Pat, (01)
I would say instead that every theory has its own fundamental elements
(semantic primitives). If the theory is accepted by others, its fundamental
elements become elements of their elaborated theories. Now, the authors of
theory B might accept theory A, but propose "more fundamental" elements, and
then formulate some of the fundamental elements in theory A as constructs of
the fundamental elements in theory B. And of course, theory B may propose
additional fundamental elements that are beyond the scope of theory A. So
acceptance of a theory requires acceptance of its fundamental elements, but not
necessarily agreement that they are fundamental. As you say, this has
certainly been the path of "refinements" in atomic physics, but also of several
branches of mathematics. (02)
I agree that there are no truly fundamental elements that are undisputedly part
of (or consistent with) all theories. (03)
I must say I don't understand the idea "fundamental representation" at all. A
language that can express a theory can represent the fundamental elements of
the theory, using fundamental elements of the language. But does that make the
language elements "more fundamental", or just part of a potentially orthogonal
theory of expression? Is 'predicate' "more fundamental" than 'atom'? That
kind of question takes us off into a philosophical wilderness for which I lack
the survival skills. (04)
-Ed (05)
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
> bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Patrick Cassidy
> Sent: Friday, October 03, 2014 1:51 AM
> To: '[ontolog-forum] '
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology vs KR
>
> Regardkg A COMMENT OF John Sowa's:
>
> [JS]:
> > As soon as you admit that there are multiple representations and
> tradeoffs, that implies that no single representation of any kind
> (propositional or whatever) can be fundamental.
>
> This sounds like saying that because no theory of physics captures the full
> reality, there is **no** reality that can be approximated to a better or worse
> degree.
>
> I am not convinced that there are no fundamental elements (semantic
> primitives) - rather, I imagine that there are increasingly better
> approximations, like physical theories, that can be elaborated or improved,
> and, only occasionally, when necessary, deleted from the inventory (vide
> phlogiston).
>
> PatC
>
> Patrick Cassidy
> MICRA Inc.
> cassidy@xxxxxxxxx
> 1-908-561-3416
>
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
> >bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John F Sowa
> >Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2014 9:32 AM
> >To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology vs KR > >Ali, Steven, Ed, > >That
> claim is a narrow view, which requires much more qualification:
> >
> >Brian Cantwell Smith
> >> Any mechanically embodied intelligent process will be comprised of >>
> structural ingredients that a) we as external observers naturally take >> to
> represent a propositional account of the knowledge that the overall >>
> process exhibits, and b) independent of such external semantic >>
> attribution, play a formal but causal and essential role in >> engendering
>the
> behavior that manifests that knowledge.
> >
> >I agree with Steven's criticisms, and I also agree with Ed's point:
> >
> >EJB
> >> Ontologies are indeed representations of "a propositional account of >>
> knowledge", but not necessarily knowledge exhibited by any particular
> >process.
> >
> >Brian CS stated his claim in his PhD dissertation of 1982. But in the same
> book >in which it was reprinted, Levesque and Brachman made further
> >qualifications:
>
> >http://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse574/01wi/readings/levesque
> -
> >brachman-fundamental.pdf
> >
> >HL & RB
> >> There is no single best language, it is argued, only more or less >>
> interesting positions on the tradeoff.
> >
> >As soon as you admit that there are multiple representations and
> tradeoffs, >that implies that no single representation of any kind
> (propositional or
> >whatever) can be fundamental.
> >
> >But if so, what would be fundamental? Many researchers in cognitive
> >science, ranging from Aristotle to modern neuroscience, would say that
> >imagery derived directly from perception is more fundamental.
> >(And 'imagery' includes versions from all senses, not just vision.) >
>>Short
> summary: Any propositional representation in any language, natural or
> >artificial, is an approximation that is based on some "interesting position
>on
> >the tradeoff". But there is no limit to the number and kinds of tradeoffs
>for
> >different purposes. Peirce's "twin gates" of perception and action
> determine >the symbol grounding for any and all representations.
> >
> >John
> >
>
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