> Dear Matthew, Pat, and Ingvar,
>
> In these discussions, I completely agree with Pat and Ingvar. (01)
John, Many thanks for the mail below!
Ingvar (02)
>
> MW>>>> Why is maximum allowable temperature not a temperature?
>
> IJ>>> It is a temperature.
>
> MW>> Then tell me which temperatures are the maximum
> >> allowable ones?
>
> PH> How should I know? You will have to look at the relevant
> > spec.
>
> I believe that Matthew has caught a "philosopher's disease"
> as Wittgenstein would say. Matthew is trying to force
> extensional definitions on concepts that cannot be defined
> by pointing to a concrete set.
>
> MW>> Then I ask you how I know when I look at a temperature whether
> >> it is maximum allowable one or not.
>
> PH> The question is meaningless.
>
> Making meaningless statements that only a philosopher could imagine
> is another symptom of a philosopher's disease. Wittgenstein would
> prescribe a course of therapy that would guide the patient toward
> more sensible speech.
>
> MW>> There is a possible world in which there is something that
> >> has that temperature.
>
> PH> Ah, OK, if you allow possible words then no problem. (Interesting
> > move, for a nominalist, but lets have that discussion in another
> > thread)
>
> This point is key to a cure. The original motivation for a purely
> extensional philosophy is to give clear, precise definitions by
> pointing to specific sets. But many important concepts cannot be
> defined extensionally. Those include hypothetical notions or plans
> for the future.
>
> To preserve a semblance of consistency, Matthew was forced to adopt
> not just a four-dimensional ontology that treats extensions in an
> unobservable future as if they were just as concrete as anything
> observable in the present, but also sets in an infinity of purely
> imaginary possible worlds.
>
> But possible worlds are only definable by intensions. There is no
> way to define them extensionally because they don't exist (or at
> least there is no way to observe them, point to them, travel to
> them, or get any news or reports from them). Nobody can say
> anything about the possible worlds except by making claims about
> unobservable fictions.
>
> In summary, it may be possible to formulate a coherent extensional
> theory that accounts for observable phenomena. But there is no way
> to generalize such a theory to support hypotheses or plans for the
> future. Any attempt to generalize such a theory inevitably leads
> to unsubstantiated statements about unobservable futures or claims
> about purely imaginary possible worlds.
>
> John
>
>
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> (03)
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