Dear Hans,
If you were to write that sentence with a
variable “_X” instead of “institutions” you would find
wider agreement because we are each free to suggest one or more fillers for
X. Rewritten, it would state:
Hence,
we rely mostly on _X to establish facts for us, and to create frames of reference
by which such facts can be described in an institution-wide scope context.
But there is no strong validation of any
particular designated “institution” or other source of meme throughout
history, IMHO. At different periods, in different circumstances, under
diverse contexts, there have been plenty of us either for or opposed to various
issuances from said sources. The actual historical evidence appears to be
fragile at best and manipulated at worst, though your opinion may differ re
that.
So lets call fillers for _X by the
class name “source”
instead of “institution”. Sometimes the source can indeed be an
institution, but often it is not.
Otherwise, I am impressed with the clarity
of your explanation; it was excellently stated as amended. I heartily
agree.
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Hans Polzer
Sent: Thursday, May 24, 2012 7:37
PM
To: edbark@xxxxxxxx;
'[ontolog-forum] '
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] [ontology-summit] Estimating number
of all known facts
Ed, Rich, et al:
Ultimately, facts
are what institutions we trust, or are subject to the actions of, say they are.
We tend to trust institutions and individuals whose statements/assertions
corroborate with our own experience – but we clearly can’t verify
every such statement/assertion ourselves. Hence, we rely mostly on institutions
to establish facts for us, and to create frames of reference by which such
facts can be described in an institution-wide scope context. Publication in
scientific (or other) literature by itself does not establish facts. It is the
reproducibility of what one party publishes/reports by other parties, and
mediated by institutions that attest to the general trustworthiness and
competence of the other parties, that determines what is a fact. Legal
frameworks, rules of evidence and jurisdictions are a special case of this
general process.
In some cases, facts
are forced on us by institutions that control us or our environment, despite
evidence to the contrary (which such institutions attempt to suppress). This
often leads to some of us trying to escape the context in which these institutions
control us or our environment, be it political emigration/amnesty (like the
recent Chen case) or creation of new disciplines and supporting institutions
(or like-minded groups of individuals – a weak form of institution that
the Internet has made more accessible/feasible than in the fairly recent past).
Recall my earlier
emails about this forum underestimating the role of institutions and
institutional scope in ontologies. I like to think that this approach to
determining what is a fact and how many of them there are is somewhere in
between the notion of absolute truths independent of any individual or group of
observers, and the “anything goes”, purely subjective and
individualized interpretations of reality school of thinking. I also like to
think that the history of the human race reflects a gradually increasing scope
of such institutions across human society and fields of knowledge/endeavor (not
without some occasional setbacks, however). Indeed, we have become so
accustomed to this institutional “background” that we tend to take
it for granted and actually tend to forget that it is there and that it is not
necessarily universal or guaranteed to persist (without active efforts to make
it so). We also have to guard against institutional bias and assumptions
of fact that are not really so because the associated institution(s) is not
really universal in context and scope and has overlooked/turned a blind eye to
countervailing perspectives and evidence (usually because of the
institution’s perspective and focus on certain aspects of reality or
theory). I think that’s really what Kuhn was talking about with respect
to paradigms in scientific revolutions, but it’s not limited to science
and rather applies to all fields of knowledge and human endeavor.
So appreciate the
institutions that provide you frames of reference and collections of facts in
areas important to you, and try to be explicit about which ones you are using
when making an assertion of fact – or that you are basing the assertion
on your own first-hand experience (in which case you need to try to be as
exhaustively explicit regarding the surrounding context as possible so that
others can attempt to recreate that experience).
Hans
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Edward Barkmeyer
Sent: Thursday, May 24, 2012 7:16
PM
To: Rich
Cooper
Cc: '[ontolog-forum]
'
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] [ontology-summit] Estimating number
of all known facts
Rich Cooper
wrote:
It might be more productive to discuss the number
of evidentiary units rather than the number of facts.
I wrote:
I would be interested to see a definition of
"evidentiary unit" that was
significantly different from the definition of
"fact".
Rich responded:
The usual evidentiary unit is a
statement (one or a few sentences) of the facts and opinions manifest in the
case.
Ipse dixit. I rest my case (so to speak :-) ).
-Ed
--
Edward J. Barkmeyer Email: edbark@xxxxxxxx
National Institute of Standards & Technology
Manufacturing Systems Integration Division
100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8263 Tel: +1 301-975-3528
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8263 Cel: +1 240-672-5800
"The opinions expressed above do not reflect consensus of NIST,
and have not been reviewed by any Government authority."
Rich Cooper wrote:
Ed, please see below for my comments,
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
Ed Barkmeyer wrote
Rich Cooper
wrote:
> These discussions don't seem to be bound by
> realistic constraints which exist in all systems
> of fact.
>
> In my experience, courts of law are most
> effectively organized to represent facts in a way
> that "the great unwashed" (sic) can
either accept
> or reject.
