Dear John, (01)
You are conflating two usages of intensional, so it is not I who is
suffering from a philosophers desease. (02)
> I believe that Matthew has caught a "philosopher's disease"
> as Wittgenstein would say. Matthew is trying to force
> extensional definitions on concepts that cannot be defined
> by pointing to a concrete set.
>
> MW>> Then I ask you how I know when I look at a temperature whether
> >> it is maximum allowable one or not.
>
> PH> The question is meaningless. (03)
MW: If you are claiming that maximum allowable working temperature is a
subtype of temperature, it seems perfectly reasonable to me. It is not
different from asking "How do I know which pieces of equipment are
pumps?" Is that a meaningless question?
>
> Making meaningless statements that only a philosopher could imagine
> is another symptom of a philosopher's disease. Wittgenstein would
> prescribe a course of therapy that would guide the patient toward
> more sensible speech.
>
> MW>> There is a possible world in which there is something that
> >> has that temperature.
>
> PH> Ah, OK, if you allow possible words then no problem.
> (Interesting
> > move, for a nominalist, but lets have that discussion in another
> > thread)
>
> This point is key to a cure. The original motivation for a purely
> extensional philosophy is to give clear, precise definitions by
> pointing to specific sets. But many important concepts cannot be
> defined extensionally. Those include hypothetical notions or plans
> for the future. (04)
MW: Certainly.
>
> To preserve a semblance of consistency, Matthew was forced to adopt
> not just a four-dimensional ontology that treats extensions in an
> unobservable future as if they were just as concrete as anything
> observable in the present, but also sets in an infinity of purely
> imaginary possible worlds. (05)
MW: You try to make it sound as if this is something I just thought up,
whereas it is a quite standard approach. There is no such thing as a
"semblance of consistency" you are either consistent or not, and this is
consistent. It simply avoids traditional modal logic.
>
> But possible worlds are only definable by intensions. (06)
MW: You confuse two different sorts of intentionality. There is the sort
where I create a class by make a definition, and then see what fits, and
there is intentionally as in intentionally constructed objects (see
Searle "The construction of social reality"). These are quite different.
So there is no problem in my constructing plans intentionally. That does
not however mean that their identity is defined intentionally rather
than extensionally. (07)
> There is no
> way to define them extensionally because they don't exist (or at
> least there is no way to observe them, point to them, travel to
> them, or get any news or reports from them). Nobody can say
> anything about the possible worlds except by making claims about
> unobservable fictions. (08)
MW: Indeed. They are intentionally constructed, but their identity is
extensional.
>
> In summary, it may be possible to formulate a coherent extensional
> theory that accounts for observable phenomena. But there is no way
> to generalize such a theory to support hypotheses or plans for the
> future. Any attempt to generalize such a theory inevitably leads
> to unsubstantiated statements about unobservable futures or claims
> about purely imaginary possible worlds. (09)
MW: This is only not possible in the philosophical world you have
constructed in which the two different uses of intentional are confused. (010)
Regards (011)
Matthew West
Information Junction
Tel: +44 560 302 3685
Mobile: +44 750 3385279
matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/ (012)
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>
> John
>
>
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