On Mar 18, 2015, at 9:17 AM, Thomas Johnston <tmj44p@xxxxxxx> wrote: (01)
> Could those of you who are involved in this thing vs. event (endurantism vs.
>perdurantism) exchange explain to me why, except as a bit of interesting
>metaphysical speculation, those of us building formal ontologies should be
>interested in it? (02)
Because if one is using almost any conventional representational notation, from
classical FOL through RDF and/or OWL, each of these positions requires one to
adopt an axiomatic style which is sharply incompatible with the style the other
one forces you to adopt. If your ontology encompasses both kinds of entities,
then you are obliged to enforce a rigid top-level distinction between them,
since all assertions about one kind have to be made in one axiomatic style,
different from those mentioning the others. Basically, one style prohibits
attaching a temporal parameter to entity names (because "continuants do not
have temporal parts"), the other prohibits attaching temporal parameters to
relations (because relations are timeless.) One sees this very sharply in the
amount of work involved in the OBO ontologies to keep continuants separated
from occurrents. The typical result is that many general facts have to be
stated twice, one using each notational style. (03)
>
> This is indeed an issue which has been revised in analytic Philosophy in the
>last decade or so. Personally, although my reading in this area has been
>light, I don't think there has been a better case made for the ontological
>primacy of events than Whitehead's process philosophy. (04)
Forgive me for repeating myself, but it is a mistake to think that this is a
philosophical issue. The philosophy is irrelevant to the ontology engineering.
You can choose your favorite philosophical position, whichever one makes you
comfortable, and express just about anything within it, with more or less
bother. But we will not make ontology progress by trying to decide which
philosophical position is more correct. There are no winners in philosophical
debate. The issue here for ontology engineering is how best to allow
Whiteheadians and Quineans and Aristotelians and even Bergsonians to all
express themselves in inter-translatable ways, so that they can communicate
with one another about the one world that they all live in, without getting
sidetracked into debates about philosophy. (05)
> (BTW, for anyone wanting to learn a bit more about Whitehead's process
>philosophy, I recommend that they not start with Whitehead's magnum opus,
>Process and Reality. There is a remarkable presentation of these ideas --
>remarkable in being accessible to non-specialists while not significantly
>simplifying the metaphysics, in the middle sections of Whitehead's Adventure
>of Ideas. But for those who want to dive into Process and Reality, I recommend
>you take along the following life preserver: A Key to Whitehead's Process and
>Reality, by Donald Sherburne.
>
> Back to my inaugural question. I ask it because this debate is another
>example of what I call doing prescriptive metaphysics. As I've suggested
>earlier, if our job is to help software mediate across data stored in
>different databases, each of them with for the most part unarticulated
>ontologies, then why all this speculation? The upper level ontology we all in
>fact think with is, in fact, (06)
Whoa. Stop there. There is no one single ULO that we all think with. That is
the source of the problem. There are entire communities of practical,
hard-nosed people using standardized ontologies, whose standardized ontologies
are incompatible with one another on exactly this issue. It is not going to go
away by everyone agreeing to use the same upper-level ontology. They don't
agree on a single upper-level ontology. (07)
Pat Hayes (08)
> the Aristotelian ontology I have described before (with the addition of
>events). Why not concentrate on doing this: for each specific real-world
>database, generalize ontological categories to create an enterprise ontology
>covering them, and then work with the individual databases to remove any
>discrepancies with that enterprise ontology. Repeat the process to provide an
>industry-level ontological cover over participating enterprise ontologies.
>Identify important cross-industry ontological themes, e.g. people, places and
>things, important thematic roles (agent, patient, instrument) and make them
>ontologically explicit and then work with the industry-level ontologies to
>remove any discrepancies with that thematic level ontology. Integrate all
>this, finally, with the upper-level ontology which is in fact the one we all
>use -- Aristotle plus events. (Realizing, of course, that this actual work,
>although described as bottom-up integration, must also be, at the same time,
>top-down guidance.)
>
> This is what I call building descriptive ontologies. Of course, at the upper
>levels, where ontological commitments tend to be implicit rather than
>explicit, some degree of speculative theory-building will be inevitable. But
>stick with Aristotle, I believe, and we are far less likely to get lost in the
>ontological woods (where we encounter both perdurants and endurants) than if
>we don't.
>
> Comments?
