Dear Matthew, Pat, and Ingvar, (01)
In these discussions, I completely agree with Pat and Ingvar. (02)
MW>>>> Why is maximum allowable temperature not a temperature? (03)
IJ>>> It is a temperature. (04)
MW>> Then tell me which temperatures are the maximum
>> allowable ones? (05)
PH> How should I know? You will have to look at the relevant
> spec. (06)
I believe that Matthew has caught a "philosopher's disease"
as Wittgenstein would say. Matthew is trying to force
extensional definitions on concepts that cannot be defined
by pointing to a concrete set. (07)
MW>> Then I ask you how I know when I look at a temperature whether
>> it is maximum allowable one or not. (08)
PH> The question is meaningless. (09)
Making meaningless statements that only a philosopher could imagine
is another symptom of a philosopher's disease. Wittgenstein would
prescribe a course of therapy that would guide the patient toward
more sensible speech. (010)
MW>> There is a possible world in which there is something that
>> has that temperature. (011)
PH> Ah, OK, if you allow possible words then no problem. (Interesting
> move, for a nominalist, but lets have that discussion in another
> thread) (012)
This point is key to a cure. The original motivation for a purely
extensional philosophy is to give clear, precise definitions by
pointing to specific sets. But many important concepts cannot be
defined extensionally. Those include hypothetical notions or plans
for the future. (013)
To preserve a semblance of consistency, Matthew was forced to adopt
not just a four-dimensional ontology that treats extensions in an
unobservable future as if they were just as concrete as anything
observable in the present, but also sets in an infinity of purely
imaginary possible worlds. (014)
But possible worlds are only definable by intensions. There is no
way to define them extensionally because they don't exist (or at
least there is no way to observe them, point to them, travel to
them, or get any news or reports from them). Nobody can say
anything about the possible worlds except by making claims about
unobservable fictions. (015)
In summary, it may be possible to formulate a coherent extensional
theory that accounts for observable phenomena. But there is no way
to generalize such a theory to support hypotheses or plans for the
future. Any attempt to generalize such a theory inevitably leads
to unsubstantiated statements about unobservable futures or claims
about purely imaginary possible worlds. (016)
John (017)
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