Dear David, (01)
Hi Matthew (02)
Actually you do not always need to have shared names of types of things.
[MW>] By names of types I mean things like pump and valve. Is that what you
mean?
As an example, in an environmental reporting app we persist the data in a 4D
ontology but project it into a 3D ontology. The 3D ontology drives the
read/write API used in the user interface and for query. There is nothing
shared between the two ontologies, only the URIs of the facts are the same.
[MW>] So how do you make sure the data about pumps doesn't end up being
interpreted as data about a valve? (03)
We have not seen a case yet where two upper ontologies were useful, but I
guess that is a possibility.
[MW>] I'm assuming you happen to have two bits of ontology that are
pre-existing and that you want to make use of, that happen to have different
upper level ontologies. I haven't come across an example either, but I guess
it could happen. (04)
Regards (05)
Matthew West
http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
+44 750 338 5279 (06)
Just wanted people to know these are not only abstract philosophical
ramblings, these scenarios are real in some engineering enterprises. (07)
Cheers
David Price
UK +44 7788 561308
US +1 336 283 0606 (08)
> On 2 Apr 2015, at 9:28 am, Matthew West <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Dear Pat,
> I've been struggling a bit to understand what it is you are saying,
> but I think I may have it at last.
> I think what you are saying is that you can state facts in a neutral
> way that would allow them to be imported and reasoned over by either
> an ontology that was endurantist or perdurantist, and this gives you
> an easy way to federate a group of ontologies. You'd obviously have to
> have shared names for the types of things you were talking about, but
> as long as you leave any axioms in the exporting and importing
> ontologies, and don't try to impose them across the exchange, you
> should be just fine, and as long as the axioms are valid within their own
framework you should be able to do useful work.
> Is that right?
> I certainly think that works for a lot of the time, but I think there
> are edges where you might have to work a bit harder. The obvious
> example would be the need to recognise that the endurant object and
> its life were the same thing when translated into a perdurant ontology and
vice versa.
>
> Regards
>
> Matthew West
> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
> +44 750 338 5279
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Pat Hayes
> Sent: 31 March 2015 16:23
> To: William Frank
> Cc: [ontolog-forum]
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some
> Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
>
>
>> On Mar 31, 2015, at 9:27 AM, William Frank <williamf.frank@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
>>
>> Mathew,
>>
>> I would be very interested to know how you eliminate the boundaries
> between these categories. I think they must be eliminable, not to
> say, though, that things can't be categorized in one of these ways,
> depending on what aspect of a situation we want to look at.
>>
>> To me, philosophers and too many engineers seem moved to consider
>> whether
> there 'really are' processes, objects, and events, and whether they are
> 'really' different. I note in particular as a description of a paper
>>
>> "argues that processes are like objects, and distinct from events. "
>>
>> What is clear is that these are distinctions that **we are able to
>> make**,
> as many do. We can give examples, even though the lines between
> things we might choose to classify one way or the other, as with most
> things, is fuzzy.
>>
>> The question for the engineer is, is it **useful* to make these
> distinctions?
>>
>> If one makes it critical to success to have 'correctly' classified
> everything, into its one true category, and uses a language and a
> logic that makes us have to repeat information in each category, then
> the answer is that however useful it **might be** to make the
> distinctions, we are doing it in a manner that is awkward.
>>
>> On the other hand, if we treat what we are doing when we classify
>> things
> as *casting* them, rather than saying what they 'really are', and have
> a method by which things in one category can be *recast* in another,
> and information not repeated, then, what practical person, working say
> in business process design, would object <330.gif> being able
> reference events, processes, and objects. And, anything we would want
> to talk about, don't there need to be types for all those things, as well
as individuals?
>>
>> So, if we can categorize things, we can recategorize them, as need be.
> Is there a reference in this thread as to how to do that that I
> missed, that is not alot of math about time series, or is that it?
>
> That is exactly what I was trying to explain at the start of this thread.