>
>
> On Monday, March 16, 2015 5:43 PM, William Frank <williamf.frank@xxxxxxxxx>
>wrote:
>
>
> Pat,
>
> While you call your analysis an oversimplification, it fills in the
>background for what, in contrast to simplification, must be my simplistic view
>of this matter.
>
> People can and do take almost any conceptual category of being and re-cast it
>as any other one. We can recast occurrents as continuents, even give them
>names, as we do with Hurricanes, and as some even do with Maria. Other way
>around, too, as some of the languages of the Northwest are purported to do -
>who tend to say thinks like 'it is Williaming over there'. We can re-cast
>individuals as types, and reify types making new individuals. Just as we do
>with count nouns Hair in French and Spaghetti in Italian) and mass nouns (Hair
>and Spaghetti in English).
>
> Having a strong belief about what conceptual category something 'really is'
>seems to me to be Flatlandish. I did not realize the silliness of this
>invading engineering till a programmer told me that what he had learned on a
>project was that a position was not 'really' an object, it was a 'really'
>relation between an account and a security. I asked him if then a customer
>was 'really' an object. He said, of course.
>
> OTOH, because conceptual categorization is a human undertaking, not a given
>of nature, we should choose an effective number of categories, and allow
>thingies in one category to be recast in another, as the need arises. Common
>logic does this, I think. In doing so, it is just reflecting our own natural
>abilities. [Making everything ONE thing is not effective for human thought,
>though Turing machines can accomplish it, making everything two dozen kinds
>of things, (though I never bothered to count) like UML, especially if they
>even then restrict what you can say, is almost as bad. This is why I call
>everything a 'thingie', and suggest that thingies be cast as most useful, (as
>well as to put my baby thumb in the eye of the ponderous.) ]
>
> There is actually and excellent Dr. Seuss poem about this subject).
>
> "
> An application’s location is a common choice
> Maybe a nation, a gas station, or behind a Rolls Royce
> But what if “location” is now the domain
> Now it’s not about the application, it’s about what’s in Spain
> "
>
> extracted from
>
>
>http://community.mega.com/t5/Blog/One-Fish-Blue-Fish-When-Characteristics-Become-Their-Own-Domain/ba-p/9727
>
> And Rich, I agree with what you say, too.
>
> On Mon, Mar 16, 2015 at 2:38 PM, Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> Greetings.
>
> I have read, thought and occassionally written on this topic (of how to
>describe real things involved with time and change) for many years. I have
>come to think that much of the problem arises from a rather uninspiring but
>very real problem, which is the expressive limitations imposed on first-order
>descriptions (and hence, via Quine's dictum, on the ontologies implied by
>those theories) by traditional syntactic limitations of first-order syntax.
>These have been eliminated in ISO Common Logic by allowing first-order
>quantification over all entities, including relations, and by allowing
>relations (and functions) to be variadic. This allows one to write axioms to
>'convert' between formal styles of temporal description. For example
>
> (forall ((x PhysicalThing)(t Time) c) (iff (c x t)(c (x t)) ))
>
> which says that a property of continuants holds at a time t just when the
>corresponding property of occurrents is true of the t-slice of the continuant.
>I know, of course, that philosophical doctrine prohibits taking a time-slice
>of an occurrent: but the fact that (as Matthew points out) these
>classifications refer to the exact same physical entities motivates using the
>same name for (for example) me and my lifetime, and for the simple property
>and its fluent variation with a temporal parameter.
>
> Obviously this is oversimplified, but perhaps you get the idea. The basic
>point, in any case, is that this entire discussion is made easier to handle if
>the underlying formal language is truly ontologically neutral, rather than
>imposing its own subtle (and familiar, perhaps) restrictions on what can be
>said about various 'kinds' of 'thing' (such as the conventional FO syntax not
>allowing properties and relations into the universe of discourse, and
>requiring them to have a fixed number of arguments).
>
> Once this syntactic freedom is available, the various disputes about
>different styles of temporal ontology (3-D versus 4-D, etc.) can be seen
>simply as debates about the appropriate syntactic location for temporal
>arguments, ie about where in a timeless sentence to add the temporal
>parameter. Does one express (P x) + t as a temporal index added to a sentence
>(TRUE[t] (P x) ) giving a temporally-indexed modal language, where time is
>considered as a parameter of truth, or as an argument to relations (P x t)
>giving a 3-d view of continuant entities with time-varying properties, or as
>an argument to individual names, now treated as temporal functions (P (x t))
>giving a 4-d view of occurrent entities which have temporal slices or parts?
