can you cite any article that talks about contexts in terms of sets
with different ranks? In flat theories such as mereology and Boolean
algebras everything is on the same level, but in set theories there
are different granular levels. (02)
Lainaus "Pat Hayes" <phayes@xxxxxxx>: (04)
> On Jul 25, 2012, at 6:44 AM, John Bottoms wrote:
>> On 7/25/2012 7:25 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
>>> On 7/25/2012 12:45 AM, Pat Hayes wrote:
>>>> JMcC's point was that there was no single "theory" of contexts; that
>>>> contexts are not a natural kind, and a "context" is just anything
>>>> that anyone cares to use in a context kind of a way, ie as something
>>>> that influences truth values and denotations.
>> It almost sounds like there are two definitions of "context".
> Two? TWO??? I attended several workshops and meetings on the theme
> of contexts and context reasoning. At one of them I took careful
> notes. Over three days of talks, no two speakers used the same sense
> of "context". They were all talking about different things, ranging
> in scope from a psychological state lasting a few miiliseconds to an
> entire human culture lasting millennia. When people say "context"
> they simply mean "all the stuff that I havn't got an explicit theory
> of". I have in fact offered this as a definition of "context" at
> the Heidelberg ontology meeting (which John Sowa was also present at):
> The meaning of language is influenced by a very large number of
> factors. No theory of meaning is comprehensive enough to account for
> all of these; particular theories of meaning focus on some and
> analyze them in detail, and ignore others completely. For each such
> theory of meaning, the combined effect of the factors which the
> theory does not explicitly address is often called a "context".
>> One is the perceived setting which may evoke observations based on
>> the level and type of perception. While the other is the
>> brute-force real world set of facts? Is this correct? And if so,
>> should we have different terms by the type of context we refer to?
> The brute force real world (or part of it) is the context, not facts
> about that real world. Contexts are objects. For more on this, see
> my paper on 'contexts in context' at the AAAI context symposium,
> visible at http://bit.ly/N2yGYa . But they key point is that
> there are not two or even twenty-two 'kinds' of context, but that
> being a context is more like a status or role than an ontological
> type. ANYTHING can be a 'context' in the right, um, context.
>> JB: My fear is that by not defining a context type we will
>> disparage its use. That would be awkward.
> What do you see the "use" of contexts as being? Personally, I think
> we would make great progress (indeed, we ARE making great progress)
> by eliminating all talk of "contexts" entirely, and doing our utmost
> best to forget about the term as being pre-scientific and confusing.
> If you want to think about how time influences meaning, think about
> temporal logics. If you want to think about how beliefs influence
> meaing, think about epistemic logics. If you want to think about
> fiction, study literary theory. But don't think that by calling all
> these (and so many other things) all "contexts" that you have
> thereby achieved any kind of insight or clarity. All you have done
> is get time and belief and fiction muddled, ie created confusion.
>>> I agree with that idea.
>>>> my (often repeated) objection that time, for example, and belief,
>>>> for example, were very different kinds of thing and influenced
>>>> truth in very different kinds of ways...
>>> I also agree with that.
>>>> his response was always that the point of a context logic was not
>>>> to capture the essence or nature of contexts, but rather to be simply
>>>> a general framework for stating inferences which might be influenced
>>>> by *any* kind of context.
>>> And I have no objection to that idea.
>>>>> "(that p)" is a kind of quasi-quotation that allows
>>>>> variables in p to be bound to quantifiers outside of p.
>>>> Hmm, I don't think it is correct to think of it as quasi-quotation.
>>>> Rather than quoting the sentence, it treats it as defining a
>>>> zero-ary predicate, and creates a term denoting that entity.
>>> The backquote in LISP can be applied to any expression. The IKL
>>> 'that' operator can be implemented in LISP by applying backquote
>>> to sentences in some version of logic.
>>> That is an explanation that is meaningless to anybody who does
>>> not know LISP. But LISP aficionados like that way of talking.
>>> In any case, I agree that your definition is the proper way
>>> to define 'that' in purely CL or IKL terms.
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