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At 3:04 PM -0400 3/11/08, Patrick Cassidy wrote:
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boundary="----=_NextPart_000_01FD_01C88389.2C134E00"
Content-Language: en-us
Matthew,
ÝÝÝ I think it would not be
particularly difficult to include both 3D and 4D in an
ontology,
Of course not, since 3-d is simply a projection from the 4-d
space, which is kind of trivial; IF, that is, one accepts the 4-d
framework to begin with. But many people do not, which is the entire
point. For many people (Barry Smith et al) and many ontologies (Dolce,
BOF) , there are two distinct ways for something to exist 'in time'.
One of them is similar to the 4-d view, and these things are called
occurrents: they are things that happen and can have temporal
parts. They take place, and it is meaningful to talk of time-slices of
them. The other way for something to exist in time is to be a
continuant. Continuants do not have temporal parts (in one
well-known characterization, a continuant is wholly present when
present), they endure rather than happen, and they do not have
temporal slices. They are not 4-dimensional in any way, even though
they are 3-d and last for a time. A continuant is identically the
same thing for as long as it endures, though of course its
properties may change: so the properties of continuants typically have
to be treated as fluents. You and I are continuants: we are each the
'same person' throughout our lives. On this view, note, a continuant
cannot be identified with a time-slice of a 4-d entity, since two of
those, at different times, are never the same thing. Continuants are
strictly impossible in a true 4-d ontological framework.
If you formalize these two intuitions directly and put them
simply together (that is, without a fairly elaborate translation
process to map one to the other) you will quickly get formal
inconsistencies (or, possibly, something like syntax errors, where one
ontology makes assertions which are illegal or ill-formed in the other
ontology.)
PatH
but it depends on a specific
interpretation of both which may or may not suit the intuitions of
those who like one or the other.Ý I do not believe it is necessary
to consider that a physical object ìisî a 4D or ìisî a 3D
entity, but that those are two different ways to view and represent
physical objects.Ý As I have mentioned before, I find both 3D and 4D
views of objects to be useful, and would prefer to have both in y
ontology, as below.
ÝÝ One mapping is to interpret a 3D
object as completely identical to a 4D timeslice of the corresponding
4D object that extends over a zero-length time interval (start and end
times are identical).
Quite. This is the obvious way to treat 3-d objects in a 4-d
framework; but such a 3-d object is NOT what the other guys call a
continuant.
ÝÝ In this view, a 3D entity is also
a 4D entity, but just having special properties ( a 4D object with a
restriction on the length of time of the time-slice - zero time
extension).Ý
That is one way to go, though it makes more sense IMO to treat it
as a 3-d 'surface' of a 4-d entity, just as a physical surface is a
2-d surface of a 3-d entity.
The way to accommodate both 3D and
4D formalisms in this manner is to allow time-explicit assertions with
3D objects that would not be meaningful for 4D extended objects.Ý
Then
ÝÝ (and
ÝÝÝÝÝÝ (instance OBJ3D101
Object3D)
ÝÝÝÝ
ÝÝ(hasAttributeInInterval OBJ3D101 RedColor (interval 20080101
20080130)))
ÝÝÝÝÝ Asserts that OBJ101 is
red from Jan 1 to Jan 30 in 2008, at every time point in that
interval.
ÝÝ In 4D one can assert:
ÝÝÝÝ (and
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ (startsAt
OBJ4D101 20080101)
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ (endsAt OBJ4D101
20080130)
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ (has Attribute
OBJ4D101 RedColor))
Ý Where ëhasAttributeí also means
that the attribute holds throughout the time extension of the
object.
