝÝÝBFO is
> structured as a single-inheritance hierarchy.Ý If it is considered
> immutable, it will be quite impossible to include it, without change,
> into a common ontology.Ý But I think the required changes will not
> be too many (I have identified some required changes).Ý Whether any
> ontologist will be willing to make any change depends totally on the
> motivation.Ý I expect that a substantial project to develop a common
> foundation ontology, with enough participants to guarantee that it
> will have wide usage, would be a powerful motivation.
>  
> ÝÝÝ Question: do you think that
> equating a zero-time-interval timeslice of a person with a 3D
> ìContinuantî person would lead to any logical
> incompatibility?

I KNOW that it would. Here's a quick one:

(cl-comment 'basic continuant axiom' (forall ((t Time)(c Continuant)) (= (c at t) c ) ))

(cl-comment 'definition of age property in 4-d' (forall (x (t Time)) (=  (age (x at t)) (minus t (birthtime x)) )))

from which, and a little arithmetic, it follows that

(forall ((t Time)(s Time)) (= s t) )

i.e. time is impossible.

Pat H

> Ý It seems to me that the only
> difference would be in the way the assertions include the time
> element.Ý Here I can imagine the bridging axioms.Ý Yet 3D/4D Ýis
> often cited as an incompatibility.
>  
> PatC
>  
> Patrick Cassidy
> MICRA, Inc.
> 908-561-3416
> cell: 908-565-4053
> cassidy@xxxxxxxxx
>  
> From:
> ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
> Pat Hayes
> Sent: Monday, March 10, 2008 3:02 PM
> To: [ontolog-forum]
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology similarity and accurate
> communication
>  
> At 1:36 PM -0400 3/10/08, Patrick Cassidy
> wrote:
> > Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
> >    
> > boundary="----=_NextPart_000_007A_01C882B3.D0E981A0"
> > Content-Language: en-us
> > To clear up misinterpretations:
> >  
> > [[[1]]]
> > [PH] >> Second, even a conceptual defining
> > vocabulary is not a formal foundation ontology, since you are using
> > 'defining' in the dictionary sense (which is of limited, if any, use
> > when describing formal ontologies).
> >        I have tried to
> > explain several times that the word ?defining¾ in the phrase
> > ?conceptual defining vocabulary¾ is used in an analogical way, and
> > that the foundation ontology will consist mostly of concept
> > specifications that use necessary conditions, not necessary and
> > sufficient conditions.
>  
> Then it is not analogous to the
> dictionary case (which as far as I can see, is the only motivation for
> your entire proposal.) You can't have it both ways: if you are making
> an analogy based on definitions, but not meaning actual definitions,
> then you need to either elucidate the analogy more carefully or
> abandon it (I'd suggest the latter).
>  
> >  But if you believe that only an ontology with all
> > N&S definitions will be useful, then I can only disagree.
>  
> Of course not, but then I don't use the
> term "definition".
>  
> > Too many useful basic notions are not N&S definable. 
> > If you are merely objecting to the use of the term ?defining¾ in
> > that phrase, then substitute any other word you consider less
> > problematic for your own use.
> No, I want to understand what YOU mean.
> >  
> > [[[2]]]
> > [PC] >> You say that psycholinguistic research has
> > already disproven the notion that children can learn to communicate
> > with a common vocabulary by the experience of seeing words used in
> > context to refer to objects and events.
> >  
> > [PH]  > No, I did not say that. At some level this
> > is clearly true, as this is simply a description of what children in
> > fact actually do (if you substitute 'hearing' for 'seeing', and avoid
> > the question-begging use of 'refer to' in the last phrase.) The
> > question is, how do they do it? And what I heard you saying was
> > that they did it by a process of association: that when a word is used
> > 'near' an object or event, that proximity is enough to induce an
> > association between words and their meanings which constitutes the
> > word-meaning mapping underlying linguistic competence
> >  
> >      And no, I did not say that mere
> > proximity of a word and object is enough to associate a term with a
> > meaning.  I never used the word ånear¼.  What I said was
> > ?words are associated with their meanings by experience in
> > context¾.
>  
> I used scare quotes to acknowledge that
> you did not use the word, but "experience in context"
> implies near, I presume. Or if it does not, perhaps you could tell us
> what YOU mean by 'context'.
>  
> >   Of course, the process of language learning
> > involves multiple clues, including possibly an innate ability to
> > exclude certain combinatorially possible syntactic constructions from
> > the grammar.  My point was that the language learning process is
> > sufficiently *similar* in different people learning the same
> > native language, that the process supports the ability of learners
> >  to develop a common internal ontology (of unknown structure)
> > that is very close.
>  
> Again, that simply does not follow. You
> are begging the question entirely. I didn't bring up this whole topic
> of language learning, note: you did in order to justify this idea of a
> 99.9% common ontology, and I repeat, regardless of the
> psycholinguistic data, in fact, that is poppycock: nothing about
> language learning supports the claim that we all have 99.9% agreement
> on our mental models.
>  
> >    I merely alluded to a couple of
> > components of the learning process as examples of things that would be
> > similar among learners.  Of course, saying this doesn¼t prove
> > it, and your doubting it doesn¼t disprove it either.
>  
> Of course not, but the burden of proof is
> on you, seems to me.
>  
> >     You correctly point out the disputes
> > among adults when trying to formalize a common ontology.  But in
> > those cases the terms used need to acquire a much more precise meaning
> > than the terms used in normal communication.
>  
> Exactly. It follows, then, that agreement
> on word meanings in normal usage does NOT imply agreement on meanings
> at the level of precision needed to support a formal ontology. Which