> Yes, there is such a way, if we can use the syntactic freedom
> available in ISO Common Logic. Suppose we are talking about a relation
> R between two things A and B: (R A B) in the CLIF dialect of CL, which
> uses a LISP-like prefix syntax. (Or R(A, B) in a perhaps more familiar
> notation. I will stick to the CLIF style to keep things coherent.) But
> things change with time, so this relationship may be true at one time
> but not at another, or have a temporal parameter, or be thought of as
> holding between temporal 'parts' of the objects. Respectively:
>
> 1 (ist (R A B) T) where 'ist' is the modal 'is true at' operator.
>
> To be strict, this cannot be expressed directly in CL but requires the
> IKL extension, and should be written using the IKL 'that' operator to
> make the embedded atomic sentence into a term: (ist (that (R A B)) T)
> See http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes/IKL/GUIDE/GUIDE.html for details,
> especially
> #ContextsModalities.)
>
> 2 (R A B T)
> 3 (R (A T)(B T))
>
> 2 treats the objects as continuants: they exist through time,
> retaining their identity (so they can be referred to by simple names
> even in a temporal framework) but their relations are time-dependent
> fluents (using McCarthy's old terminology), so we see a ubiquitious
> time-argument in most relational atomic sentences, typically by
> convention the last argument, as here.
> 3. treats the objects as occurrents: they have temporal parts,
> indicated here by treating the names as functions from times to
> temporal parts, and relationships between temporal sections of entities
are asserted timelessly.
>
>
> So, there are various ways to do it. But my original point was that
> one can COMPLETELY IGNORE all philosophical speculation about the
> metaphysical nature of these things, and simply treat all these
> various options as purely syntactic variations on how to say a fact.
> There is ONE SINGLE FACT being expressed here: that R holds between
> the things A and B at time T. That is really all that matters, and
> arguments about whether A and B are continuants (and so must not be
> spoken of in style 3, because the holy texts assert that continuants
> do not have temporal parts) or are occurrents (and so should not be
> spoken of in style 2) is basically just noise. You can view them
> either way, if it suits your way of thinking. Nothing of ontological
> importance turns on that decision. You can also completely ignore the
> question, and the metaphysical distinction it presumes. All it boils
> down to is where you like to see your temporal parameters. Do you want
> to see them attached to abitrary sentences? (Use a modal language or
> IKL, see style 1.) Or to relations in atomic sentences? (Style 2) Or
> to referring terms? (Style 3) There really are no other options in
> first-order logical syntax, so you have to choose one (or more) of
> these. So go ahead, choose whichever one makes you comfortable. It is
> easy to translate between these variations, given a certain minimal
> discipline about where temporal parameters are placed. In ISO CL, one
> can even write axioms which will do the translation, along the lines
> of
>
> (forall (r x y (T time))(iff (r x y T)(r (x T)(y T)) ))
>
> although it takes a few more lines to do this for every possible
> number of arguments; and in any case, you might want to be more picky
> about where you put the temporal parameters in some cases. I do not
> recommend actually using axioms to make the translation, but the fact
> that is is possible, and even easy, surely suggests that the
> distinctions are not as deep as many have assumed.
>
> But to return to your question, such translation axioms are exactly
> the 'recategorization' to which you refer. x and y here are treated as
> continuants on the LHS of the iff and as occurrents on the RHS. And
> yet they are both identically the same thing on both sides of the
equivalence.
>
> Pat Hayes
>
>
>
>>
>> Tx
>>
>> Wm
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 9:59 AM, Obrst, Leo J. <lobrst@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> Matthew,
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, this does not break down the distinction between continuant and
> occurrent, but instead argues that processes are like objects, and
> distinct from events. They are following and building on [1], and of
> course other papers in that vein, including other papers of Galton.
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Leo
>>
>>
>>
>> [1] Stout, R. (1997). Processes. Philosophy, 72, 19-27.
