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"[ontolog-forum] " <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
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From: |
Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx> |

Date: |
Mon, 14 Jan 2008 12:01:57 -0600 |

Message-id: |
<p0623090dc3b14c4a8691@[10.100.0.28]> |

At 11:11 AM -0600 1/14/08, Chris Menzel wrote:
On Sun, 13 Jan 2008, Pat Hayes wrote:
Exactly: that was my entire point. And yet, as I think you know,
advocates of context logic (in particular, of McCarthy's) have
insisted that
any coherent or rational notion of truth in a
context must satisfy this axiom, which of course is why it is
adopted as an axiom.The Well, I agree; but the point of this thread was my claim that no
axiom, not even this, can be taken to be simply true of all intuitive
uses of 'true in a context'. And as this is the only logical truth
that has been proposed to hold in
all cases of truth in a
context, the only conclusion seems to be that there are *no*
axioms which hold for all such cases: so that the 'general upper
ontology' of contextual truth is, in fact, empty. So let us return to
the McCarthy/Sowa claim that 'contexts are whatever satisfy the axioms
of our theory of contexts', and ask what the general theory of
contexts *is*, and we find that it isn't anything. IMO, this
reduces the idea of a 'mathematical' theory of contexts to
triviality.
> t with P true in it, then ist does not satisfy McCarthy's axiom. either (ist t P) or (ist t (not P)). Slightly weaker: (not (ist t (P & (not P)))). I think any
notion which fails this has no coherent logic. But we may well
disagree here:
I don't think that is a viable I presume you are thinking of states of belief and other
'psychological' context-ish things. IMO, philosophers have been far
too glib in assuming that states of belief can be logically
inconsistent. There is a lot of evidence that certain kinds of
inconsistency, at any rate, are actively corrected by unconscious
mental processes. (Now, this is a topic worthy of extended debate
:-)
(though it's probably ok Its certainly OK, as your own paper on the topic elegantly
expounds.
No, my point was that there exists a perfectly reasonable
semantics for 'ist' which made it invalid.
So there might be more than one context logic? Isnt it better at
this point to admit that there is no actual
logic of
contexts?
> a notion of 'true during an interval'. Which was my main point: there Quite. The burden of proof seems to lie elsewhere, and if John
McCarthy can't come up with it after over a decade, I think its time
to forget the idea.
Pat
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