Pavithra wrote:
> Dr.
Sowa,
>
> - An Elephant is an animal
> - Clyde is an elephant
> - Therefore
Clyde is an animal
> > John F. Sowa wrote:
>
>
> > I have read the following slides, which make some interesting
points
> > and cite some useful references:
> >
> >
http://www.micra.com/COSMO/TheFoundationOntologyForInteroperability.ppt> >
> > First of
all, I have a very high regard for the work by Anna Wierzbicka
> >
which I have been following for nearly 30 years. (I cited her
early
> > _Lingua Mentalis_ in my 1984 book.) I also agree with
Cliff Goddard
> > that the arguments against that kind of research are
*bad*.
> >
> > But I must emphasize that the so-called
"primitives" that Anna W. and
> > others have proposed are most
definitely *not* primitives in the sense
> > that mathematicians
use.
(remainder
snipped)
The point in Pavithra's comment does
not have to do with logic deduction. It is more
pragmatic , about an issue of
conflating three meanings
of the word "is."
First,
from Pavithra :
- An
Elephant is an animal
- Clyde is an elephant
- Therefore Clyde is an animal
But now consider (from an different J. Sowa
source) :
- An
Elephant is a species
- Clyde is an elephant
- Therefore Clyde is a species
Both are valid, but only the first is true.
The difference is the verb use. In
the first set, "Elephant is an animal" is a "kind-of" relation.
In the second set, "Elephant is a
species" is an "is-a" hyponym relation. This semantic relation
underlies
taxonomies.
In both sets, a third
relation is present: "Clyde is an elephant" is an instance relation from Clyde to
types animal and
species.
Mixing the three relations together cannot be
transitive just
because they share the same verb.
For example, the instance Elephant and the
types animal and species do not result in a construct like:
- Clyde is an
elephant is a species, so Clyde is a species
Comments?
-- Jeffrey
Schiffel