Ý===========Ý To relate these twoÝ
==================================
ÝThen, if one identifies the Type OBJ3D
as a subtype of OBJ4D, the relation will be:
ÝÝ (=>
ÝÝÝÝÝ (and
ÝÝÝ ÝÝÝÝÝÝ(instance
?OBJ3 OBJ3D)
ÝÝÝ ÝÝÝÝÝÝ(instance
?OBJ4 OBJ4D)
ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ
(isaTimeSliceOf ?OBJ4 ?OBJ4Whole)
ÝÝÝÝ ÝÝÝÝÝ(startsAt
?OBJ4 Ý?T1)
ÝÝÝÝÝÝ ÝÝÝ(endsAt ?OBJ4
?T2)
ÝÝÝÝÝ
ÝÝÝÝ(isa3DProjectionOf ?OBJ3 ?OBJ4Whole))
ÝÝÝÝ (<=>
ÝÝ
ÝÝÝÝÝÝ(hasAttributeInInterval ?OBJ3 ?ATTR (interval ?T1
?T2))
ÝÝÝÝÝÝ ÝÝ(has Attribute
?OBJ4 ?ATTR)))
ÝÝ *** the ëisa3DProjectionOfí
relation relates the 3D and 4D objects and allows both to inhabit the
same ontology, if the above axiom is accepted ****
Ý This allows assertions using the
time-explicit relations on 3D objects to be translated into 4D-speak
and vice versa.
ÝÝ The above example only maps the
ëattributeí property, but if the logic allows one would replace the
explicit relation with a variable (possibly needing related pairs, one
for 3D and one for 4D)
============================================
An alternative method is to define a
class of ëTimeSliceí which has a begin time point and an end time
point (somewhat like the Cyc TemporalThing, but Cyc has things like
physical objects as necessary instances, which I prefer to avoid).Ý
In this formalization a PhysicalObject is neither necessarily 3D nor
necessarily 4D (dimension-neutral).Ý One can use the same 3D
relation as above on a PhysicalObject in this formalism:
ÝÝ (and
ÝÝÝÝÝÝ (instance OBJ101
PhysicalObject)
ÝÝÝÝ
ÝÝ(hasAttributeInInterval OBJ101 RedColor (interval 20080101
20080130)))
ÝIn order to create a 4D timeslice and
assert a property on it, one creates and object that is an instance of
both PhysicalObject and TimeSlice:
Ý (and
ÝÝÝ (instance ?OBJ101TSÝ
PhysicalObject)
ÝÝÝ (instance ?OBJ101TSÝ
TimeSlice)
ÝÝÝ (startsAt ?OBJ101TS
Ý20080101)
ÝÝÝÝ(endsAt Ý?OBJ101TS
20080130))
Ý ÝÝ(has Attribute OBJ101TSÝ
RedColor)))
ÝÝ
This has the virtue of only requiring
binary relations, suitable for those who want to confine themselves to
OWL.Ý Again, the attribute is interpreted as holding throughout the
time interval.
The two ëattributeí relations are
related by the axiom, similar to the one above:
ÝÝ (=>
ÝÝÝÝÝ (and
ÝÝÝ ÝÝÝÝÝÝ(instance
OBJ-TSÝ PhysicalObject)
ÝÝÝ ÝÝÝÝÝÝ(instance
OBJ-TSÝ TimeSlice)
Ý ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ(startsAt
OBJ-TS Ý?T1)
ÝÝÝÝÝÝ ÝÝÝ(endsAt
ÝOBJ-TSÝ ?T1))
ÝÝÝÝ (<=>
ÝÝ
ÝÝÝÝÝÝ(hasAttributeInInterval OBJ-TS ?ATTR Ý(interval ?T1
?T2))
ÝÝÝÝÝÝ ÝÝ(has Attribute
OBJ-TS ?ATTR)))
Ý In this case, both ëattributeí
relations -Ý time explicit and time implicit ñ can take ?OBJ-TS as
an argument because it is an instance of both PhysicalObject and
TimeSlice.Ý Here, one generates 4D objects when creating instances,
by asserting them as an instance of TimeSlice.
ÝÝÝÝ In neither case is it
necessary to handle physical Events as anything other than temporally
extended entities (even if they are instantaneous), so no bridging
axioms are required there.Ý A physical event does not need to be
asserted as an instance of TimeSlice, since it already has begin and
end points as part of its own specification.
ÝÝÝÝÝ An interesting question
is whether anything other than a PhysicalObject could reasonably be
asserted to be an instance of TimeSlice.Ý Roles also can have a
beginning and end, but I would prefer to have the ëRoleí type as a
subtype of TimeSlice, where it simply inherits the begin and end time
points.Ý Then asserting something to be an instance of Role also
makes it a TimeSlice.