>Or perhaps a judicious mix of these. In the usual FOL syntax, these last two
>are sharply incompatible, since for example P has one argument in one of them
>but two in the other, and x is a name in one but a function in the other. So
>one is obliged to chose, or impose a careful, rigid, discipline on how names
>are used. But this is merely an artifact of the syntactic rigidity of
>traitional FO notations, and this rigidity has no foundational basis, and can
>easily (almost trivially) be side-stepped.
>
> In ISO-CL, *all* of these various syntactic patterns can co-exist, with the
>same names used for the entities and all their relations no matter where the
>argument is located (so that the enduring, timeless PatHayes is the exact same
>entity as the PatHayes which can be sliced by taking a temporal argument in
>terms such as (PatHayes 1966), used in sentences such as (Undergraduate
>(PatHayes 1963)) which refers to a section of my past life, or – which is the
>*very same* thing – me in the past, since this sentence is equivalent (using
>the earlier axiom) to the alternative form (Undergraduate PatHayes 1963),
>which treats me as a continuant rather than an occurrent and treats the
>relation as a fluent rather than a simple property. But, to emphasize, in
>ISO-CL, all the names in these sentences and terms refer to single entities:
>the PatHayes which gets timesliced and the PatHayes which is treated as a
>continuant are the same, unique referent of the name "PatHayes" in every CL
>universe of interpretation. There is no need to keep a separate accounting of
>me vs my life, or to write two versions of many axioms, one in the 'fluent'
>style and the oher in the '4-d' style, as one sees throughout the OBO basic
>ontologies. The division of the universe into these categories which seems to
>be so important in many formal ontologies is simply the result of looking at
>reality through crooked glasses created by the traditional (but logically
>unnecessary) first-order segregated syntax.
>
> Comments?
>
> Pat Hayes
>
>
>
> On Mar 15, 2015, at 7:55 PM, <rrovetto@xxxxxxxxxxx> <rrovetto@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>wrote:
>
> > Matthew,
> >
> > You wrote: [MW>] The problem with combining endurantism with a process (or
>purdurantist) approach is that endurantism insists that physical objects
>wholly exist at each point in time and pass through time, which means that in
>particular that they do not have temporal parts. On the other hand a
>process/purdurantist ontology has physical objects extended in time (like
>processes) and hence they have temporal parts. Overcoming that contradiction
>is non-trivial without actually changing sides, and the choice between them is
>one of the core commitments one has to make.
> >
> > You've described traditional views of perdurantism, and also what is often
>presented as a contradiction. The idea is to develop other more accurate
>conceptions of perdurantism/endurantism or some amalgam of the two seemingly
>opposing views. I doubt there is reason to make the distinction dogma, and
>from my experience it seems it's been accepted as such.
> >
> > Now, in philosophy, some have questioned the wholly-present aspect, leading
>to a view according to which processes are persisting, wholly-present yet
>ongoing or unfolding (in no temporally-extended sense) entities (See Rowland
>Stout). In the applied side, as Galton et al. (Waterfall paper) have said
>"objects are points of stability" in virtue of processes they or their parts
>participate in. In my view, these are some steps to a more accurate
>ontological description of existents.
> >
> > I believe traditional endurantism and perdurantism are too rigid and narrow
>in themselves, each picking out aspects of the world, but are at least two
>sides to the same coin in describing existents. If some are interested in
>collaborating on a paper--ideally funded as it is important in my
>circumstances--on these topics, contact me privately. As I said, I have one,
>but the area needs more work.
> >
> > FYI: I've added 'Endurantism and Perdurantism' to the subject-line of this
>thread, and including the comment by Rich below (because I seem to be getting
>separate emails). For those responding further, I encourage responding with
>that addition in the subject for reference and consistency with the topic.
> >
> >
> > Rich Cooper wrote:
> > It seems to me that combining the two - object properties and process
>properties - would be more realistic than separating them. It has been common
>practice to separate them for so long we should at least review the reasons
>why we don't, in practice, put them together.
> >
> >
> > In games, the objects go through state changes and also appear to perform
>actions. Those would certainly be natural examples we could discuss it that
>way. Starships, Klingons, Martians, ray weapons, shields, sick bay, Captain
>Kirk, Scotty, the whole cast, the Conn, and all those objects could be used as
>examples.
> >
> >
> > But isn't the idea to construct "Scriptive" ontologies, i.e., task
>schedules, as stored or calculated, for each object? One purpose of the
>historic separation was for partitioning the program, from the data tables, so
>that the software could be generalized for use in wider application domains.
