I agree. The syntax of logic is mostly uninformative. The real
issue is to match the representation of the problem with the
semantic and pragmatic needs of the user. (01)
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper,
www DOT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
( 9 4 9 ) 5 2 5-5 7 1 2 (02)
-----Original Message-----
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Pat
Hayes
Sent: Monday, March 16, 2015 11:39 AM
To: rrovetto@xxxxxxxxxxx; [ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Endurantism and Perdurantism - Re:
Some Comments on Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Ontologies (03)
Greetings. (04)
I have read, thought and occassionally written on this topic (of
how to describe real things involved with time and change) for
many years. I have come to think that much of the problem arises
from a rather uninspiring but very real problem, which is the
expressive limitations imposed on first-order descriptions (and
hence, via Quine's dictum, on the ontologies implied by those
theories) by traditional syntactic limitations of first-order
syntax. These have been eliminated in ISO Common Logic by
allowing first-order quantification over all entities, including
relations, and by allowing relations (and functions) to be
variadic. This allows one to write axioms to 'convert' between
formal styles of temporal description. For example (05)
(forall ((x PhysicalThing)(t Time) c) (iff (c x t)(c (x t)) )) (06)
which says that a property of continuants holds at a time t just
when the corresponding property of occurrents is true of the
t-slice of the continuant. I know, of course, that philosophical
doctrine prohibits taking a time-slice of an occurrent: but the
fact that (as Matthew points out) these classifications refer to
the exact same physical entities motivates using the same name
for (for example) me and my lifetime, and for the simple property
and its fluent variation with a temporal parameter. (07)
Obviously this is oversimplified, but perhaps you get the idea.
The basic point, in any case, is that this entire discussion is
made easier to handle if the underlying formal language is truly
ontologically neutral, rather than imposing its own subtle (and
familiar, perhaps) restrictions on what can be said about various
'kinds' of 'thing' (such as the conventional FO syntax not
allowing properties and relations into the universe of discourse,
and requiring them to have a fixed number of arguments). (08)
Once this syntactic freedom is available, the various disputes
about different styles of temporal ontology (3-D versus 4-D,
etc.) can be seen simply as debates about the appropriate
syntactic location for temporal arguments, ie about where in a
timeless sentence to add the temporal parameter. Does one express
(P x) + t as a temporal index added to a sentence (TRUE[t] (P x)
) giving a temporally-indexed modal language, where time is
considered as a parameter of truth, or as an argument to
relations (P x t) giving a 3-d view of continuant entities with
time-varying properties, or as an argument to individual names,
now treated as temporal functions (P (x t)) giving a 4-d view of
occurrent entities which have temporal slices or parts? Or
perhaps a judicious mix of these. In the usual FOL syntax, these
last two are sharply incompatible, since for example P has one
argument in one of them but two in the other, and x is a name in
one but a function in the other. So one is obliged to chose, or
impose a careful, rigid, discipline on how names are used. But
this is merely an artifact of the syntactic rigidity of
traitional FO notations, and this rigidity has no foundational
basis, and can easily (almost trivially) be side-stepped. (09)
In ISO-CL, *all* of these various syntactic patterns can
co-exist, with the same names used for the entities and all their
relations no matter where the argument is located (so that the
enduring, timeless PatHayes is the exact same entity as the
PatHayes which can be sliced by taking a temporal argument in
terms such as (PatHayes 1966), used in sentences such as
(Undergraduate (PatHayes 1963)) which refers to a section of my
past life, or - which is the *very same* thing - me in the past,
since this sentence is equivalent (using the earlier axiom) to
the alternative form (Undergraduate PatHayes 1963), which treats
me as a continuant rather than an occurrent and treats the
relation as a fluent rather than a simple property. But, to
emphasize, in ISO-CL, all the names in these sentences and terms
refer to single entities: the PatHayes which gets timesliced and
the PatHayes which is treated as a continuant are the same,
unique referent of the name "PatHayes" in every CL universe of
interpretation. There is no need to keep a separate accounting of
me vs my life, or to write two versions of many axioms, one in
the 'fluent' style and the oher in the '4-d' style, as one sees
throughout the OBO basic ontologies. The division of the universe
into these categories which seems to be so important in many
formal ontologies is simply the result of looking at reality
through crooked glasses created by the traditional (but logically
unnecessary) first-order segregated syntax. (010)
Comments? (011)
Pat Hayes (012)
On Mar 15, 2015, at 7:55 PM, <rrovetto@xxxxxxxxxxx>
<rrovetto@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: (013)
> Matthew,
>
> You wrote: [MW>] The problem with combining endurantism with a
process (or purdurantist) approach is that endurantism insists
that physical objects wholly exist at each point in time and pass
through time, which means that in particular that they do not
have temporal parts. On the other hand a process/purdurantist
ontology has physical objects extended in time (like processes)
and hence they have temporal parts. Overcoming that contradiction
is non-trivial without actually changing sides, and the choice
between them is one of the core commitments one has to make.