Ý ÝÝÝIf one wants to work only
with 3D or only with 4D, one can simply eliminate the parts one
doesnít need.Ý If later one wants to interact with an ontology
having the alternative view, one can do a translation or just add back
the bridging axiom(s).
ÝÝ I donít know if either of the
above formulations would conflict with any axioms in your 4D system.Ý
If they do, perhaps you might check to see if those axioms are
actually necessary, or perhaps were added to create distinctions that
do not actually factor into the performance of the
system.
Ý Pat
Patrick Cassidy
MICRA, Inc.
908-561-3416
cell: 908-565-4053
cassidy@xxxxxxxxx
From:
ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx
Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2008
10:55 AM
To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology similarity and accurate
communication
Dear Pat C.
I've been following this loosely, and I
mostly agree with Pat H, even if he has been giving you rather a hard
time with it. However, I think you are probably right when you say
that the case you are trying to make has neither been definitively
proved nor disproved. An experiment is therefore
worthwhile.
I suggest that the 3D/4D interpretation
of continuant and occurent mentioned below is a well known example of
contradiction between upper ontologies. Whilst I am confident about
how to map between them, I do not see how they can co-exist in a
canonical ontology, i.e. each object in the real world is represented
by just one object in the ontology. If you can show otherwise for just
this case, you would have gone a long way towards proving your thesis.
I suggest trying this experiment.
Regards
Matthew West
Reference Data Architecture and Standards Manager
Shell International Petroleum Company Limited
Registered in England and Wales
Registered number: 621148
Registered office: Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Mobile: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx
http://www.shell.com
http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
-----Original Message-----
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of
Patrick Cassidy
Sent: 10 March 2008 23:34
To: '[ontolog-forum] '
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology similarity and accurate
communication
Responses to selected comments:
[[[1]]]
[PH] >> Second, even a conceptual defining
vocabulary is not a formal foundation ontology, since you are using
'defining' in the dictionary sense (which is of limited, if any, use
when describing formal ontologies).
I have tried to
explain several times that the word ?defining¾ in the phrase
?conceptual defining vocabulary¾ is used in an analogical way, and
that the foundation ontology will consist mostly of concept
specifications that use necessary conditions, not necessary and
sufficient conditions.
Then it is not analogous to the dictionary case (which as
far as I can see, is the only motivation for your entire proposal.)
You can't have it both ways: if you are making an analogy based on
definitions, but not meaning actual definitions, then you need to
either elucidate the analogy more carefully or abandon it (I'd suggest
the latter).
A definition is a description of the meaning of a term,
whether it is a linguistic definition or a logical specification. That
is the analogy. The
[[[2]]]<snip>
[PC] >> Of course, the process of
language learning involves multiple clues, including possibly an
innate ability to exclude certain combinatorially possible syntactic
constructions from the grammar. My point was that the language
learning process is sufficiently *similar* in different people
learning the same native language, that the process supports the
ability of learners to develop a common internal ontology (of
unknown structure) that is very close.
[PH] > Again, that simply does not follow. You are
begging the question entirely. I didn't bring up this whole topic of
language learning, note: you did in order to justify this idea of a
99.9% common ontology, and I repeat, regardless of the
psycholinguistic data, in fact, that is poppycock: nothing about
language learning supports the claim that we all have 99.9% agreement
on our mental models.
My opinion that our mental models for
the basic terms are over 99.9% in agreement is based on personal
observation of the high accuracy of communication, when using the
basic words. I believe that that level of accuracy
requires common mental models, for the concepts represented by those
basic words. You donít. Fine. But you shouldnít
assert that it has been disproven unless you can cite an accessible
reference and point to the passage where the data is
summarized.
My mentioning elements of language
learning merely provides a possible mechanism for the achievement of
such commonality. It was never advanced as more than that.
If you think that commonality canít be achieved that way, fine.