> is exactly what I have been arguing through this whole thread, and you
> have until now been denying.
>  
> >  Even though they consciously try not to get hung up
> > on terminology, it appears to me that some disagreements still are
> > caused by a desire to fix a specific meaning to a term, where
> > different ontologists have a different notion of how that term should
> > be formalized.  My suggestion is to formalize all of the
> > different notions, and give them different names.
>  
> In what POSSIBLE sense can that be said
> to amount to agreement to within 99.9% ? I agree this is an
> interesting, though naive, engineering strategy, but it can't possibly
> be aligned with your arguments about common mental ontologies and
> language learning.
>  
> >  If that process results in a **logical
> > contradiction**, it is my expectation that one or more of the
> > formalizations specifies a concept that is not primitive
> >
>  
> OK, let me immediately give you a
> counterexample. DOLCE and BOF both require the categories of
> continuant and occurrent to be disjoint: nothing can possibly be both
> a continuant and an occurrent in these ontologies. Other ontologies (
> I have one, and I think the same is true of Cyc) allow both categories
> with pretty much the same properties of the respective types, but
> allow them to overlap. These two categories of ontology are logically
> incompatible: adding a Cyc axiom to DOLCE will immediately produce
> inconsistencies. And yet this is all concerned with very basic topics
> of how to describe time and change, without which a nontrivial
> ontology can hardly be said to be possible.
>  
> >  This latter expectation is part of the ?conceptual
> > defining vocabulary (CDV) hypothesis¾.  But this can only be
> > proven by attempting specifically to create a foundation ontology as a
> > CDV.
> As is often the case, it is much easier to refute than to prove.
> >  The question of whether people actually use an
> > innate common ontology is a scientific question, but the methods for
> > investigating that are likely to be horrendously complex, and I do not
> > think that past efforts to create a foundation ontology at Cyc
> > actually address this specific question.
>  
> I agree, and it would have save a lot of
> time if you had not brought it up.
>  
> >  The development of a foundation ontology as a CDV
> > would not itself prove that the internal ontologies of
> > sixteen-year-olds are similar, but it would at least show that it is
> > possible to have some reasonably small set of concepts that can be
> > used in combination to describe the meanings of a very large number of
> > other more specialized concepts.  That knowledge would be very
> > useful, in my opinion.
> >  
> >     The common terms in English can have
> > multiple meanings.  Yet, it appears to me that assertions using
> > those terms by people trying to be clear are almost always (> 99%)
> > unambiguous, taken in the full context of the text.   So I
> > believe that there is a disambiguation process that results in the
> > selection of the proper sense, at least 99% of the time.
>  
> That begs the question by assuming that
> there is a single sense. But you may work with your sense and I with
> my sense, and most of the time our conclusions agree well enough for
> us to cooperate. We say that we both understand 'the' meaning of the
> word, when there is no single meaning.
>  
> >  Three amplifications:
> > (1)    That statistic represents a
> > use-weighted accuracy.  There may be some basic terms that are
> > misinterpreted with a lot higher frequency, but those terms, if they
> > exist, appear to be used infrequently.  This accuracy is intended
> > to refer to accuracy in interpreting written text, read in a context
> > in which the background of the communication is already known. 
> > Spoken language may be more accurate, by having more situational
> > referents and an opportunity for feedback; it may be less accurate if
> > too much knowledge in the hearer is assumed.
> > (2)    The senses in which terms are
> > interpreted may still be quite vague.  That would leave room for
> > misinterpretation in the case where the vagueness masks an important
> > distinction.  But I believe that where there are important
> > distinctions, people trying to be clear will use more specific terms
> > or phrases to avoid significant misinterpretation.
> > (3)    The senses that are represented by
> > the basic linguistic defining vocabulary may not be identical to some
> > enumerated sense in a given dictionary.
> >  
> > [[[3]]] [PC]  >> None of this is a theory of
> > language acquisition, but it is a description of how people can
> > acquire the *same* meanings
> >          [PH] WHY
> > is it that? You keep saying that, but even your own account does not
> > support this claim.
> >       
> >     I didn¼t think that suggesting a hypothesis
> > ? stated as such -  required an actual proof of the
> > hypothesis.  But I did say that my own observations suggest that
> > communication using the basic vocabulary is highly accurate, and that
> > that implies a common set of meanings that can be attached to the
> > words.  This estimate of accuracy is a non-systematic observation
> > that would need proof if one wanted to investigate the hypothesis. 
> > I think it would  be the first thing that needs proof, if one
> > were to properly investigate the notion of a common ontology used in
> > language understanding.  I am not aware of whether the accuracy
> > of basic communication has been formally investigated (didn¼t do a
> > literature search ? Googling some relevant phrases has not lead to
> > anything on point).    If you don¼t think that
> > linguistic communication using the basic words (Longman¼s, 
> > e.g.) is accurate, perhaps you have some reason for that skepticism,
> > which I would like to hear.  But the ambiguity of
> >
> > Individual words is not at issue.  The question is,
> > if one person tries to explain something to another, using the basic
> > words in their basic senses, how often is the explanation
> > misunderstood?
>  
> Suppose the answer is, almost never. It
> STILL does not follow that people all have the same internal
> ontology.
>  
> PatH
>  
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