>
> You've described traditional views of perdurantism, and also
what is often presented as a contradiction. The idea is to
develop other more accurate conceptions of
perdurantism/endurantism or some amalgam of the two seemingly
opposing views. I doubt there is reason to make the distinction
dogma, and from my experience it seems it's been accepted as
such.
>
> Now, in philosophy, some have questioned the wholly-present
aspect, leading to a view according to which processes are
persisting, wholly-present yet ongoing or unfolding (in no
temporally-extended sense) entities (See Rowland Stout). In the
applied side, as Galton et al. (Waterfall paper) have said
"objects are points of stability" in virtue of processes they or
their parts participate in. In my view, these are some steps to a
more accurate ontological description of existents.
>
> I believe traditional endurantism and perdurantism are too
rigid and narrow in themselves, each picking out aspects of the
world, but are at least two sides to the same coin in describing
existents. If some are interested in collaborating on a
paper--ideally funded as it is important in my circumstances--on
these topics, contact me privately. As I said, I have one, but
the area needs more work.
>
> FYI: I've added 'Endurantism and Perdurantism' to the
subject-line of this thread, and including the comment by Rich
below (because I seem to be getting separate emails). For those
responding further, I encourage responding with that addition in
the subject for reference and consistency with the topic.
>
>
> Rich Cooper wrote:
> It seems to me that combining the two - object properties and
process properties - would be more realistic than separating
them. It has been common practice to separate them for so long
we should at least review the reasons why we don't, in practice,
put them together.
>
>
> In games, the objects go through state changes and also appear
to perform actions. Those would certainly be natural examples we
could discuss it that way. Starships, Klingons, Martians, ray
weapons, shields, sick bay, Captain Kirk, Scotty, the whole cast,
the Conn, and all those objects could be used as examples.
>
>
> But isn't the idea to construct "Scriptive" ontologies, i.e.,
task schedules, as stored or calculated, for each object? One
purpose of the historic separation was for partitioning the
program, from the data tables, so that the software could be
generalized for use in wider application domains. But that
separation changes the design to ensure that an API for the
scheduler would be distinct from an API to the script tables
manager - SQL or NoSQL. Separating the two subsystems over the
years has gradually made each subsystem more general, more
efficient at its subtask, and more complete in its treatment of
the combined System, both software and tables.
>
>
> HTML is an example of scripted layout, and there is an ontology
of objects and operations that can be extracted from the various
verbs and nouns in HTML pages. HTML also separates out the verb
parts from the declarative parts, and the latest version is
syntactically closed, so it's hierarchical and very easy to
parse. Yet it still maintains the separation of objects from
processes. Why is that the choice made instead of putting them
together? What would be gained or lost by integrating them?
>
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Rich Cooper,
>
> Rich Cooper,
>
>
>
> On Sun, Mar 15, 2015 at 1:28 PM, Matthew West
<dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Dear Robert,
>
>
>
> There is actually a problem here.
