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Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology vs KR

To: "'[ontolog-forum] '" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: "Patrick Cassidy" <pat@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2014 01:51:13 -0400
Message-id: <12ac01cfdece$0a7235c0$1f56a140$@micra.com>
Regardkg A COMMENT OF John Sowa's:    (01)

> As soon as you admit that there are multiple representations and
tradeoffs, that implies that no single representation of any kind
(propositional or whatever) can be fundamental.    (02)

This sounds like saying that because no theory of physics captures the full
reality, there is **no** reality that can be approximated to a better or
worse degree.    (03)

I am not convinced that there are no fundamental elements (semantic
primitives) - rather, I imagine that there are increasingly  better
approximations, like physical theories, that can be elaborated or improved,
and, only occasionally, when necessary, deleted from the inventory (vide
phlogiston).    (04)

PatC    (05)

Patrick Cassidy
1-908-561-3416    (06)

 >-----Original Message-----
 >From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
 >bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John F Sowa
 >Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2014 9:32 AM
 >To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
 >Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology vs KR
 >Ali, Steven, Ed,
 >That claim is a narrow view, which requires much more qualification:
 >Brian Cantwell Smith
 >> Any mechanically embodied intelligent process will be comprised of
 >> structural ingredients that a) we as external observers naturally take
 >> to represent a propositional account of the knowledge that the overall
 >> process exhibits, and b) independent of such external semantic
 >> attribution, play a formal but causal and essential role in
 >> engendering the behavior that manifests that knowledge.
 >I agree with Steven's criticisms, and I also agree with Ed's point:
 >> Ontologies are indeed representations of "a propositional account of
 >> knowledge", but not necessarily knowledge exhibited by any particular
 >Brian CS stated his claim in his PhD dissertation of 1982.  But in the
same book
 >in which it was reprinted, Levesque and Brachman made further
 >HL & RB
 >> There is no single best language, it is argued, only more or less
 >> interesting positions on the tradeoff.
 >As soon as you admit that there are multiple representations and
 >that implies that no single representation of any kind (propositional or
 >whatever) can be fundamental.
 >But if so, what would be fundamental?  Many researchers in cognitive
 >science, ranging from Aristotle to modern neuroscience, would say that
 >imagery derived directly from perception is more fundamental.
 >(And 'imagery' includes versions from all senses, not just vision.)
 >Short summary:  Any propositional representation in any language, natural
 >artificial, is an approximation that is based on some "interesting
position on
 >the tradeoff".  But there is no limit to the number and kinds of tradeoffs
 >different purposes.  Peirce's "twin gates" of perception and action
 >the symbol grounding for any and all representations.
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 >    (07)

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