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## Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology

 To: Avril Styrman "[ontolog-forum] " Pat Hayes Thu, 21 Feb 2008 16:44:40 -0600
 At 8:54 PM +0200 2/21/08, Avril Styrman wrote: Pat and Chris, here's some answers and qestions. Quoting Pat Hayes : > >I'm claiming that finitism is better than transfinitsim > >because it is simpler, uncontroversial, and nothing more is > >needed. > > 1. Its not simpler. It has to explain a host of > new difficulties, not the least of which is how > it can account for the hundreds of apparently > obvious refutations of it (such as the elementary > proof that cannot be a largest integer.) > > 2. It is most certainly not uncontroversial. As > this is an elementary empirical fact, I will not > provide arguments for it. If you are not satisfied with strict finitism, then take Aristotle's potential infinity: you can take always more and more, as much as is needed. However, because we are only weak humans, we can only ever take a finite number of anything, even though the finite border is vague. This is why potential infinity can be reduced into  finitism: no matter how much we take, we always take finitely many. Of course we do, being (as you say) finite beings ourselves. But our finiteness does not prevent us thinking about things larger than ourselves, so please continue your thought, above. We always take finitely many... of what? Or if you prefer the active form, we always take finitely many from what? What is this bucket, or supply, that we take these integers from? Is this not an infinite set? (Or do you also not believe in sets?)   > 3. Continuous mathematics is certainly useful, I would claim needed. No need for transfinitism to be continuous. Transfinitism is needed only for being point-continuous. Trying to make the idea of point- continuum intelligible does require transfinitism. But even if one denies that the continuum is constructed from points - a topic which gave rise to heated debate among mathematicians as little as 150 years ago - it is hard to see how one can rationally deny that it is possible to make indefinitely fine discriminations of location on the continuum. So if a continuum exists at all, then a point continuum exists alongside it, as it were.  I do not see why, because mapping the point-continuum into nature only makes movement impossible. This was Zeno's reasoning Zeno's reasoning was simply faulty, and Aristotle's response to it was inadequate. > One could reject the > set-theoretic account of the continuum, and still > Cantor's diagonalization is crying out for a > refutation from any finitist. I'd be interested > to see a careful refutation of it (or, for that > matter, of the ancient and elementary proof that > there is no largest number, which I gave in an > earlier posting.) As you might know, many people think that the diagonal argument proves nothing. I have never seen a remotely convincing counter-argument to it, however. I'd be delighted to see yours, if you have one. > >Of course, there is no > >sense of typing Ack(Ack(5,5),5) because you cannot > >understand its magnity, and you have no you use for it. > > What can I not understand about its magnitude? I > know it is larger than Ack(5,5), for example. But > in any case, what I can understand about it and > whether it is any use (and how do you know what > uses I might have for very large numbers?) are > irrelevant to the proposition that it EXISTS. It > seems obvious to me that it exists, as does its > square; indeed, as does the result of raising it > to its own power (a much bigger number than any > that have been discussed on this thread so far, > but still one that has a successor.) I can in no way deny that it exists, once you have typed it down. But you DID deny it exists, in an earlier post. What then is your actual position? If there is an upper bound, please tell us roughly where it is, and I will undertake to immediately reply by naming a number which is much larger than it. It is a good criterion for the existence of numbers. But, there are other criteria too, such as the use of numbers. But we are here only discussing existence. Numbers such as Ack(Ack(5,5),5) might as well be considered solely as numerals, or as character strings. Numbers like 1,2,3,4, are useful. For what do you use numbers such as Ack(Ack(5,5),5)? I enjoy contemplating very large numbers. What I do in private is none of your business. The point at issue is, do they exist? I take it that you have been denying that they do. All the numbers that have a potential applicability, are within the borders of potential infinity, that can in one sense be reduced into finitism. Why is potential infinity not enough for you? I have no idea what it means. What distinguishes a potential infinity from infinity? Does not a never ending totality bother you? No. It seems kind of obvious. Imagine a perspective view of parallel lines. Its even in the Lord's prayer: "...for ever and ever, amen." How can it be a totality, if it never ends? How can it be completed, if it never ends? What exactly do you mean by 'completed'? I