>
> Just a quick note on a passage in this helpful thread (not
intended to deviate from the topic at hand, but important all the
same)...
>
> MW: "The problem I have with this insistence that
activities/processes/events are disjoint from physical objects is
that it requires two objects for (amongst other things) me, one
for me as the physical object, and another for the activity of my
life. I'm with John S. (and some others) who take a process
approach, seeing physical objects as (relatively) slowly changing
processes."
>
> I agree with not being entirely fond of the traditional
object-process distinction as such. To me it does not seem to
capture the fluid (so to speak), processual-yet-persisting aspect
of the world. However, one does not necessarily have to chose
either the process-ontology approach or endurantism. One can
think outside of the box and combine qualities of each. The task
would then be to solve whatever philosophical (or other) problems
that arise in doing so. This has been attempted, at least in
philosophy. In fact describing physical objects as slowly
changing process is moving toward that attempt. Anyway, one need
not feel confined to the traditional distinction as if there were
no alternatives. One certainly not feel as if we could not create
(or discover) alternatives!
>
> [MW>] The problem with combining endurantism with a process (or
purdurantist) approach is that endurantism insists that physical
objects wholly exist at each point in time and pass through time,
which means that in particular that they do not have temporal
parts. On the other hand a process/purdurantist ontology has
physical objects extended in time (like processes) and hence they
have temporal parts. Overcoming that contradiction is non-trivial
without actually changing sides, and the choice between them is
one of the core commitments one has to make.
>
>
>
> Regards
>
>
>
> Matthew West
>
> Information Junction
>
> Mobile: +44 750 3385279
>
> Skype: dr.matthew.west
>
> matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
>
> https://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
>
> This email originates from Information Junction Ltd. Registered
in England and Wales No. 6632177.
>
> Registered office: 8 Ennismore Close, Letchworth Garden City,
Hertfordshire, SG6 2SU.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Respectfully,
> Robert
>
> On Sun, Mar 15, 2015 at 10:17 AM, Matthew West
<dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Dear Thomas,
>
>
>
>
>
> 3/24/15.
>
> To: Ontolog Discussion Group
>
> From: Tom Johnston (new member)
>
> [MW>] Welcome!
>
>
>
> I would like to comment on the current discussion about SMEs
and ontologies.
>
>
>
> [MW>] <snip>
>
> (note: in the upper-level ontology I developed in my recent
book "Bitemporal Data: Theory and Practice" (Morgan-Kaufmann,
2014), objects and events divide the world between them; they are
exhaustive of what there is, and nothing is both an object and an
event. Objects come into existence, cease to exist and, while
they exist, change from one state to a successive state by
participating in events. I consider this the formalization of an
upper-level folk ontology which is the ontology common to all
relational databases.
>
> [MW>] That is not true, relational technology is neutral in
ontological commitments, except that it requires that tables
cannot themselves be instances of other tables. However, I accept
many relational databases adopt this commitment. The problem I
have with this insistence that activities/processes/events are
disjoint from physical objects is that it requires two objects
for (amongst other things) me, one for me as the physical object,
and another for the activity of my life. I'm with John S. (and
some others) who take a process approach, seeing physical objects
as (relatively) slowly changing processes.
>
> [MW>] <snip>
>
> During the JAD sessions (see below), the initial statement of
requirements will be transformed into a different set of
requirements that are not simply the initial requirements stated
in greater detail. The initial set of objects, events and
transformations will be similarly transformed as the BA helps the
SMEs realize (a) ambiguities inherent in their original
statement, (b) generalizations of their requirements that will do
what they require but also additional useful things; (c)
restrictions on their requirements because the current state of
technology at the enterprise would make their satisfaction
unacceptably expensive; and (d) a sorting of initial requirements
into do-now and do-later categories, based on dependencies among
the requirements, and on the need to keep the project on-time and
under budget (so both the BA and the SMEs, whose names are most
directly attached to the project, will look good to their bosses
when the whole thing eventually moves into production status).
