John, (01)
This is my second reply to your post in which you had responded to my
question in this way: (02)
>Christopher,
>
>That is a very good question:
>
>> ... is Ontology not the field on which all proper progress
>> towards more security-appropriate technologies should best
>> be founded?
>
>Ontology is a proposed solution, but any question about
>foundations should go back to the original problem and ask how
>that proposed solution is related to the actual problem. (03)
In my first reply to your comment re-quoted above I had taken up
your challenge with these words: (04)
"Yes, certainly, you are quite right, and my forthcoming 3rd
instalment does exactly that. Some of my earlier posts have
already briefly hinted at or even stated what the problem and the
solution are. We shall trigger the market's seeing in detail that
general-purpose programming on networked computers is the nub of
our present security problem. That will happen once we have made
it evident how an appropriately (i.e semantics-based and
Ontology-founded) programmer-restrictive architecture need not be
unduly user-restrictive, and on the contrary will open up easier
and faster avenues towards the indefinite further creation of more
user-congenial opportunities." (05)
That is true, but perhaps the more immediately helpful reply to
your challenge recalls the part of my question you had omitted,
namely my question's premise or background, namely: (06)
"[...] since semantic considerations must surely provide the relevant
measures for the scopes of permissions and authorizations, [is
Ontology not the field on which all proper progress towards more
security-appropriate technologies should best be founded?]" (07)
My promised 3rd instalment will make a meaningful start with
indicating in more detail how in a MACK environment all
user-specified processing runs within semantically-defined "scopes
of permissions and authorizations". Since, as you will see, that
semantic definition is based accessibly on user-familiar facts,
the user will have fine control over local execution initiated by
others. Add to that the reflectivity of a MACK environment and
you get fine assisted monitoring of the effects of all such
decisions too. (08)
(All the above is still open to loopholes left by present operating
systems, but until the mooted trusted platforms materialize I can see
various ways in which such residual dangers can be largely mitigated,
and I'm sure the basic operating system experts will be able to
furnish more and better ways.) (09)
Interestingly, this promised secure-environment solution was not at
all an original objective of the Metaset/MACK project. It just fell
out of meeting the more generic need for capturing and formalizing
'context' for its simplifying role. And though I am usually very
reluctant to talk of "solutions" at this kind of level, here I have
after all adopted the word you had used in your challenge, John. I
think you will agree, once you have all seen a few more of my
instalments and helped clarify and fill out my first formulations,
that in this case the word is appropriate at the high level it
addresses. (010)
Resuming the theme of this thread, I foresee that there will be no
need for any legislated devices in ensuring compliance with the
more secure and otherwise effective MACK standards. The more
immediate benefits of the new environment, including its
configurability and customizability, will be sufficiently evident to
endusers and developers alike for the free market to ensure their
rapid spread into every nook and cranny of Internet-leveraging
applications ("rapid", that is, once I can get my fuller message
across...). (011)
The long-promised 3rd instalment will, I hope, make all those
outrageous claims seem somewhat less so, even though you will
still be expected to have a good programmer's imagination, and
even though I shall be inviting collaboration involving various more
technical design issues as well as quite a bit of programming. (012)
Christopher (013)
_________________________________________________________________
Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/
Subscribe/Config: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/
Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/
Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/
To Post: mailto:ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (014)
|