am of course a finite being, but I can think of an infinity as a whole. > >PH: > >>  Finitism seems much more intuitive when dealing > >>  with very large numbers than when dealing with > >>  very small ones, ie their reciprocals. If all our > >>  series have to be finite and we cannot talk of > >>  limits, it becomes impossible to give an adequate > >>  foundation for calculus, for example. On the > >>  whole, I think that the mathematicians have done > >>  a fairly good job and we would all be better off > >>  leaving it to them, and focusing on matters of > >>  more direct importance to our engineering. > > > >We can very well talk about limits without having to > >use anything infinite. Take the series 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, ... > >the limit of the series is obviously 0. > > You just did talk about something infinite, by > your casual use of the three-dots notation, and > saying 'the series'. That series is an infinite > object. I interpret the three dots not as "ad infimum", but as "ad enough". You referred to "the series" - your words, above. Now, what was IT that you were referring to, that thing called "the series"? Your answer must be ONE thing. The interpretation of the three dots is also one theme of Wittgenstein's critique of transfinitism, and I recommend that you'd reconsider your attitude towards it. Did you know that e.g. Alan Turing participated into Wittgensten's lectures on the foundations of mathematics? His attitute in the lectures has some resemblance with your attitude. Independently from this conversation, I have a very low opinion of most of Wittgenstein's philosophy. I hesitate even to call it philosophy: it smacks more of a collection of jottings. The much-vaunted 'picture theory of meaning' in the Tractatus is clearly absurd. I rank Wittgenstein somewhere near the writings of Lawrence of Arabia. As for mathematics, there isn't the slightest evidence that Wittgenstein understood anything about it at all. > >You must > >give a certain level of accuracy that is needed > >for the problem at hand, like building a house or > >assigning the accuracy of a float variable on a > >computer program. If your accuracy is 100 digits, > >then you only need 100 digits, and the limit of > >the series is 0 because within the accuracy of 100 > >digits there are only zeros 0.000....0 > > That does not establish that the limit is zero. > To establish that, you have to also show that if > your accuracy is 10|3 digits, then.. and if your > accuracy is 10|4 digits, then, ... and so on. And > that 'and so on' has no finite stopping place. I can very well maintain that the limit is 0 in the domain where the needed accuracy is 100 digits. You did not previously refer to limits in a domain, you simply said the limit of the series. Is this notion well-defined, in your view, or must it depend upon the 'domain'? If so, we need a mathematical theory of these domains. Think of normal transactions in a shop. If 5 cents would be the smallest coin, then an item with price 5,551\$ would be rounded up into 5,55\$, if you pay in cash. No need for transfinity here, and no need in anywhere else either. The more accuracy you need, the more you get. That is in the area of potential infinity. I understand all that, of course. But now show me how to actually provide a foundation for all this talk of 'potential'. One gets similar difficulties when trying to formalize vague predicates such as 'large' or 'fairly small'. These ideas have never been satisfactorily, rigorously, accounted for. If you feel you know how to do it, by all means explain it to us, I will be all ears. > >CM: > >>  The "ideology" in question would makes natural science impossible. > >>  Notably, strict finitism, even coherently argued, does not permit > >>  enough real analysis (which involves not only the infinite, but the > >>  uncountably infinite) to do physics. > > > >What does it make impossible? > > Real analysis; differential geometry, for example. The analysis of real numbers is similarly the story that tells what they are. Taking a finitist view, we only need finitely long rationals. Irrationals may be handled as symbols that denote a process that is executed with a needed accuracy How then do you distinguish between rationals and irrationals? Or would you prefer that we had no such distinction? > >Fair enough. What about the Burali-Forti paradox. All Cantorist sets > > exist as 'being', not as generating. So, > > For the record, I utterly fail to follow this > piece of your argument. BUt never mind... To exists as "being a completed totality" is very different to existing as "Generating". No, to exist is to exist. There aren't different 'kinds' of existence. And this has nothing to do with finite or infinite: its simply what one means by 'exists'. I have no idea what 'to exist as generating' can mean (except maybe that a generating process exists, and can always be run to a next stage: but even to say that last bit requires me to consider infinite models of my axioms...) Generation is a process, while being is not a process. For example, the Cantorist definition of