>>
>>
>>
>> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Matthew
>> West
>> Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2015 2:27 AM
>> To: '[ontolog-forum] '
>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some
>> Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
>>
>>
>>
>> Dear Leo,
>>
>> Whilst this is a paper that does a good job of showing how
>> interdependent
> continuants and occurrents are. It still maintains the dichotomy of
> continuant and occurrent, and even explicitly states that this means a
> duplication of an occurrent and its life. So it has not actually taken
> the step of breaking down the barriers between them and picking up
> that interdependence might point to something common underlying them both.
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards
>>
>>
>>
>> Matthew West
>>
>> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
>>
>> +44 750 338 5279
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Obrst, Leo J.
>> Sent: 25 March 2015 19:45
>> To: [ontolog-forum]
>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some
>> Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
>>
>>
>>
>> One interpretation (process, event) that Robert may be referring to
>> is the
> "waterfall" paper:
>>
>>
>>
>> Galton, Antony, and Riichiro Mizoguchi. 2009. The water falls but the
> waterfall does not fall: New perspectives on objects, processes and
events.
> Applied Ontology 4 (2009), pp. 71-107, DOI 10.3233/AO-2009-0067, IOS
Press.
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Leo
>>
>>
>>
>> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Matthew
>> West
>> Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 3:12 PM
>> To: '[ontolog-forum] '
>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some
>> Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
>>
>>
>>
>> Dear Robert,
>>
>> If you get something going with this, I'll be interested in the outcome.
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards
>>
>>
>>
>> Matthew West
>>
>> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
>>
>> +44 750 338 5279
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
>> rrovetto@xxxxxxxxxxx
>> Sent: 23 March 2015 17:21
>> To: [ontolog-forum]
>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re: Some
>> Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Mon, Mar 23, 2015 at 5:21 AM, Matthew West
>>> <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Dear Robert,
>>
>>
>>
>> Replies below after [RR] (= Robert Rovetto)...
>>
>> [MW>] I think it is more useful to think of being a process or a
>> physical object are different views on things, rather than being
>> entirely different things or just eliminating the physical object
>> view
>>
>> [RR] Agreed. A colleague not long ago mention this vis-a-vis bfo:
>> that it
> should return to the idea that the continuant-occurent (or snap-span)
> distinction are two perspectives on the world.
>>
>> [MW>] The key is whether it is one object with two perspectives, or
>> one
> object per perspective with the perspectives being mutually exclusive
> (as BFO requires). Changing between these two might seem simple, but
> it is a change to a core commitment of the ontology. I'd rather not be
> around when you suggested it to Barry Smith.
>>
>>
>>
>> For sure I think the perspectives are ours and can be many. I
>> question,
> and others should as well, whether the mutual exclusivity (I think
> some have
> here) of any given two or more perspectives--speaking of any ontology,
> now--should be. Right, changing b/w them for that particular ontology
> would be an issue, but no one should have any consternation to
> suggesting it, not if the intention is to contribute, help and ensure
> that the ontology or system in question itself helps the communities
> it serves. And if people have consternation then something is wrong.
>>
>>
>>
>> It is also more help, and perhaps less stressful, to think of them as
> perspectives rather than one or the other being metaphysically
> (objectively) reflective of reality.
>>
>> [MW>] I would not see these different perspectives as not being
>> reflective
> of reality, just reflective of different aspects of it.
>>
>> Some have metaphysical views, and there may be a fact of the matter,
>> but
> when it comes to solving real-world problems (to the extent that
> applied ontologies can even do so!) taking the perspective approach
> appears better since, again, the goal is to solve problems.
>>
>> [MW>] The question is, if there is one object, with a physical object
>> and
> process perspective, what sort of thing is it that allows those two
> perspectives? I suppose you could just say that they are particulars
> without saying anything more. My answer would be chunks of space-time
> (or spatio-temporal extents). A chunk of space time might be the
> spatio-temporal extent of a person, or it might be the spatio-temporal
> extent of a meeting, or of a person whistling.
