Azamat (01)
I like the approach that and might lead to applicable solutions /
approaches ("fruitful"!). (02)
Especially for science, Items 3 and 4 at best evolve as our knowledge of
real domain (system or process) gels or progresses by further / enriched
experimental and observed / analyzed information about REAL phenomena in
many parts of science. (03)
I see that experimental and statistical aspects are grouped by you in
empirical, practical and technological? Any particular reason to not
explicitly value experiments particularly designed to observe
preliminary phenomena in more detail or by gathering more samples to be
statistically significant before even these are called empirical? (04)
Thanks. (05)
Ravi (06)
(Dr. Ravi Sharma) Senior Enterprise Architect (07)
Vangent, Inc. Technology Excellence Center (TEC) (08)
8618 Westwood Center Drive, Suite 310, Vienna VA 22182
(o) 703-827-0638, (c) 313-204-1740 www.vangent.com (09)
-----Original Message-----
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Azamat
Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 6:49 AM
To: [ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology (010)
Ingvar, (011)
I fully share your concern about the utility of formal ontological
schemes
based on symbolic logic. We say the same things but in different styles.
I
recognize and do only one type of ontology which is: (012)
1. real (dealing with reality and its basic domains);
2. scientific (based on sciences, theoretical and empirical, practical
and
technological)
3. axiomatic (organized as a deductive theoretical system)
4. formal (encoded by mathematical language). (013)
A geniune ontology should employ science, mathematics, semantics, and
logic,
lifting up their concepts and rules and laws to the highest level of
application. (014)
Also I hold the view that the classes of categories come from the
sciences
(fundamental, theoretical, empirical, practical, engineering, and
formal)
and technology, while ontology is aimed to organize all the knowledge
about
the world, scientific, philosophical, and common sense, in the most
consistent and comprehensive ways. (015)
best,
Azamat (016)
----- Original Message -----
From: "Ingvar Johansson" <ingvar.johansson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 12:49 PM
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology (017)
> Azamat schrieb:
>> On Thursday, January 31, 2008 1:23 PM, Ingvar wrote,
>> ''The basic ontological classes such as 'substance', 'property', and
>> 'relation' are very abstract, and by means of only abstract concepts
it
>> is
>> logically impossible to define more specific concepts.''
>>
>> Together with 'change, these things are actually categories, highest
but
>> indefinable entities, if to define is to indicate a genus and its
>> essential
>> quality (a differentia). Thinking that ontology ends up at this point
is
>> a
>> delusion. All only starts here. For one needs to do the hardest work
>
> Rightly or wrongly, your mail gave the impression that this kind of
work
> can be done philosophers, mathematicians, and logicians alone. And I
> think this is completely wrong. This work cannot be done in splendid
> isolation from the empirical sciences; as rationalist philosophers
have
> falsely thought. Ontology and empirical sciences are *overlapping
> disciplines*; see also comments below.
>
>> and
>> investigate the following:
>> 1. what is the nature and meaning of each category, expressed as
>> fundamental
>> definitions and axioms;
>>
>
> I would say that the electromagnetic waves postulated by
> Maxwell-Farady's theory belong to the philosophical category of
> 'substance', but they are not like ordinary things. No philosopher
just
> thinking in abstract about the meaning of the category of 'substance'
> could have produced this theory, since - to repeat my point from my
> former mail - out of an abstract concept you cannot *deduce* more
> specific concepts. Hegel thought he could, but this was a mistake. Of
> course, when you have already grasped both an abstract concept (A) and
a
> more specific concept (S), then you can by mere thinking find out
> whether or not A subsumes S. But this is quite another feat than the
> kind of Hegelian undertaking that you seem to me to tend toward.
>
>> 2. what is the basic classes of each category, formulated as the top
>> level
>> classification schemes;
>>
>
> What number and kinds of classes that in reality exhaust a certain
> category can only be established by empirical science.
>
> Best,
> Ingvar J
>
>> 3. how they interrelated, formulated as ontological rules and laws;
>> 4. how to formalize them in formal KR languages.