>But that separation changes the design to ensure that an API for the scheduler
>would be distinct from an API to the script tables manager - SQL or NoSQL.
>Separating the two subsystems over the years has gradually made each subsystem
>more general, more efficient at its subtask, and more complete in its
>treatment of the combined System, both software and tables.
> >
> >
> > HTML is an example of scripted layout, and there is an ontology of objects
>and operations that can be extracted from the various verbs and nouns in HTML
>pages. HTML also separates out the verb parts from the declarative parts, and
>the latest version is syntactically closed, so it's hierarchical and very easy
>to parse. Yet it still maintains the separation of objects from processes.
>Why is that the choice made instead of putting them together? What would be
>gained or lost by integrating them?
> >
> >
> > Sincerely,
> >
> > Rich Cooper,
> >
> > Rich Cooper,
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Mar 15, 2015 at 1:28 PM, Matthew West <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx>
>wrote:
> > Dear Robert,
> >
> >
> >
> > There is actually a problem here.
> >
> > Just a quick note on a passage in this helpful thread (not intended to
>deviate from the topic at hand, but important all the same)...
> >
> > MW: "The problem I have with this insistence that
>activities/processes/events are disjoint from physical objects is that it
>requires two objects for (amongst other things) me, one for me as the physical
>object, and another for the activity of my life. I’m with John S. (and some
>others) who take a process approach, seeing physical objects as (relatively)
>slowly changing processes."
> >
> > I agree with not being entirely fond of the traditional object-process
>distinction as such. To me it does not seem to capture the fluid (so to
>speak), processual-yet-persisting aspect of the world. However, one does not
>necessarily have to chose either the process-ontology approach or endurantism.
>One can think outside of the box and combine qualities of each. The task would
>then be to solve whatever philosophical (or other) problems that arise in
>doing so. This has been attempted, at least in philosophy. In fact describing
>physical objects as slowly changing process is moving toward that attempt.
>Anyway, one need not feel confined to the traditional distinction as if there
>were no alternatives. One certainly not feel as if we could not create (or
>discover) alternatives!
> >
> > [MW>] The problem with combining endurantism with a process (or
>purdurantist) approach is that endurantism insists that physical objects
>wholly exist at each point in time and pass through time, which means that in
>particular that they do not have temporal parts. On the other hand a
>process/purdurantist ontology has physical objects extended in time (like
>processes) and hence they have temporal parts. Overcoming that contradiction
>is non-trivial without actually changing sides, and the choice between them is
>one of the core commitments one has to make.
> >
> >
> >
> > Regards
> >
> >
> >
> > Matthew West
> >
> > Information Junction
> >
> > Mobile: +44 750 3385279
> >
> > Skype: dr.matthew.west
> >
> > matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >
> > http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
> >
> > https://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
> >
> > This email originates from Information Junction Ltd. Registered in England
>and Wales No. 6632177.
> >
> > Registered office: 8 Ennismore Close, Letchworth Garden City,
>Hertfordshire, SG6 2SU.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Respectfully,
> > Robert
> >
> > On Sun, Mar 15, 2015 at 10:17 AM, Matthew West <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx>
>wrote:
> >
> > Dear Thomas,
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > 3/24/15.
> >
> > To: Ontolog Discussion Group
> >
> > From: Tom Johnston (new member)
> >
> > [MW>] Welcome!
> >
> >
> >
> > I would like to comment on the current discussion about SMEs and ontologies.
> >
> >
> >
> > [MW>] <snip>
> >
> > (note: in the upper-level ontology I developed in my recent book
>“Bitemporal Data: Theory and Practice” (Morgan-Kaufmann, 2014), objects and
>events divide the world between them; they are exhaustive of what there is,
>and nothing is both an object and an event. Objects come into existence, cease
>to exist and, while they exist, change from one state to a successive state by
>participating in events. I consider this the formalization of an upper-level
>folk ontology which is the ontology common to all relational databases.
> >
> > [MW>] That is not true, relational technology is neutral in ontological
>commitments, except that it requires that tables cannot themselves be
>instances of other tables. However, I accept many relational databases adopt
>this commitment. The problem I have with this insistence that
>activities/processes/events are disjoint from physical objects is that it
>requires two objects for (amongst other things) me, one for me as the physical
>object, and another for the activity of my life. I’m with John S. (and some
>others) who take a process approach, seeing physical objects as (relatively)
>slowly changing processes.
