Dear Robert, Replies below after [RR] (= Robert Rovetto)...
[MW>] I think it is more useful to think of being a process or a physical object are different views on things, rather than being entirely different things or just eliminating the physical object view [RR] Agreed. A colleague not long ago mention this vis-a-vis bfo: that it should return to the idea that the continuant-occurent (or snap-span) distinction are two perspectives on the world. [MW>] The key is whether it is one object with two perspectives, or one object per perspective with the perspectives being mutually exclusive (as BFO requires). Changing between these two might seem simple, but it is a change to a core commitment of the ontology. I’d rather not be around when you suggested it to Barry Smith. It is also more help, and perhaps less stressful, to think of them as perspectives rather than one or the other being metaphysically (objectively) reflective of reality. [MW>] I would not see these different perspectives as not being reflective of reality, just reflective of different aspects of it. Some have metaphysical views, and there may be a fact of the matter, but when it comes to solving real-world problems (to the extent that applied ontologies can even do so!) taking the perspective approach appears better since, again, the goal is to solve problems. [MW>] The question is, if there is one object, with a physical object and process perspective, what sort of thing is it that allows those two perspectives? I suppose you could just say that they are particulars without saying anything more. My answer would be chunks of space-time (or spatio-temporal extents). A chunk of space time might be the spatio-temporal extent of a person, or it might be the spatio-temporal extent of a meeting, or of a person whistling. Some have held that processes (but not events) endure. [MW>] I’m not sure what you mean by this last statement. [RR] What I meant was this. In the traditional sense...
Endurance is the form of persistance attributed of endurants/continuants (objects).
Perdurance is the form of persistance attributed of perdurants/occurrents (processes, events).= temporal extension, temporal parts, etc. Some in philosophy and applied onto hold that processes are different from events, the former enduring (no temporal parts), with the latter perduring (having temporal parts). [MW>] So an event has zero thickness in time? That would be how I use the term, as a temporal boundary. But many use it as a synonym for activity or process. [MW>] No, I disagree here. I (and I think Pat) would consider that having an upper level ontology like that of OBO is better than no upper level at all, even though neither of us would want to use it ourselves. It is important that different parts of an ontology are consistent, or you just end up in all kinds of mess. I’ve said it before, but it’s worth repeating. The problems arise in the constraints that an ontology imposes. You need to be very critical of any constraint that is proposed. Leave it out unless you are certain it is one that always applies, no exceptions ever [RR] I did not say no upper level at all. I said ontology projects, such as obo foundry, should not have *as a rule/requirement* the adoption of this or that particular top-level. Certainly not for projects dealing with socially critical data and subject matters such as health. There are too many risks. [MW>] The risks however, compare to the certainty that if you use different upper level ontologies, you will have work to do to get them to interoperate. We want the models to be helpful, match the helpful domain conceptualizations and domain knowledge, and we do not want the ontological systems or ontologists to impost this is or that philosophical view that may in fact distort the domain knowledge, or worse distort the way domain scientists think! (an interesting research project, yes. Interested parties, please contact me). Some in the foundry have agreed on no rule/requirement, even prior to me even thinking about it (independent of knowing their sharing this point). [MW>] So how are you going to determine your upper level ontology, i.e. the top level commitments and constraints you are going to accept? Regards Matthew West http://www.matthew-west.org.uk +44 750 338 5279
[MW] I’ve said it before, but it’s worth repeating. The problems arise in the constraints that an ontology imposes. You need to be very critical of any constraint that is proposed.
[RR] I agree.
On Sat, Mar 21, 2015 at 2:57 PM, Matthew West <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: Dear Roberto <snip> Two good points:
1a) Questioning the mutual exclusivity of the object-process endurant-perdurant distinction.
There is, at least to me, something odd about conceptualizing a process as distinct from the participant, at least in any objective or metaphysical sense. In reality whatever we call 'process' and their 'participant' (or 'object') are mutually interrelated. The distinction, the separation, may at most be an artificial one. The question is, what are symbolisms or representations that better capture that? [MW>] The way that I do it is that an activity/process consists of its participants, where a participant is the state of a particular whilst it participates in the activity/process. This works both for things like a banana ripening, where there is only one participant, and for things like meetings, or a game of football, where there are multiple participants. 1b) And opening the door to other conceptualizations of these categories.
We also read: "I see no strong or principled difference between things undergoing change and processes of change in things"
This intuition is shared by others and should be explored and formalized. But it need not mean that things are processes in the traditional perdurantist sense. [MW>] I think it is more useful to think of being a process or a physical object are different views on things, rather than being entirely different things or just eliminating the physical object view. Some have held that processes (but not events) endure. [MW>] I’m not sure what you mean by this last statement. 2) Questioning and preventing the formalization (or the symbolism/logic) from distorting or misrepresenting the world (or the conceptualization of it we want to formalize)
- "axiom-bloat"
- "I meant decisions such as whether to treat a concept as a relation or a function or an individual, where to locate the temporal parameters, whether or not one uses a discipline to keep differently typed parameters distinct, and if so what it is, and so on. There are many alternative ways to express a given set of facts in a given formal language"
A question to ask is how much do philosophical theories/views affect the treatment of the concepts and the symbolism.
For example, the concern about forcing the distinction or requiring a specific syntax--a concern I've expressed elsewhere--is important. The obo foundry and other similar projects should not have as a rule/requirement a particular upper-level ontology. This might seem contrary to the goal of interoperability in the domain, but it is simply to ensure that the forcing does not take place, that monopolies are avoided, and that alternative representations that might better serve the biomedical community are sought and available/open to be sought and created. [MW>] No, I disagree here. I (and I think Pat) would consider that having an upper level ontology like that of OBO is better than no upper level at all, even though neither of us would want to use it ourselves. It is important that different parts of an ontology are consistent, or you just end up in all kinds of mess. I’ve said it before, but it’s worth repeating. The problems arise in the constraints that an ontology imposes. You need to be very critical of any constraint that is proposed. Leave it out unless you are certain it is one that always applies, no exceptions ever.
The goal is (should be) *the solving of real-world problems*, and health, biomedicine, privacy, etc. are most certainly domains where we should keep that in mind. The particular upper-level (or otherwise) views and symbolisms should not hinder that goal. The point about the limits of owl is also worth repeating.
Finally, I find what Avril S. said interesting. But there may be mistake in: "a particular at one time is called an occurrent; a sequence of two or more particulars at two or more consecutive times is called a continuant."
In the traditional endur-perd/contin-occur sense, a partiular *at a time* would be a continuant, i.e., a wholly-present persisting entity. If parts of occurrents are particulars, then it could be a temporal part (slice) of an occurrent, but not the whole occurrent. And I think a particular over a time interval would be an occurrent. [MW>] Traditional occurrents don’t have temporal parts of course, and at each time it exists you have all of it. Probably better to use another name if you mean something different. Regards Matthew West http://www.matthew-west.org.uk +44 750 338 5279
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