>
> [MW>] The challenge I find is in validating the requirements
(providing evidence to support them).
>
>
>
> JAD: joint application development (a somewhat outdated term).
>
> [MW>] I think SCRUM is the current incarnation of this.
>
> . Next, a comment on SMEs.
>
>
> It is this: SMEs generally do not know what they are talking
about. To repeat: SMEs generally do not know what they are
talking about.
>
> [MW>] John made a similar point, and I agree. I was too polite
in my earlier post. In particular they generally don't know what
they don't know.
>
>
>
> [MW>] <snip>
>
> For anyone familiar with Plato's Socratic dialogues (early and
middle period dialogues), I can make my point like this: SMEs
(Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras, etc.) are the protagonists of
Socrates (the BA) in those dialogues. Those SMEs are the ones who
profess to know something - about knowledge, justice, courage,
etc. Socrates engages each of them in a dialog which always ends
with Socrates demonstrating, usually by eliciting a contradiction
from his protagonist, that the SME actually doesn't know what he
claims to know.
>
>
>
> But there is one difference between Socrates and today's BAs.
Socrates is content (pleased, in fact, his protestations to the
contrary) to show that his protagonists don't know what they
claim to know. Today's BAs, however, cannot afford that luxury.
Today's BAs must somehow guide her SMEs from ignorance to
knowledge, from vague, ambiguous, incomplete or otherwise
inchoate initial statements of what they want to a final
statement which will mediate between them and the developers who
will implement their requirements.
>
>
>
> One conclusion from all this is that the (ontologically-adept)
BA must take a very active role in eliciting and clarifying
definitions of the objects and events of concern to the
enterprise. Her role must not be tidying up around the edges of
what the SMEs initial come up with as a requirements statement.
She must not use a light touch. She must challenge her SMEs as
aggressively as Socrates challenged the self-proclaimed experts
he engaged with.
>
> [MW>] I agree.
>
>
>
> Is there any additional guidance I can suggest, other than
these very general comments?
>
>
>
> There is. I would like to suggest that before we begin
eliciting ontological commitments from SMEs, we should clarify
(a) what we are defining, and (b) what a definition is.
>
>
>
> (3) What are we defining when we ask SMEs for definitions?
>
>
>
> Let's take Customer as an example. In any enterprise, in any
JAD session, with any group of SMEs, when we ask "What is a
customer?" (the same "What is X?" question form as Aristotle's
most basic ontological question, ti esti?), surely we must be
asking for something besides a dictionary definition.
>
>
>
> We don't need SMEs to formulate general definitions, whether
they are do-it-yourself dictionary definitions, or definitions
defining nodes in a taxonomy whose linearly parent nodes, up to
the root node, have already been defined. We are asking our SMEs
what a customer of our enterprise is, that is, what a customer of
our enterprise in fact is, not what the SMEs think a customer of
our enterprise ideally should be.
>
> [MW>] Yes. When I was talking about an evidence based approach
in my response to John, this is the kind of thing I was meaning.
>
> [MW>] <snip>
>
> In any relationship of a set and its immediate superset, the
immediate superset defines a universe of discourse from which the
members of the set are chosen by means of that rule. For example,
the set Customer will have (whether represented as such in a
database or not) as an immediate superset the set Party, which we
can think of as being the set of all those individuals or
organizations with which our organization engages in some way.
>
>
>
> This immediately excludes from the universe of discourse for
Customer such things as dogs, cars, and also any persons or
groups not able to enter into a legal agreement (which a customer
relationship is). Now, to define what a customer of our
enterprise is, all we need to do is to state the rule which picks
out a subset from that universe of discourse.
>
>
>
> [MW>] <snip>
>
> To accept a person or organization as a customer is to add a
row to the enterprise's Customer table representing that person
or organization.