rationals is the set that contains all  a/b, where a and b are naturals. There is no generation there. Everything in transfinitism exists solely as 'being'. Everything described by any extant formalism exists solely as 'being'. To be IS to exist. You just cannot overlook the Burali-Forti paradox and say it is nonsense. I don't say that; but I do say that it is not a paradox. It is one of a number of illustrations of the fact, now well-understood, that mathematical formalisms can only capture mathematical intuitions expressed within the system, rather than outside the system. Thus the central question for a foundational theory (such as ZFC) is, can all of mathematics be conducted within this system? Which is a pragmatic question as much as a philosophical one. It is about the most fundamental feature of classical analysis, ZFC incorporated, that the law of the excluded middle holds. Every theorem, that has any sense in it, is either true or false. Every set in ZFC either exists or it does not exists. The set of the natural numbers exists as being a completed totality. So does its power set, and so on. OK so far. And this is the very paradox. Everything in ZFC should exists as a completed totality, but the axioms say that there are always a greater and greater sets. OK... This is the paradox ?? ...what paradox? Why did you think there would be a largest ordinal? You of all people should be content with this result, I would have thought. ZFC proves that there is no largest ordinal. This might be thought surprising, but it is not paradoxical. It might be viewed as a critique of ZFC, indeed it was so viewed at one time; but it is still not paradoxical. , and it does not help to call it a theorem that there is no greatest set/ordinal. Its not a question of what you call it: it IS a theorem of ZFC. That is simply a fact. Chris argued about the same thing here: > > What about the Burali-Forti paradox.  All Cantorist  > > sets exist as 'being', not as generating. > > This is not mathematics.  There is no such thing in mathematics as  > "Cantorist sets".  Here's what we've got:  For any purported > collection of things, ZFC either (i) proves that it exists (as a set),  > (ii) proves that it doesn't exist, or (iii) does not decide the matter  > either way.  Those are the only facts pertinent to set existence.   > Your talk of "existence as being" and "existence as generating" is  > muddle-headed philosophical codswallop. The idea of generation is from Brouwer's intuitionism, which must be seen as a middle option between finitism and transfinitism. There, e.g. the real numbers are freely generating. This of course faces the problem of the speed of the generation Im afraid I agree with Chris that 'existence as generating' is codswallop, Brouwer notwithstanding (and Brouwer's ideas have never been made precise and rigorous: Heyting's formalization of intuitionist reasoning was never accepted by Brouwer, although it is now considered definitive.) But this talk of 'speed of generation' is certainly not from Brouwer, and to me only emphasizes the coddish nature of the wallop. Even if it made sense, what does it matter how 'fast' the integers 'grow'? > Ignorant rubbish.  It makes no sense to talk about what *should* exist  > in ZFC, only what does or doesn't.  It is in fact a *simple* theorem  > of ZFC that there is no largest ordinal.  Period.  That is, we have  > case (ii) above.  The Burali-Forti paradox simply never gets off the  > ground in ZFC.  That was the *point* of *axiomatizing* set theory in  > the first place.  What possesses you even to talk about ZFC when you  > clearly have never studied it and don't understand even its most  > elementary theorems? As I already answered Pat, it does not make it any better to say "Hey, it is not a bug, it is a feature". The law of the excluded middle together with the ZFC axioms give birth to the BF paradox. No, they DONT. Im sorry, you are just flat wrong here. There is no B-F paradox in ZFC. There is nothing more special in it, than what Cantor said: it is in the nature of the truly infinite that it is not exhausted, and thereby Cantor turned a paradox into a definition. Also this is not logic, because all that your counter argument proves, is that it is totally a subjective option whether the BF is or is not a paradox. And this proves also that the whole (subjective) framework should be abandoned. It proves nothing at all. > > But the axioms say there are always greater and greater ordinals. > > Well, it's a theorem, but yes. > > > This is a case of A and not A. > > It is exactly not such a case.  It is a case of not-A.  Period. You give a too friendly interpretaion of ZFC. It is in the nature of ZFC that all that exists, exists as a completed totality. You are trying to force a philosophical view onto a formal theory, and complaining that it does not fit. Chris is saying that if it doesn't fit, forget the philosophy and stick to the formalism. That after all is what the formalism was designed for in the first place. Assume that the hierarchy does not exists as a completed totality: you must assume that because there is no greatest ordinal. There is no greatest ordinal, but there simultaneously must always be greater and greater ordinals. This immediately brings up two more questions. 