But you shouldnít assert it has been proven to be impossible unless
you can cite an accessible reference and point to the passage where
the data is summarized.
[[[3]]] [PC] >> The question of whether people
actually use an innate common ontology is a scientific question, but
the methods for investigating that are likely to be horrendously
complex, and I do not think that past efforts to create a foundation
ontology at Cyc actually address this specific question.
[PH] I agree, and it would have save a lot of time if you
had not brought it up.
Now, this puzzles me. It
was you who brought up the experience at Cyc as evidence that we
donít have common mental models. Now you say that the Cyc
experience doesnít address the question. Can you reconcile
these two assertions? I canít find the bridging
axioms.
On the other hand, I think that trying
to develop a foundation ontology *explicitly* as a Conceptual
Defining Vocabulary *would* provide evidence for or against
this hypothesis, and in the process may help develop a common
foundation ontology that is more widely used than the existing ones.
You donít think the answer is worth the effort?
Fine. We just disagree.
[[[4]]] ]PC] >> If that process results in a
**logical contradiction**, it is my expectation that one or more of
the formalizations specifies a concept that is not
primitive
[PH] > OK, let me immediately give you a
counterexample. DOLCE and BOF both require the categories of
continuant and occurrent to be disjoint: nothing can possibly be both
a continuant and an occurrent in these ontologies. Other ontologies (
I have one, and I think the same is true of Cyc) allow both categories
with pretty much the same properties of the respective types, but
allow them to overlap. These two categories of ontology are logically
incompatible: adding a Cyc axiom to DOLCE will immediately produce
inconsistencies. And yet this is all concerned with very basic topics
of how to describe time and change, without which a nontrivial
ontology can hardly be said to be possible.
Good example. Here is a case where it seems that the
disputants are using ìcontinuantí and ìoccurrentî terms in
different senses. Clearly, if some entity is an instance of one
ìoccurrentî but not an instance of another ìoccurrentî, the
meanings differ ñ they are using the terms in different senses.
Once this is recognized, it is necessary to explore the intended
meanings of those terms in more detail in order to decide why it is
that one ontologist believes that ?X is an instance, but the other
doesnít think so. I would be delighted to explore any such
example in detail, and believe it likely that the problem will be
shown to be at basis a terminology dispute. In order to discover
the problem, one needs to analyze the intended meanings of those terms
in more detail than can be achieved by merely pointing to subclasses
or instances. The subclass/instance tactic clearly fails in this
case to resolve the intended meanings. It will be necessary to
continue dissecting the intended meanings into increasingly finer
parts and formalizing them, until the part of the intended meaning
that differs between the two ontologists become clear. Then it
will be possible to recompose the basic categories (which may have to
change, but now for a good reason) to allow each ontologist to specify
the intended meanings, without causing a logical contradiction.
Such a process would in fact help discover what the true fundamental
elements of meaning are. My expectation would be that if the
analysis reveals that there are things that can be reasonably labeled
as ìcontinuantî and ìoccurrentî and that the two are truly
disjoint, then the ontology that has instances that are considered to
be of both types may in fact be a merger of two different views of the
same entity. We would need to look at the specifics of the
representations to determine what the problem is. Perhaps not
something that can be done in an on-line discussion, but maybe worth
trying.
You may not think that such a
process is practical, but I think it is the most plausible path to
achieving true semantic interoperability. BFO
is structured as a single-inheritance hierarchy. If it is
considered immutable, it will be quite impossible to include it,
without change, into a common ontology. But I think the required
changes will not be too many (I have identified some required
changes). Whether any ontologist will be willing to make any
change depends totally on the motivation. I expect that a
substantial project to develop a common foundation ontology, with
enough participants to guarantee that it will have wide usage, would
be a powerful motivation.
Question: do you think that equating a
zero-time-interval timeslice of a person with a 3D ìContinuantî
person would lead to any logical incompatibility? It seems to me
that the only difference would be in the way the assertions include
the time element. Here I can imagine the bridging axioms.
Yet 3D/4D is often cited as an incompatibility.
PatC
Patrick Cassidy
MICRA, Inc.