>
> [MW>] I was once given as a definition of "Customer" "One who
is recorded in on the Customer table". Accurate, but not actually
useful J
>
> .a customer of our enterprise is - a subtype of a Party with
whom we have entered into a customer relationship, a relationship
subject to conditions stated in our policy manuals and
implemented in our code.
>
>
>
> [MW>] <snip>
>
> Finding these definitions - which clearly can be done - is
doing something a lot more concrete than talking to a group of
SMEs with the objective of obtaining consensus definitions of
such key terms as "customer".
>
> [MW>] <snip>
>
>
>
> So we have steered away from the dragon of Wittgensteinian
definitions, and reached the safe fortress of Aristotelian
definitions. To wit: the category Customer (of enterprise X) is
represented by a relational table (hopefully named Customer, or
something like it). A relational table is a set. A set is a
collection of set members drawn from a universe of discourse such
that the members of the set satisfy a specific set membership
criterion. That membership criterion is expressed in policy
manuals, and in the rules expressed in code that determine
whether or not someone will be added to the Customer table.
>
> [MW>] <snip>
>
> Prescriptive ontologies come into play, on my view, when our
objective is to construct higher-level ontologies, for example
industry-level ontologies. For these higher-level ontologies to
play the role of facilitating semantic interoperability across
those industries, each enterprise subscribing to the
industry-level ontology must realize that their responsibility is
not to simply play lip service to the industry ontology. It is to
begin the difficult work of adjusting their de facto ontologies,
including the set membership rules for the sets represented as
tables in their databases, so that those lower-level ontological
categories - the ones corresponding one-to-one with their
database tables, are consistent extensions of those higher-level
ontologies.
>
> [MW>] I've developed this kind of ontology. It is not really
quite as you describe. Generally industry ontologies are about
supply chain integration, so they do not cover all of an
enterprises data. What becomes most important is to identify the
subset of the industry model that is relevant to your slot in the
supply chain, and to be sure that you can map your enterprise
model into and out of those parts of the industry model. That has
more flexibility than a simple subset, your mappings may be from
multiple tables, or a subset of one of your tables. The other key
is to be able to incorporate into your data key industry level
master data such as product categories and their specifications.
>
>
>
> This is the basic, boots-on-the-ground work that is required to
make prescriptive ontologies a reality. But the foundation from
which we must begin is what ontological commitments are in fact,
right now, in place in individual databases. The prescriptive
work of integrating these de facto low-level ontologies, however,
is not simply a bottom-up process of supertyping the types we
begin with. It is a process of working with a well-developed
upper-level ontology as well as a set of de facto low-level
ontologies, combining top-down guidance towards an ideal goal
with real-world realizations of ontological categories that have
been proven, over time, to actually work.
>
> [MW>] Yes, but when you look at the commitments/rules imposed
by a database, you should also be questioning whether these are
not imposed as an implementation convenience (changing what are
really many-to-many relationships to one-to-many for example).
>
>
>
> Perhaps this is something of a Manifesto - a description of a
research and a development program of work guided by strong
theoretical commitments and also a commitment to objects and
processes that are time-tested in the real world. I don't like
the term "Manifesto", simply because of its creaky 19th century
feel. But I am proposing that we clearly distinguish descriptive
from prescriptive ontologies, clearly recognize the importance of
descriptive ontologies, and begin to formalize them in the manner
described above.
>
>
>
> Comments?
>
> [MW>] I think you are raising a lot of valid issues.
>
>
>
> Regards
>
>
>
> Matthew West
>
> Information Junction
>
> Mobile: +44 750 3385279
>
> Skype: dr.matthew.west
>
> matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
>
> https://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
>
> This email originates from Information Junction Ltd. Registered
in England and Wales No. 6632177.
>
> Registered office: 8 Ennismore Close, Letchworth Garden City,
Hertfordshire, SG6 2SU.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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