> >
> > [MW>] <snip>
> >
> > During the JAD sessions (see below), the initial statement of requirements
>will be transformed into a different set of requirements that are not simply
>the initial requirements stated in greater detail. The initial set of objects,
>events and transformations will be similarly transformed as the BA helps the
>SMEs realize (a) ambiguities inherent in their original statement, (b)
>generalizations of their requirements that will do what they require but also
>additional useful things; (c) restrictions on their requirements because the
>current state of technology at the enterprise would make their satisfaction
>unacceptably expensive; and (d) a sorting of initial requirements into do-now
>and do-later categories, based on dependencies among the requirements, and on
>the need to keep the project on-time and under budget (so both the BA and the
>SMEs, whose names are most directly attached to the project, will look good to
>their bosses when the whole thing eventually moves into production status).
> >
> > [MW>] The challenge I find is in validating the requirements (providing
>evidence to support them).
> >
> >
> >
> > JAD: joint application development (a somewhat outdated term).
> >
> > [MW>] I think SCRUM is the current incarnation of this.
> >
> > • Next, a comment on SMEs.
> >
> >
> > It is this: SMEs generally do not know what they are talking about. To
>repeat: SMEs generally do not know what they are talking about.
> >
> > [MW>] John made a similar point, and I agree. I was too polite in my
>earlier post. In particular they generally don’t know what they don’t know.
> >
> >
> >
> > [MW>] <snip>
> >
> > For anyone familiar with Plato's Socratic dialogues (early and middle
>period dialogues), I can make my point like this: SMEs (Gorgias, Meno,
>Protagoras, etc.) are the protagonists of Socrates (the BA) in those
>dialogues. Those SMEs are the ones who profess to know something – about
>knowledge, justice, courage, etc. Socrates engages each of them in a dialog
>which always ends with Socrates demonstrating, usually by eliciting a
>contradiction from his protagonist, that the SME actually doesn't know what he
>claims to know.
> >
> >
> >
> > But there is one difference between Socrates and today's BAs. Socrates is
>content (pleased, in fact, his protestations to the contrary) to show that his
>protagonists don't know what they claim to know. Today's BAs, however, cannot
>afford that luxury. Today's BAs must somehow guide her SMEs from ignorance to
>knowledge, from vague, ambiguous, incomplete or otherwise inchoate initial
>statements of what they want to a final statement which will mediate between
>them and the developers who will implement their requirements.
> >
> >
> >
> > One conclusion from all this is that the (ontologically-adept) BA must take
>a very active role in eliciting and clarifying definitions of the objects and
>events of concern to the enterprise. Her role must not be tidying up around
>the edges of what the SMEs initial come up with as a requirements statement.
>She must not use a light touch. She must challenge her SMEs as aggressively as
>Socrates challenged the self-proclaimed experts he engaged with.
> >
> > [MW>] I agree.
> >
> >
> >
> > Is there any additional guidance I can suggest, other than these very
>general comments?
> >
> >
> >
> > There is. I would like to suggest that before we begin eliciting
>ontological commitments from SMEs, we should clarify (a) what we are defining,
>and (b) what a definition is.
> >
> >
> >
> > (3) What are we defining when we ask SMEs for definitions?
> >
> >
> >
> > Let's take Customer as an example. In any enterprise, in any JAD session,
>with any group of SMEs, when we ask “What is a customer?” (the same “What is
>X?” question form as Aristotle's most basic ontological question, ti esti?),
>surely we must be asking for something besides a dictionary definition.
> >
> >
> >
> > We don't need SMEs to formulate general definitions, whether they are
>do-it-yourself dictionary definitions, or definitions defining nodes in a
>taxonomy whose linearly parent nodes, up to the root node, have already been
>defined. We are asking our SMEs what a customer of our enterprise is, that is,
>what a customer of our enterprise in fact is, not what the SMEs think a
>customer of our enterprise ideally should be.
> >
> > [MW>] Yes. When I was talking about an evidence based approach in my
>response to John, this is the kind of thing I was meaning.
> >
> > [MW>] <snip>
> >
> > In any relationship of a set and its immediate superset, the immediate
>superset defines a universe of discourse from which the members of the set are
>chosen by means of that rule. For example, the set Customer will have (whether
>represented as such in a database or not) as an immediate superset the set
>Party, which we can think of as being the set of all those individuals or
>organizations with which our organization engages in some way.