>>
>>
>>
>> My intuition is that a given physical object is more than s-t
>> extent/c,
> but since this question delves into space-time, it might be wise to
> consult physicists. A number of interesting issues come up here with the
question:
> implicit (perhaps outdated/naive-physics sense) conceptions of space
> and time (e.g. container view), s-t boundaries of, say, a meeting (event),
etc.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Some have held that processes (but not events) endure.
>>
>> [MW>] I'm not sure what you mean by this last statement.
>>
>> [RR] What I meant was this. In the traditional sense...
>> Endurance is the form of persistance attributed of
>> endurants/continuants
> (objects).
>> Perdurance is the form of persistance attributed of
>> perdurants/occurrents
> (processes, events).= temporal extension, temporal parts, etc. Some in
> philosophy and applied onto hold that processes are different from
> events, the former enduring (no temporal parts), with the latter
> perduring (having temporal parts).
>>
>> [MW>] So an event has zero thickness in time? That would be how I use
>> the
> term, as a temporal boundary. But many use it as a synonym for
> activity or process.
>>
>>
>>
>> [MW>] No, I disagree here. I (and I think Pat) would consider that
>> having
> an upper level ontology like that of OBO is better than no upper level
> at all, even though neither of us would want to use it ourselves. It
> is important that different parts of an ontology are consistent, or
> you just end up in all kinds of mess.
>>
>> I've said it before, but it's worth repeating. The problems arise in
>> the constraints that an ontology imposes. You need to be very
>> critical of any constraint that is proposed. Leave it out unless you
>> are certain it is one that always applies, no exceptions ever
>>
>> [RR] I did not say no upper level at all. I said ontology projects,
>> such
> as obo foundry, should not have *as a rule/requirement* the adoption
> of this or that particular top-level. Certainly not for projects
> dealing with socially critical data and subject matters such as
> health. There are too many risks.
>>
>> [MW>] The risks however, compare to the certainty that if you use
> different upper level ontologies, you will have work to do to get them
> to interoperate.
>>
>> We want the models to be helpful, match the helpful domain
> conceptualizations and domain knowledge, and we do not want the
> ontological systems or ontologists to impost this is or that
> philosophical view that may in fact distort the domain knowledge, or
> worse distort the way domain scientists think! (an interesting
> research project, yes. Interested parties, please contact me). Some in
> the foundry have agreed on no rule/requirement, even prior to me even
> thinking about it (independent of knowing their sharing this point).
>>
>> [MW>] So how are you going to determine your upper level ontology, i.e.
> the top level commitments and constraints you are going to accept?
>>
>>
>>
>> You're right. But I think you might be missing the point. I did not
> say--nor did I mean to imply--that multiple top-level ontologies
> should be used for a given domain ontology or for a project like obo.
> I said, again, it should NOT be a rule or requirement (of potential
> ontology members of the project or of ontologies being subsumed) to
> use this or that particular ontology. That's all. The point is that in
> making it a rule, you take steps toward monopolization, and greater
> risk of what some people in this thread have concerns about also,
> e.g., imposition, forcing, constraints, syntax issues, etc. The goal
> is to solve real-world problems, and if there happens to be a
> different upper-level that can help accomplish them (or even better
> captures the domain), then such a rule would stand in that way. This
> does not mean change top-levels haphazardly. In fact I would hope that
> any top-level has checks and balances in place to ensure those risks
> are not realized and that it is open to change in the light of
> discovery and error-finding. The concern is largely ensuring that the
> system solves real-world problems it's intended to (to the extent
> ontologies will/have even prove useful to do that!), and that the
> domain science be represented faithfully without any distorting affects on
domain scientists thinking (assuming their thinking is rational).
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards
>>
>>
>>
>> Matthew West
>>
>> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
>>
>> +44 750 338 5279
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> [MW] I've said it before, but it's worth repeating. The problems
>> arise in
> the constraints that an ontology imposes. You need to be very critical
> of any constraint that is proposed.
>>
>> [RR] I agree.
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Rob
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Sat, Mar 21, 2015 at 2:57 PM, Matthew West
>>> <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Dear Roberto
>>
>> <snip>
>>
>> Two good points:
>> 1a) Questioning the mutual exclusivity of the object-process
> endurant-perdurant distinction.