908-561-3416
cell: 908-565-4053
cassidy@xxxxxxxxx
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
Pat Hayes
Sent: Monday, March 10, 2008 3:02 PM
To: [ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology similarity and accurate
communication
At 1:36 PM -0400 3/10/08, Patrick Cassidy wrote:
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_007A_01C882B3.D0E981A0"
Content-Language: en-us
To clear up misinterpretations:
[[[1]]]
[PH] >> Second, even a conceptual defining
vocabulary is not a formal foundation ontology, since you are using
'defining' in the dictionary sense (which is of limited, if any, use
when describing formal ontologies).
I have tried to
explain several times that the word ?defining¾ in the phrase
?conceptual defining vocabulary¾ is used in an analogical way, and
that the foundation ontology will consist mostly of concept
specifications that use necessary conditions, not necessary and
sufficient conditions.
Then it is not analogous to the dictionary case (which as
far as I can see, is the only motivation for your entire proposal.)
You can't have it both ways: if you are making an analogy based on
definitions, but not meaning actual definitions, then you need to
either elucidate the analogy more carefully or abandon it (I'd suggest
the latter).
But if you believe that only an ontology with all
N&S definitions will be useful, then I can only disagree.
Of course not, but then I don't use the term
"definition".
Too many useful basic notions are not N&S definable.
If you are merely objecting to the use of the term ?defining¾ in
that phrase, then substitute any other word you consider less
problematic for your own use.
No, I want to understand what YOU mean.
[[[2]]]
[PC] >> You say that psycholinguistic research has
already disproven the notion that children can learn to communicate
with a common vocabulary by the experience of seeing words used in
context to refer to objects and events.
[PH] > No, I did not say that. At some level this
is clearly true, as this is simply a description of what children in
fact actually do (if you substitute 'hearing' for 'seeing', and avoid
the question-begging use of 'refer to' in the last phrase.) The
question is, how do they do it? And what I heard you saying was
that they did it by a process of association: that when a word is used
'near' an object or event, that proximity is enough to induce an
association between words and their meanings which constitutes the
word-meaning mapping underlying linguistic competence
And no, I did not say that mere
proximity of a word and object is enough to associate a term with a
meaning. I never used the word ånear¼. What I said was
?words are associated with their meanings by experience in
context¾.
I used scare quotes to acknowledge that you did not use
the word, but "experience in context" implies near, I
presume. Or if it does not, perhaps you could tell us what YOU mean by
'context'.
Of course, the process of language learning
involves multiple clues, including possibly an innate ability to
exclude certain combinatorially possible syntactic constructions from
the grammar. My point was that the language learning process is
sufficiently *similar* in different people learning the same
native language, that the process supports the ability of learners
to develop a common internal ontology (of unknown structure)
that is very close.
Again, that simply does not follow. You are begging the
question entirely. I didn't bring up this whole topic of language
learning, note: you did in order to justify this idea of a 99.9%
common ontology, and I repeat, regardless of the psycholinguistic
data, in fact, that is poppycock: nothing about language learning
supports the claim that we all have 99.9% agreement on our mental
models.
I merely alluded to a couple of
components of the learning process as examples of things that would be
similar among learners. Of course, saying this doesn¼t prove
it, and your doubting it doesn¼t disprove it either.
Of course not, but the burden of proof is on you, seems to
me.
You correctly point out the disputes
among adults when trying to formalize a common ontology. But in
those cases the terms used need to acquire a much more precise meaning
than the terms used in normal communication.
Exactly. It follows, then, that agreement on word meanings
in normal usage does NOT imply agreement on meanings at the level of
precision needed to support a formal ontology. Which is exactly what I
have been arguing through this whole thread, and you have until now
been denying.
Even though they consciously try not to get hung up
on terminology, it appears to me that some disagreements still are
caused by a desire to fix a specific meaning to a term, where
different ontologists have a different notion of how that term should
be formalized. My suggestion is to formalize all of the
different notions, and give them different names.
In what POSSIBLE sense can that be said to amount to
agreement to within 99.9% ? I agree this is an interesting, though
naive, engineering strategy, but it can't possibly be aligned with
your arguments about common mental ontologies and language
learning.
