If you're using contexts (quads in OWL/RDF), then sets of observations (graphs)
may also be considered as things, with attributed provenance. The same can
also be done using statement IDs. I'm not sure this makes a difference to the
current discussion, but I mention it because it is very important in some of
the work I'm doing currently. (01)
----- Original Message -----
From: Mike Bennett <mbennett@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Friday, March 26, 2010 10:37 am
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Re Foundation ontology, CYC, and Mapping
To: doug@xxxxxxxxxx, "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> (02)
> Surely if everything in an ontology is defined as a subtype of the
> universal class of "Thing" then the whole ontology is predicated on
> the
> notion of individuals rather than observations.
>
> That includes of course abstract things, occurrent things and so
> on, not
> just concrete things that exist over a period of time. Observations
> are
> the facts (axioms) about things, not the things themselves. The
> classes
> define kinds of thing of which there may be individual members,
> with
> identities.
>
> Mike
>
> doug foxvog wrote:
> > Christopher Spottiswoode argues that the idea of "individual" is
> intrinsic> to the concept of Ontology. However, he then defines it
> on the basis of
> > instantiation ("I am finding it impossible to conceive of "a"
> anything> without a notion of Individual").
> >
> > This seems to me like instantiation, not instancehood. One can
> concieve of
> > a class of objects; does that mean that the class is an
> individual? One
> > can conceive of a relation between objects, is that also an
> individual?> One can even conceive of a class of object types (e.g.
> BiologicalSpecies,> each of whose instances (e.g., CanisLupus) is
> itself a class. Is such
> > a meta-class to be considered an Individual?
> >
> > I would suggest that instantiation is a relationship that holds
> between> something and a class. Having an ontological category
> refering to such
> > things, really is a feature of the language you are using, not of
> the> thing being referenced. In a powerful enough ontology
> language, e.g. Cyc,
> > every term (including ISA) is an instance of a class.
> >
> > I would use the term "Individual" at the broadest level to refer
> to things
> > that do not themselves have instances. A restriction of this
> class to
> > exclude relations and functions is another, also useful category.
> A
> > further restriction of this class to exclude numbers and character
> > strings is also useful (in many ways, more useful).
> >
> > The "patterns" John Sowa discusses are narrower still. He is
> referring to
> > a subclass of Individual that has spatio-temporal physical extent (a
> > highly useful subclass of Individual) which, also, can be sensed
> in some
> > way. Note that some spatio-temporal entities (e.g., a
> RestrictedZone)> are spatio-temporal simply by definition, and can
> not, of themselves, be
> > sensed.
> >
> > What are further properties of such classes (varieties of
> Individual)?> Nothing that does not logically follow from their
> definitions. 3+1D and 4D
> > subclasses of them can be defined such that an instance of one is
> not an
> > instance of the other. However, rules can be written that would
> provide> mappings between 3+1D and 4D statements.
> >
> > The patterns (of redness, frogness, etc.) that JS refers to are not
> > restricted to either theory of dimensionality.
> >
> > I agree that they imply the existence of individuals -- but not
> whether> such individuals are restricted to a certain spatio-
> temporal theory.
> >
> > -- doug foxvog
> >
> > Christopher Spottiswoode wrote:
> >
> >> John,
> >>
> >> Thanks as usual for your patient and painstaking response. But
> my point
> >> was a different one than you addressed here:
> >>
> >
> >
> >> John Sowa wrote:
> >>
> >>> CS> I'm afraid I have great difficulty in giving any sense to
> >>>
> >>>> "a pattern of redness" or "a pattern of frogness" without any
> >>>> notion of individual (or entity, for that matter, which you
> >>>> also claimed to have dispensed with in your example of a very
> >>>> simple ontology).
> >>>>
> >
> >
> >>> One way to think about a pure observation language is to imagine
> >>> that you're dreaming or looking at a movie screen. The patterns
> >>> you "see" might be pure illusions that have no connection to
> >>> any physical objects. The "sense" that you're asking for would
> >>> have to be added by making assumptions about what generates
> >>> those patterns.
> >>>
> >
> >
> >> My point was not a scientific or empirical one. I did not have
> illusions>> versus "reality" in mind. My point is an Ontological one.
> >>
> >
> >
> >> To talk of "a" anything implies some notion and process of
> individuation>> ... there
> >> is an absolutely inescapable assumption in "a" anything - which
> my simple
> >> mind
> >> can only call Ontological as it's *so* basic to our conceptualized
> >> knowledge
> >> itself - that it can make sense to abstract individuals out from
> the raw
> >> flux of
> >> our otherwise unconceptualized or unformed physical or mental
> experience.>>
> >> ... I am finding it impossible to conceive of "a"
> >> anything
> >> without a notion of Individual. It's so basic as to deserve the
> status of
> >> being
> >> a matter of Ontology, and an absolutely inescapable one at that.
> >> ...
> >> So perhaps my point is that one must not go overboard in
> "lattice-ifying"
> >> our
> >> most basic ontologies? Perhaps there is no harm in assuming a
> wider and
> >> still
> >> universally-acceptable degree of commonality? Wider bases of
> agreement>> can
> >> uncomplicate more detailed discussion where it is more important.
> >>
> >> Christopher
> >>
> >
> >
> > =============================================================
> > doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org
> >
> > "I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
> > initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be
> ours."> - Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
> > =============================================================
> >
> >
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> >
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> Mike Bennett
> Director
> Hypercube Ltd.
> 89 Worship Street
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