1) Can you see the analogy with hierarchy of transfinity and the natural numbers? Yes, of course. But it is a superficial analogy, and mathematical foundations are not made of analogies. 2) if the hierarchy is not complete, and similarly there is no greatest set, then there must be some sort of a generation going on. Why? All I need say is that the elements all exist but their totality does not (or if it does, is not of the same kind that they are, eg is a 'proper class'). Things do not "go on" in mathematics. There need be no 'generator' : indeed, the very notion hardly seems meaningful in the very-large-ordinal domain. How fast does the hierarchy generate? This is a question you must answer, if you maintain that the series is not complete. No, it is a question I can, and emphatically do, reject as meaningless. I could also say that it is as insulting from you to say things that you have said about Wittgenstein, as it is insulting to a muslim to say to say similar things about Mohammed. As I have long suspected, having attended several of their meetings, it seems that Wittgensteinian scholarship is a form of religious fundamentalism. > >If there is a neverending amount of members, all different, and > >the next always greater than the first, it implies that there > >are also infinitely big/long members. > > NO IT DOESN'T !!! Here, YOU explain to US why you > believe this, which seems so obviously false. Why > can't see that the integers are an obvious > counter-example? It is not very important to me just how it is: just how the complete induction should be interpreted, because I argue the there is no real need to have complete induction at all. My strategy is to show that the interpretation of complete induction is _subjective_. Because it is subjective, it cannot have anything to do with logic, that should not be subjective at all.        Anything invented as a supplement to logic       must of course be nonsense       -Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks XII.129. I explained another subjective interpretaion of complete induction to Chris below. You have not answered my challenge. Convice me that what you say above is true: that "If there is a neverending amount of members, all different, and the next always greater than the first, it implies that there are also infinitely big/long members." It seems to me that the infinite set of numerals {1,2,3,...} is an obvious counterexample. This is a never-ending collection of members, each bigger than the one before it, and each of them is obviously finite. What mistake have I made? > >You can talk of all natural numbers, meaning > >those that make sense. Just forget the 'unnatural' > >natural numbers. > > You have to explain what you mean by 'make sense' > and 'unnatural'. And you have to do this in > mathematical terms. By saying that arbitrary numbers are unnatural, I mean that they are practically very close to transifinite numbers. You have to explain it mathematically. What does 'practically close' mean? > >, while finitism manages > >to do all that needs to be done, without paradoxes. > > Its rife with paradoxes. There's the > largest-number paradox. All finite sets of > numbers have a largest member. If the set of all > numbers is finite, then there is a largest > number, call it N.  N+1 is larger than N: > paradox. Show me how to get past that one, and > I'll give you another. Take the Aristotelian view, OK, go ahead. Tell me the Aristotelian flaw in the above reasoning. > >  > >Do you disagree with Wittgenstein? > >> > >>  Yes. Almost everything he wrote, in fact. > > > >Do you disagree with Aristotle too: > > Yes. Come on Pat, you can't be serious. Of course Im serious. These guys are about the most insightful in the history. Aristotle was very good for his time, but that was a very long time ago. Im afraid I think Wittgenstein was an over-rated, borderline schizophrenic ignoramus. > >PH: > >>  No, that is simply a mistake. There are indeed > >>  arbitrarily large members, and in fact infinitely > >>  many of them, but there need not be infinitely > >>  large members. > > > >The conception of arbitrary is severely rotten. It > >is supposed to be a number randomly selected from within > >the set of all natural numbers. > > No. Nothing about random. I can rephrase the > point without using the a-word: for any given > size, there is a number in the set larger than > that size. That is all I meant by 'arbitrary'. So, once you have specified some size n, there is always a larger size. Right.  If you can specify n, it is not arbitrary. If you specify n+1, it is not arbitrary either. If you say that for all natural numbers x(n > x), then n cannot be a natural number...  