John Sowa writes:
> As soon as you admit that there are multiple representations and
> tradeoffs, that implies that no single representation of any kind
> (propositional or whatever) can be fundamental.
Obstruction of simplification over the past 40 years has
disastrously obscured
the search for fundamentals and created a cluttered illusion of
unavoidable tradeoffs.
Thorough simplification leads to convergence in underlying
features of language design,
such as the structure of information building blocks that are well
designed to be easily
arranged. This is similar to auto engineers being blinded to
fundamentals like the value of
making wheels round.
Ed Lowry
http://users.rcn.com/eslowry
On 10/2/2014 9:32 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
Ali, Steven, Ed,
That claim is a narrow view, which requires much more qualification:
Brian Cantwell Smith
Any mechanically embodied intelligent process will be comprised of
structural ingredients that a) we as external observers naturally take
to represent a propositional account of the knowledge that the overall
process exhibits, and b) independent of such external semantic
attribution, play a formal but causal and essential role in engendering
the behavior that manifests that knowledge.
I agree with Steven's criticisms, and I also agree with Ed's point:
EJB
Ontologies are indeed representations of “a propositional account of
knowledge”, but not necessarily knowledge exhibited by any particular process.
Brian CS stated his claim in his PhD dissertation of 1982. But in the
same book in which it was reprinted, Levesque and Brachman made further
qualifications:
http://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse574/01wi/readings/levesque-brachman-fundamental.pdf
HL & RB
There is no single best language, it is argued, only more or less
interesting positions on the tradeoff.
As soon as you admit that there are multiple representations and
tradeoffs, that implies that no single representation of any kind
(propositional or whatever) can be fundamental.
But if so, what would be fundamental? Many researchers in cognitive
science, ranging from Aristotle to modern neuroscience, would say
that imagery derived directly from perception is more fundamental.
(And 'imagery' includes versions from all senses, not just vision.)
Short summary: Any propositional representation in any language,
natural or artificial, is an approximation that is based on some
"interesting position on the tradeoff". But there is no limit to
the number and kinds of tradeoffs for different purposes. Peirce's
"twin gates" of perception and action determine the symbol grounding
for any and all representations.
John
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