>>
>> A real ontology consists in an exhaustive enumeration
(classification) of
>> substances, properties, changes and relationships, with their natural
>> ordering . As an example, of 'property', there are two basic classes,
>> quantity and quality. Quantity is further divided into two generic
kinds,
>> continuous quantity (magnitude) and discontinuous quantity
(multitude, or
>> number). Magnitude covers mathematical quantities, like geometric
>> magnitudes, shape, size, lines, surfaces, solids and physical
quantities
>> like as time, space, mass, weight, temperature, momentum, velocity,
etc.
>> The
>> same applies to other categories, like process of change is commonly
>> divisioned as change in substance (generation or annihilation);
change in
>> property; change in action; and change in relationship. Having a full
>> hierarchy of relationships, you will have all the fundamental changes
of
>> this specific kind.
>> Having a comprehensive ontology of things, one can deduce significant
>> statements, like ''atoms vary in size, shape and weight''. This comes (018)
>> from
>> the general truths about substances: ''substances change in
properties
>> (in
>> quantities or qualities)'', and ''an atom is a kind of substance'',
>> ''size,
>> shape, and weight are among the fundamental properties of matter''.
>>
>> The augmentation of knowledge will come from the combination of
>> ontological
>> generalities (concepts and laws) with domain specific generalities
and
>> existential statements (facts involving the things in the world,
>> individuals, systems, aggregates ), supplied by the particular
sciences
>> dealing in details at specific levels with special aspects and parts
of
>> reality.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Azamat Abdoullaev
>>
>> PS: More systematic account on how to build a standard ontology one
can
>> find
>> in the upcoming book, to be issued this or next month.
>> http://www.igi-pub.com/books/details.asp?ID=7641
>>
>> Contact UsIGI Global
>> Main Office
>> 701 E. Chocolate Avenue
>> Suite 200
>> Hershey, PA 17033, USA
>> Tel: 717-533-8845
>> Toll Free: 1-866-342-6657
>> Fax: 717-533-8661
>> or 717-533-7115
>> Email: cust@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Ingvar Johansson" <ingvar.johansson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> To: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: <standard-upper-ontology@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Sent: Thursday, January 31, 2008 1:23 PM
>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Axiomatic ontology
>>
>>
>>
>>> Azamat schrieb:
>>>
>>>> It looks any fundamental scientific theory is nothing but a body of
>>>> concepts
>>>> or principles and set of fundamental statements (existential and
>>>> universal,
>>>> as definitions, axioms, rules, and laws).
>>>>
>>> Azamat, you cannot in this way say "nothing but". The point of the
>>> natural sciences is either to describe parts of nature or to be able
to
>>> make predictions about what can happen in the already known part of
>>> nature. You cannot simply leave out the empirical part of science.
>>>
>>>
>>>> Defining all other specific
>>>> concepts and deducing all other particular propositions, this form
of
>>>> knowledge organization secures consistency of meaning and
completeness
>>>> of
>>>> analysis.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> It should also secure conformity with empirical data.
>>>
>>>
>>>> The same works for building an axiomatic real ontology as the
general
>>>> theoretical system establishing the relationships of all things to
each
>>>> other, with its application, computing ontology. Ontology is a body
of
>>>> most
>>>> primitive categories and basic truths of reality (universal
>>>> definitions,
>>>> axioms, and fundamental rules), represented in an axiomatic and
formal
>>>> manner; what makes ontology as the most valuable science. Since the
>>>> meanings
>>>> of all other concepts can be defined in terms of basic ontological
>>>> classes,
>>>>
>>> No, they cannot!
>>>
>>> The basic ontological classes such as 'substsance', 'property', and
>>> 'relation' are very abstract, and by means of only abstract concepts
it
>>> is logically impossible to define more specific concepts. For
instance,
>>> you can never define 'red' by means of 'property' or 'color'. In
>>> so-called Aristotelian definitions such as 'man =df. rational
animal',
>>> where something specific ('man') may be taken to be defined by
>>> something more abstract ('animal'), a specific *undefined* term
>>> ('rational') is brought in so to speak from the side.