> >
> >
> >
> > This immediately excludes from the universe of discourse for Customer such
>things as dogs, cars, and also any persons or groups not able to enter into a
>legal agreement (which a customer relationship is). Now, to define what a
>customer of our enterprise is, all we need to do is to state the rule which
>picks out a subset from that universe of discourse.
> >
> >
> >
> > [MW>] <snip>
> >
> > To accept a person or organization as a customer is to add a row to the
>enterprise's Customer table representing that person or organization.
> >
> > [MW>] I was once given as a definition of “Customer” “One who is recorded
>in on the Customer table”. Accurate, but not actually useful J
> >
> > …a customer of our enterprise is – a subtype of a Party with whom we have
>entered into a customer relationship, a relationship subject to conditions
>stated in our policy manuals and implemented in our code.
> >
> >
> >
> > [MW>] <snip>
> >
> > Finding these definitions – which clearly can be done – is doing something
>a lot more concrete than talking to a group of SMEs with the objective of
>obtaining consensus definitions of such key terms as “customer”.
> >
> > [MW>] <snip>
> >
> >
> >
> > So we have steered away from the dragon of Wittgensteinian definitions, and
>reached the safe fortress of Aristotelian definitions. To wit: the category
>Customer (of enterprise X) is represented by a relational table (hopefully
>named Customer, or something like it). A relational table is a set. A set is a
>collection of set members drawn from a universe of discourse such that the
>members of the set satisfy a specific set membership criterion. That
>membership criterion is expressed in policy manuals, and in the rules
>expressed in code that determine whether or not someone will be added to the
>Customer table.
> >
> > [MW>] <snip>
> >
> > Prescriptive ontologies come into play, on my view, when our objective is
>to construct higher-level ontologies, for example industry-level ontologies.
>For these higher-level ontologies to play the role of facilitating semantic
>interoperability across those industries, each enterprise subscribing to the
>industry-level ontology must realize that their responsibility is not to
>simply play lip service to the industry ontology. It is to begin the difficult
>work of adjusting their de facto ontologies, including the set membership
>rules for the sets represented as tables in their databases, so that those
>lower-level ontological categories – the ones corresponding one-to-one with
>their database tables, are consistent extensions of those higher-level
>ontologies.
> >
> > [MW>] I’ve developed this kind of ontology. It is not really quite as you
>describe. Generally industry ontologies are about supply chain integration, so
>they do not cover all of an enterprises data. What becomes most important is
>to identify the subset of the industry model that is relevant to your slot in
>the supply chain, and to be sure that you can map your enterprise model into
>and out of those parts of the industry model. That has more flexibility than a
>simple subset, your mappings may be from multiple tables, or a subset of one
>of your tables. The other key is to be able to incorporate into your data key
>industry level master data such as product categories and their specifications.
> >
> >
> >
> > This is the basic, boots-on-the-ground work that is required to make
>prescriptive ontologies a reality. But the foundation from which we must begin
>is what ontological commitments are in fact, right now, in place in individual
>databases. The prescriptive work of integrating these de facto low-level
>ontologies, however, is not simply a bottom-up process of supertyping the
>types we begin with. It is a process of working with a well-developed
>upper-level ontology as well as a set of de facto low-level ontologies,
>combining top-down guidance towards an ideal goal with real-world realizations
>of ontological categories that have been proven, over time, to actually work.
> >
> > [MW>] Yes, but when you look at the commitments/rules imposed by a
>database, you should also be questioning whether these are not imposed as an
>implementation convenience (changing what are really many-to-many
>relationships to one-to-many for example).
> >
> >
> >
> > Perhaps this is something of a Manifesto – a description of a research and
>a development program of work guided by strong theoretical commitments and
>also a commitment to objects and processes that are time-tested in the real
>world. I don't like the term “Manifesto”, simply because of its creaky 19th
>century feel. But I am proposing that we clearly distinguish descriptive from
>prescriptive ontologies, clearly recognize the importance of descriptive
>ontologies, and begin to formalize them in the manner described above.
> >
> >
> >
> > Comments?
> >
> > [MW>] I think you are raising a lot of valid issues.
> >
> >
> >
> > Regards
> >
> >
> >
> > Matthew West
> >
> > Information Junction
> >
> > Mobile: +44 750 3385279
> >
> > Skype: dr.matthew.west
> >
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> >
> > http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
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> >
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