>
EB:> Frankly, I think
this is a red herring. The purpose of a court is to
deliver
"justice" in the sense that some part of the populace brings a
person or persons to
account for wrongdoing. The only "fact" of
interest is whether there
is enough evidence for the authorized decision
makers (judge(s) and/or
jury) to conclude that there was wrongdoing by
the person(s) in question.
RC:> Actually, the courts distinguish
between what they call “fact witnesses” and those who are qualified
by the court processes to be considered “expert witnesses”, aka
“opinion witnesses” who are considered qualified to add opinions to
the fact base.
Furthermore, only criminal charges
imply wrongdoing
by any party. Civil cases, which (IANAL) I estimate as more common by
far, end without such findings of “wrongdoing” but allocate
compensation, typically financial, but sometimes extrafinancial.
"Evidence" is
what leads one to believe something. It was originally
what we perceived by our
senses, but in a court of law, it degenerates
into the reports of what
others have sensed or their interpretations of
what they sensed.
Again, evidence is what
each party considers, in its own theories of the case, to be “what leads
one to believe something”, but since the other side(s) and even such
neutrals as court appointed “special masters” provide additional
evidence, and exposit about the “meaning” or correct
“interpretation” of the evidence in total submitted. So
“facts” in litigation relate to whatever can be disinterred during
the legal discovery process, while opinions (i.e. what each testifier is
“lead to believe something” in your terms) is far from equivalent
to the next testifier’s.
The courts also have
evolved an elaborate “discovery process” which involves both sides
looking at the other side’s cards, dealing some of their own, and making
motions for the judge to enforce the discovery rules relevant to the
case. So there is quite a deep process for establishing what is fact,
what is opinion, and what interpretation is prescribed by the law. The
law only occasionally delivers what you call “justice”, but nearly
always delivers fair due process for all parties involved.
It is philosophically
rather less than satisfying,
but, as systems for
determining "truth" go, it is way ahead of taking a
metal bar out of a pot of
boiling water with your bare hand.
There is no requirement in law courts that
one take a metal bar out of a pot of boiling water. That is more in
concert with the ancients’ beliefs that the gods are interfering in their
lives than in concert with current American laws.
That is not at all what
Matthew Lange asked about, and not, as far as I
can tell, what anyone else
has addressed.
Yet, IMHO, it establishes at least
one system (the courts) for identifying facts, opinions, and legislative
compliance. Our discussion so far has simply been a Babel of opinions without firm
foundations. The closest thing that science has to a process for
discovering truth is publication in a journal of “peers”, which has
been found wanting far more often than litigation has been found wanting.
Remember OJ’s trial, and
“if it doesn’t fit you must acquit”? Remember Casey
Anthony’s trial and the lack of factual evidence that she murdered the
child? Opinions by the police, investigators, medical examiners and
others in the case were not considered “factual” enough to convince
the jurors. But in this thread, we have given only opinions on what a
fact is, rather than establish processes for construing facts, defining them,
and placing them in consistent theoretical structures.
> But arguments based simply on assertions and
rules
> without proper grounding are at the other
extreme,
> starting with the ancients who believed the gods
> were rigging their lives, through the modern
> physicists who posit esoterica based on the poles
> and zeros of equations that have never been
> observed actually behaving at the precise pole
and
> zero values.
>
> Courts of law are organized to accept evidence,
> with judge, jury and observers choosing to accept
> or reject the asserted "facts" as
truths or
> falsehoods. Findings are still considered
> "interpretations" and
"judgments" based on judge,
> jury and observer opinions of the evidence.
But
> few true "facts" can even be
represented in a
> proper court of law.
>
> I suggest we drop the word "fact" and
instead use
> the word "evidence" in this
thread. From the
> various viewpoints so far expressed, we are
> getting only the assertions without the evidence.
> That is, we are getting opinions and
> interpretations, or toe counts, not evidence, and
> therefore not pure epistemological facts.
> Therefore we should not be calling these
"facts".
>
>
> It might be more productive to discuss the number
> of evidentiary units rather than the number of
> facts.
>
I would be interested to see a definition of
"evidentiary unit" that was
significantly different from the definition of
"fact".
The usual evidentiary unit is a
statement (one or a few sentences) of the facts and opinions manifest in the
case. So we are back to NLP descriptions for the most part. In
patent cases, the claim sentences are the most basic of facts, while the
mapping of claim elements to assertions of facts or opinion about the validity
and infringement evidence.
Finally, most civil cases and perhaps
even most criminal cases (again IANAL) end in settlement agreements among the
parties. This happens when all parties feel that the facts resulting from
guided discovery processes represent a likely outcome, or risk of outcomes,
that is too high to accept compared to the settlement agreement. This
means all sides agree to SOME extent what the facts and opinions are likely to
do to persuade a jury and/or judge.
-Rich
-Ed
> -Rich
>
> Sincerely,
> Rich Cooper
> EnglishLogicKernel.com
> Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
> 9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
>