On Jul 25, 2012, at 3:43 PM, Avril Styrman wrote: (01)
> Pat,
>
> can you cite any article that talks about contexts in terms of sets with
>different ranks? (02)
Not sure what you mean by 'rank' here. Do you mean as in set theory where the
rank of an ordinal is the ordinal? If so, I don't know how to interpret that in
context language, but it sounds intriguing. (03)
Pat (04)
> In flat theories such as mereology and Boolean algebras everything is on the
>same level, but in set theories there are different granular levels.
>
> Avril
>
> Lainaus "Pat Hayes" <phayes@xxxxxxx>:
>
>>
>> On Jul 25, 2012, at 6:44 AM, John Bottoms wrote:
>>
>>> On 7/25/2012 7:25 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
>>>> On 7/25/2012 12:45 AM, Pat Hayes wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> JMcC's point was that there was no single "theory" of contexts; that
>>>>> contexts are not a natural kind, and a "context" is just anything
>>>>> that anyone cares to use in a context kind of a way, ie as something
>>>>> that influences truth values and denotations.
>>>>>
>>> It almost sounds like there are two definitions of "context".
>>
>> Two? TWO??? I attended several workshops and meetings on the theme of
>contexts and context reasoning. At one of them I took careful notes. Over
>three days of talks, no two speakers used the same sense of "context". They
>were all talking about different things, ranging in scope from a psychological
>state lasting a few miiliseconds to an entire human culture lasting millennia.
>When people say "context" they simply mean "all the stuff that I havn't got an
>explicit theory of". I have in fact offered this as a definition of "context"
>at the Heidelberg ontology meeting (which John Sowa was also present at):
>>
>> Context
>> The meaning of language is influenced by a very large number of factors. No
>theory of meaning is comprehensive enough to account for all of these;
>particular theories of meaning focus on some and analyze them in detail, and
>ignore others completely. For each such theory of meaning, the combined effect
>of the factors which the theory does not explicitly address is often called a
>"context".
>>
>>> One is the perceived setting which may evoke observations based on the
>level and type of perception. While the other is the brute-force real world
>set of facts? Is this correct? And if so, should we have different terms by
>the type of context we refer to?
>>
>> The brute force real world (or part of it) is the context, not facts about
>that real world. Contexts are objects. For more on this, see my paper on
>'contexts in context' at the AAAI context symposium, visible at
>http://bit.ly/N2yGYa . But they key point is that there are not two or even
>twenty-two 'kinds' of context, but that being a context is more like a status
>or role than an ontological type. ANYTHING can be a 'context' in the right,
>um, context.
>>
>>> JB: My fear is that by not defining a context type we will disparage its
>use. That would be awkward.
>>
>> What do you see the "use" of contexts as being? Personally, I think we would
>make great progress (indeed, we ARE making great progress) by eliminating all
>talk of "contexts" entirely, and doing our utmost best to forget about the
>term as being pre-scientific and confusing. If you want to think about how
>time influences meaning, think about temporal logics. If you want to think
>about how beliefs influence meaing, think about epistemic logics. If you want
>to think about fiction, study literary theory. But don't think that by calling
>all these (and so many other things) all "contexts" that you have thereby
>achieved any kind of insight or clarity. All you have done is get time and
>belief and fiction muddled, ie created confusion.
>>
>> Pat
>>
>>
>>>> I agree with that idea.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> my (often repeated) objection that time, for example, and belief,
>>>>> for example, were very different kinds of thing and influenced
>>>>> truth in very different kinds of ways...
>>>>>
>>>> I also agree with that.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> his response was always that the point of a context logic was not
>>>>> to capture the essence or nature of contexts, but rather to be simply
>>>>> a general framework for stating inferences which might be influenced
>>>>> by *any* kind of context.
>>>>>
>>>> And I have no objection to that idea.
>>>>
>>>> JFS
>>>>
>>>>>> "(that p)" is a kind of quasi-quotation that allows
>>>>>> variables in p to be bound to quantifiers outside of p.
>>>>>>
>>>> PH
>>>>
>>>>> Hmm, I don't think it is correct to think of it as quasi-quotation.
>>>>> Rather than quoting the sentence, it treats it as defining a
>>>>> zero-ary predicate, and creates a term denoting that entity.
>>>>>
>>>> The backquote in LISP can be applied to any expression. The IKL
>>>> 'that' operator can be implemented in LISP by applying backquote
>>>> to sentences in some version of logic.
>>>>
>>>> That is an explanation that is meaningless to anybody who does
>>>> not know LISP. But LISP aficionados like that way of talking.
>>>>
>>>> In any case, I agree that your definition is the proper way
>>>> to define 'that' in purely CL or IKL terms.
>>>>
>>>> John
>>>>
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> Avril Styrman
> +358 40 7000 589
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> (05)
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