>>
>> There is, at least to me, something odd about conceptualizing a
>> process as
> distinct from the participant, at least in any objective or
> metaphysical sense. In reality whatever we call 'process' and their
> 'participant' (or
> 'object') are mutually interrelated. The distinction, the separation,
> may at most be an artificial one. The question is, what are symbolisms
> or representations that better capture that?
>>
>> [MW>] The way that I do it is that an activity/process consists of
>> its
> participants, where a participant is the state of a particular whilst
> it participates in the activity/process. This works both for things
> like a banana ripening, where there is only one participant, and for
> things like meetings, or a game of football, where there are multiple
participants.
>>
>> 1b) And opening the door to other conceptualizations of these categories.
>>
>> We also read: "I see no strong or principled difference between
>> things
> undergoing change and processes of change in things"
>> This intuition is shared by others and should be explored and formalized.
> But it need not mean that things are processes in the traditional
> perdurantist sense.
>>
>> [MW>] I think it is more useful to think of being a process or a
>> physical
> object are different views on things, rather than being entirely
> different things or just eliminating the physical object view.
>>
>> Some have held that processes (but not events) endure.
>>
>> [MW>] I'm not sure what you mean by this last statement.
>>
>> 2) Questioning and preventing the formalization (or the
>> symbolism/logic) from distorting or misrepresenting the world (or the
>> conceptualization of it we want to formalize)
>>
>> - "axiom-bloat"
>> - "I meant decisions such as whether to treat a concept as a relation
>> or a
> function or an individual, where to locate the temporal parameters,
> whether or not one uses a discipline to keep differently typed
> parameters distinct, and if so what it is, and so on. There are many
> alternative ways to express a given set of facts in a given formal
language"
>>
>> A question to ask is how much do philosophical theories/views affect
>> the
> treatment of the concepts and the symbolism.
>> For example, the concern about forcing the distinction or requiring a
> specific syntax--a concern I've expressed elsewhere--is important. The
> obo foundry and other similar projects should not have as a
> rule/requirement a particular upper-level ontology. This might seem
> contrary to the goal of interoperability in the domain, but it is
> simply to ensure that the forcing does not take place, that monopolies
> are avoided, and that alternative representations that might better
> serve the biomedical community are sought and available/open to be sought
and created.
>>
>> [MW>] No, I disagree here. I (and I think Pat) would consider that
>> having
> an upper level ontology like that of OBO is better than no upper level
> at all, even though neither of us would want to use it ourselves. It
> is important that different parts of an ontology are consistent, or
> you just end up in all kinds of mess.
>>
>> I've said it before, but it's worth repeating. The problems arise in
>> the
> constraints that an ontology imposes. You need to be very critical of
> any constraint that is proposed. Leave it out unless you are certain
> it is one that always applies, no exceptions ever.
>>
>> The goal is (should be) *the solving of real-world problems*, and
>> health,
> biomedicine, privacy, etc. are most certainly domains where we should
> keep that in mind. The particular upper-level (or otherwise) views and
> symbolisms should not hinder that goal. The point about the limits of
> owl is also worth repeating.
>>
>> Finally, I find what Avril S. said interesting. But there may be
>> mistake
> in: "a particular at one time is called an occurrent; a sequence of
> two or more particulars at two or more consecutive times is called a
continuant."
>> In the traditional endur-perd/contin-occur sense, a partiular *at a
>> time*
> would be a continuant, i.e., a wholly-present persisting entity. If
> parts of occurrents are particulars, then it could be a temporal part
> (slice) of an occurrent, but not the whole occurrent. And I think a
> particular over a time interval would be an occurrent.
>>
>> [MW>] Traditional occurrents don't have temporal parts of course, and
>> at
> each time it exists you have all of it. Probably better to use another
> name if you mean something different.
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards
>>
>>
>>
>> Matthew West
>>
>> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk
>>
>> +44 750 338 5279
>>
>>
>>
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