Do you mean that arbitrary is something that we weak humans cannot type down? The word 'arbitrary' is not a descriptive adjective: it has adverbial force. "Pick an arbitrary number" means "Arbitrarily pick a number". No actual number is 'arbitrary', any more than any particular person is 'average' or 'typical'   > >We can talk about > >a vague border for the intelligible natural numbers. > > You can talk about it, but I'd like to know what > you mean. I have no idea what a vague border > could be. Give us some of this much-vaunted > finitist mathematics. What is a vague boundary? > What properties does it have, what theorems are > true of it? You first take the Aristotelian potential infinity. I don't know what that is either. What is it? But, because we humans always can only ever take only finitely many things, one after another, the potential infinity can in this sense be reduced into finitism. How much can we ever take, that is the vague finite border. This holds for it: type a number down in decimal notation. Why decimal? Why not allow floating-point notation? Silicon chips understand it, after all. Why not allow Conway's arrow-chain notation? It is either below the border, or it is the border. Of course, the border depends on the version of finitism. Because Ack(Ack(Ack(5,5),5),5) cannot be understood properly What do you mean by this? I claim I do understand it. How will you refute me? I do not see why it should be qualified it as a natural number. What does 'natural' mean for you? In the context 'natural number' it means a nonzero integer. > >>  No, its not nonsense. I can imagine any number. I > >>  claim this is true. Prove me wrong. You have to > >>  show that a number exists such that I cannot ever > >  > imagine it. Your move. > > > >This only proves that the intepretation of induction is subjective: > >one says it is nonsense, and the other says that it is nonsense to > >say that it is nonsense. > > > >But ok, if you can imagine it, then explain somehow the meaning of > >Ackerman(Ackerman(5 5) 5), and how you will use it. What is its > >application and utility? > > I said nothing about application or utility. I > said only that I can imagine it (you havn't > refuted this claim) and that it exists (which I > understand you to be denying?) You can imagine a textual string Ackerman(Ackerman(5 5) 5), but you can imagine njnbaöbnjaöjdöbfk as well. Im not imagining the text string: I'm reading the text string and imagining the number. I do this, if you wish to know the details, by using a special number which is the current best guess of the ratio between the diameter of the known universe and the Plank length - so I have a vision of a 'packed-full universe' - and then imagining a super-universe which has one of those in each cell, and iterating from there. So, what is the use of postulating Ackerman(Ackerman(5 5) 5)? Application and utility are central argumants for finitism: postulate only those numbers that have a possibility of application. But we can never know what this will be. And in any case, Im against any proposal to reduce mathematics to currently applied mathematics. The history of science suggests that this would be a very bad strategy indeed. As said before, finitism gives a different answer to ''what are real numbers?'' than Dedekind-cuts. I imagine it would have to, yes. So, what answer DOES it give?? So, can you by now settle with the potential infinity? Nope, as I have no idea what it is. And also because it seems to me that I have a reasonably robust intuition of actual infinity, and I can work happily with it, and have no reason to change my ways. > >We can define a vague border on how big a number we > >can ever apply in practice. We can think that our proofs > >are limited to cover only that range. By doing this, we can > >give up the unnatural natural numbers, and simultaneously > >we give up also the whole hierarchy of transfinities. > > Consider N!, where N is an integer. Clearly N! is > greater than N, for any N. Moreover, as N > increases, N! increases much faster, so that the > amount by which N! is greater than N increases as > N increases. This means that if there is an upper > limit to the set of numbers, even if it is > 'vague', that N! crosses that upper boundary a > lot sooner than N does. So there must be a lot of > numbers between the largest N such that N! > vaguely exists and the largest N, all of which > exist but their factorials don't. How can that > happen? Now re-run this argument for any other > rapidly-increasing function of N, say 2|N or N|N, > or even Ack(N,N). What happens to these functions > past the point where their value would be too > large to be a 'real' integer, yet their argument > is still quite small? Do they somehow "stop > working"? But they are all defined by finitely > describable, even quite compact, algorithms which > perform ordinary arithmetic operations, so what > is there to go wrong? Or do they actually produce > results, but these very, very big results are not > counted as "numbers"? Why not? But more to the > point, whatever you call them, if they exist then > classical infinitary mathematics seems to apply > to them. Or... what?? You have to say SOMETHING > about arguments like this, other than that you > don't like their conclusions. So, you consider above the process of generation, like, having 3, we have also 3!