>>>
>>> You are seriously overestimating what can be done by means of an
>>> axiomatic ontology.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Ingvar J
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> as all other meaningful propositions can be deduced from the basal
>>>> ontological truths.
>>>>
>>>> Azamat
>>>>
>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> From: "John F. Sowa" <sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> To: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Cc: <standard-upper-ontology@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2008 10:03 PM
>>>> Subject: Re: Axiomatic ontology
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Azamat,
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm switching this thread to ontolog-forum, since the topic is
>>>>> closer to the themes on that list. I'm cc'ing this note to SUO
>>>>> list to indicate that anyone who may be interested should go to
>>>>> ontolog-forum for a continuation.
>>>>>
>>>>> As I said, I have the highest regard for Descartes's mathematical
>>>>> achievements, and I also believe that his ideas in philosophy were
>>>>> interesting. The ideas of any great thinker, even when they're
>>>>> wrong or misleading, are worth studying because there are usually
>>>>> very instructive reasons why they are wrong.
>>>>>
>>>>> But the most important point to learn from them is what went
wrong,
>>>>> what aspects were useful for further study, and what aspects
misled
>>>>> several centuries of philosophers away from more promising ideas.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> What matters is the whole new idea of subjecting metaphysical
>>>>>> systems to axiomatization, the rigorous and systematic analysis
>>>>>> of a system from precise definitions, axioms and rules, what
>>>>>> Spinoza essayed in his philosophy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> That is indeed an interesting idea. In mathematics, it has proved
>>>>> to be very valuable. But in the empirical sciences, even physics,
>>>>> it has had mixed results. Newton's achievements came from
applying
>>>>> mathematical techniques to ideas that had been developed (with
some
>>>>> use of mathematics) by Galileo and Kepler.
>>>>>
>>>>> But if you study the history of physics, there are four kinds of
>>>>> breakthroughs:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. Developing new mathematical techniques for solving difficult
>>>>> problems stated in terms of known physical ideas. Examples
>>>>> include the work of mathematicians such as Laplace, Hamilton,
>>>>> Lagrange, Minkowski, etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. Discovering new physical principles by intuitive insights into
>>>>> the nature of the phenomena and testing them by experiment
>>>>> (either actual physical experiments or, as in the case of
>>>>> Einstein and Bohr, Gedanken experiments). Galileo, Faraday,
>>>>> and Einstein are examples of physicists whose intuitions were
>>>>> far more advanced than any of their colleagues, but whose
>>>>> mathematical techniques were modest in comparison.
>>>>>
>>>>> 3. Applying advanced mathematics to the task of formalizing
>>>>> the intuitions of physicists who were not as competent in
>>>>> mathematics. Examples include Newton, Maxwell, and Minkowski.
>>>>> (In fact, Einstein's first wife was a better mathematician
>>>>> than he was, and he gave her little or no credit for her work
>>>>> in collaborating with him.)
>>>>>
>>>>> 4. A judicious combination of mathematics and physical intuition
>>>>> to discover new principles that could not be discovered by
>>>>> observation directly. The first and one of the most
impressive
>>>>> examples was the work on statistical mechanics and
thermodynamics
>>>>> by Ludwig Boltzmann. The starting point was the intuition
that
>>>>> heat was the result of enormous numbers of molecules bouncing
>>>>> around, but the numbers were so enormous that it was
impossible
>>>>> to calculate the effects of individual atoms or molecules.
>>>>> So Boltzmann invented statistical methods for dealing with
them.
>>>>> That was a brilliant achievement, but it was the result of
deep
>>>>> intuition into both physical phenomena and mathematical
methods.