If that process results in a **logical
contradiction**, it is my expectation that one or more of the
formalizations specifies a concept that is not primitive
OK, let me immediately give you a counterexample. DOLCE
and BOF both require the categories of continuant and occurrent to be
disjoint: nothing can possibly be both a continuant and an occurrent
in these ontologies. Other ontologies ( I have one, and I think the
same is true of Cyc) allow both categories with pretty much the same
properties of the respective types, but allow them to overlap. These
two categories of ontology are logically incompatible: adding a Cyc
axiom to DOLCE will immediately produce inconsistencies. And yet this
is all concerned with very basic topics of how to describe time and
change, without which a nontrivial ontology can hardly be said to be
possible.
This latter expectation is part of the ?conceptual
defining vocabulary (CDV) hypothesis¾. But this can only be
proven by attempting specifically to create a foundation ontology as a
CDV.
As is often the case, it is much easier to refute than to prove.
The question of whether people actually use an
innate common ontology is a scientific question, but the methods for
investigating that are likely to be horrendously complex, and I do not
think that past efforts to create a foundation ontology at Cyc
actually address this specific question.
I agree, and it would have save a lot of time if you had
not brought it up.
The development of a foundation ontology as a CDV
would not itself prove that the internal ontologies of
sixteen-year-olds are similar, but it would at least show that it is
possible to have some reasonably small set of concepts that can be
used in combination to describe the meanings of a very large number of
other more specialized concepts. That knowledge would be very
useful, in my opinion.
The common terms in English can have
multiple meanings. Yet, it appears to me that assertions using
those terms by people trying to be clear are almost always (> 99%)
unambiguous, taken in the full context of the text. So I
believe that there is a disambiguation process that results in the
selection of the proper sense, at least 99% of the time.
That begs the question by assuming that there is a single
sense. But you may work with your sense and I with my sense, and most
of the time our conclusions agree well enough for us to cooperate. We
say that we both understand 'the' meaning of the word, when there is
no single meaning.
Three amplifications:
(1) That statistic represents a
use-weighted accuracy. There may be some basic terms that are
misinterpreted with a lot higher frequency, but those terms, if they
exist, appear to be used infrequently. This accuracy is intended
to refer to accuracy in interpreting written text, read in a context
in which the background of the communication is already known.
Spoken language may be more accurate, by having more situational
referents and an opportunity for feedback; it may be less accurate if
too much knowledge in the hearer is assumed.
(2) The senses in which terms are
interpreted may still be quite vague. That would leave room for
misinterpretation in the case where the vagueness masks an important
distinction. But I believe that where there are important
distinctions, people trying to be clear will use more specific terms
or phrases to avoid significant misinterpretation.
(3) The senses that are represented by
the basic linguistic defining vocabulary may not be identical to some
enumerated sense in a given dictionary.
[[[3]]] [PC] >> None of this is a theory of
language acquisition, but it is a description of how people can
acquire the *same* meanings
[PH] WHY
is it that? You keep saying that, but even your own account does not
support this claim.
I didn¼t think that suggesting a hypothesis
? stated as such - required an actual proof of the
hypothesis. But I did say that my own observations suggest that
communication using the basic vocabulary is highly accurate, and that
that implies a common set of meanings that can be attached to the
words. This estimate of accuracy is a non-systematic observation
that would need proof if one wanted to investigate the hypothesis.
I think it would be the first thing that needs proof, if one
were to properly investigate the notion of a common ontology used in
language understanding. I am not aware of whether the accuracy
of basic communication has been formally investigated (didn¼t do a
literature search ? Googling some relevant phrases has not lead to
anything on point). If you don¼t think that
linguistic communication using the basic words (Longman¼s,
e.g.) is accurate, perhaps you have some reason for that skepticism,
which I would like to hear. But the ambiguity of
Individual words is not at issue. The question is,
if one person tries to explain something to another, using the basic
words in their basic senses, how often is the explanation
misunderstood?
Suppose the answer is, almost never. It STILL does not
follow that people all have the same internal ontology.
PatH
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