=6, and having 6, we have 6!, and so on. And this is nothing more than 1,2,3,... You don't seem to have understood my point. It *is* more than 1,2,3, because it grows faster at an ever-increasing rate, so it meets the boundary sooner. Of course this is meaningless for a infinitarist like me, but it should worry a finitist like you. What does Factorial mean when N is a finite integer but Factorial(N) is too big to be considered finite? I have tried to answer in the best way I can, and I can't see any other reason for your transfinitism than education. And you have given no other reason. My reason is that transfinitism all seems fairly obviously true, and the arguments against finitism seem absolutely conclusive and have never been responded to. You havn't responded to them. Unlike Wittgenstein, I don't see the ZFC axioms as a joke, but I see them as a measure of what is required in order to make discrete into continuous, as a measure of how crazy constructions do we need in order to make the point continuum 'intelligible'. Which of the ZFC axioms do you find so crazy? They all seem quite obvious to me, except possibly Choice, which we all now know to be take-it-or-leave-it, and the axiom of Foundation, which we now know to be optional. > > There is no objective way to decide that the convention that you  > > have learned is somehow better than the below convention: > > > > 1. Having a set {1,2,3, ..., n}, the cardinality of the set is n. > > 2. The cardinality of the set grows as n grows. > > 3. If the cardinality is infinite, there must be an infinite n > > Unbelievable.  Ok, tell you what.  In ZFC, proposition 3 is provably > false.  So you obviously don't accept ZFC. If you hold on to ZFC, then you perhaps can prove that 3. is wrong, but I do not hold on to ZFC, and therefore 3. makes sense to me. Given as choice between ZFC and all of 20th-century mathematics, on the one hand, and proposition 3. above, on the other, I unhesitatingly choose the former. I would likely do that even if 3. seemed intuitively true: but as it seems obviously, in-your-face, blatantly false, the choice really is a no-brainer. > > The conception of arbitrary is severely rotten. It is supposed to be  > > a number randomly selected from within the set of all natural  > > numbers. First of all, the selection process itself is impossible.  > > How would you do it? Arbitrary, like the whole transfinitisim, is  > > given an existence simply by saying ''hey, it exists''. > > Rubbish.  To say a set of numbers contains arbitrarily large members  > is completely clear and precise.  It means simply that there is no  > largest member; for any natural number in the set, there is a larger  > one in the set.  That's it.  It has nothing to do with "random  > selection" or any sort of "selection process". There is no largest member? Isn't that the same as the definition of an inductive set? And that is nothing else that the definition of complete induction. So you say, if there is an inductive set, such as {1,2,3,...}, then there are arbitrary numbers in the set. See above. All numbers are equally arbitrary: it is not a word which indicates a classification. I have clearly argued that potential infinity is totally enough for the needs of the man kind, Actually you havn't argued this at all. You have asserted it several times, but you have given no *argument*. And you havn't said what it means. Pat ```-- ``` --------------------------------------------------------------------- IHMC               (850)434 8903 or (650)494 3973   home 40 South Alcaniz St.       (850)202 4416   office Pensacola                 (850)202 4440   fax FL 32502                     (850)291 0667    cell http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes      phayesAT-SIGNihmc.us http://www.flickr.com/pathayes/collections ``` _________________________________________________________________ Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/ Subscribe/Config: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/ Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/ Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/ To Post: mailto:ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx    (01) ```
 Current Thread Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, (continued) Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, Christopher Menzel Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, Pat Hayes Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, Avril Styrman Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, John F. Sowa Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, Pat Hayes Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, Christopher Menzel Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, John F. Sowa Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, Len Yabloko Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, Avril Styrman Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, Avril Styrman Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, Pat Hayes <= Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, John F. Sowa Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology, John F. Sowa