>>>>> In effect, Boltzmann had the combined power of Faraday and
>>>>> Maxwell, but he did *not* begin with a priori axioms.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> Although created statistical thermodynamics as a new branch of
>>>> thermodynamics, Boltzman failed to show that the laws of
thermodynamics
>>>> can
>>>> be derived from the laws of mechanics (classical or quantum); since (019)
>>>> heat
>>>> as
>>>> a non work interaction, by its nature, could not be defined in
>>>> mechanical
>>>> concepts.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> This is the state of physics, the most mathematical of all the
>>>>> empirical sciences. For other branches of science, ranging from
>>>>> chemistry to biology to psychology to sociology, careful
observation,
>>>>> intuition, and experimental testing become more and more important
>>>>> than mathematical formalization.
>>>>>
>>>>> In fact, one can safely say that the great advances in chemistry
and
>>>>> biology during the past century have *not* resulted from any use
of
>>>>> axioms in those subjects, but from the applications of ideas and
>>>>> technology that were first developed in physics.
>>>>>
>>>>> Even in physics, mathematics has certainly been of overwhelming
value,
>>>>> but the very few attempts at axiomatization, such as von Neumann's
>>>>> axioms for quantum mechanics, were little more than interesting
>>>>> exercises. They did not lead to any useful breakthroughs that
could
>>>>> not be made more effectively by people with a good intuitive feel
>>>>> for the subject.
>>>>>
>>>>> As far as formalizing metaphysics, it is safe to say that there
are
>>>>> *no* major insights that have resulted from the formalization.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> There is a principal distinction between formalization and
>>>> axiomatization,
>>>> see my message on this subject.
>>>>
>>>> It
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> is true that formal axioms are important for computer
applications,
>>>>> since computers, by themselves, have no intuitions whatever. But
>>>>> the real insights have come from people whose intuitions were at
>>>>> the level of Galileo, Faraday, and Einstein. There are no formal
>>>>> achievements that are remotely comparable to the work of Newton,
>>>>> Maxwell, or Minkowski. (But there are insights into metaphysics
>>>>> that result from mathematical studies in physics, but the insights
>>>>> originated in physics, not formal philosophy.)
>>>>>
>>>>> In summary, the attempts by Spinoza and Descartes to formalize
>>>>> metaphysics were interesting failures. Even as late as the 20th
>>>>> century, when modern logic became available, attempts such as
>>>>> Carnap's Logische Aufbau were also interesting failures. Carnap
>>>>> was a good logician with a strong background in physics and
>>>>> mathematics. But his attempt was a dead end. Nelson Goodman
>>>>> made another interesting attempt, which developed some useful
>>>>> mathematics, but no new insights into metaphysics.
>>>>>
>>>>> The largest of all attempts was the Cyc project, which many people
>>>>> in AI regard as a failure. Cyc has had some useful applications,
>>>>> but none of them have been sufficiently successful to pay for the
>>>>> many millions of dollars that were invested in the project.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Those of us who are working with logic and ontology hope that
>>>>> some kind of formalization will be useful for major applications.
>>>>> But so far, there have been *no* new insights into metaphysics
that
>>>>> have come from the process of axiomatizing Cyc or any other formal
>>>>> system. On the contrary, the real insights have come from the
same
>>>>> source as all the other insights since antiquity: dedicated
study,
>>>>> observation, intuition, and discussion with teachers, students,
and
>>>>> colleagues. The insights from formalization, if any, were modest
>>>>> at best.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> The crucial problem with this project consists in its artificial
>>>> selection
>>>> of top-level categories, what makes a shaky foundation for the
whole
>>>> enterprise. (more detailed analysis in the Universal Ontology
book).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> John
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> _________________________________________________________________
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>>>>
>>> --
>>> Ingvar Johansson
>>> IFOMIS, Saarland University
>>> home site: http://ifomis.org/
>>> personal home site:
>>> http://hem.passagen.se/ijohansson/index.html
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
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>
>
> --
> Ingvar Johansson
> IFOMIS, Saarland University
> home site: http://ifomis.org/
> personal home site:
> http://hem.passagen.se/ijohansson/index.html
>
>
>
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