> -----Original Message-----
> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
> bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Smith, Barry
> Sent: 13 June 2007 17:37
> To: Conklin, Don; Kathryn Blackmond Laskey; [ontolog-forum] ;
> sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Two ontologies that are inconsistent but both
> needed
>
> At 10:12 AM 6/13/2007, Conklin, Don wrote:
> >OK, I just have to bite on this one...
> >
> >Most of what we encounter in the "real" world are concepts. My driver's
> >license may be a physical artifact of the type document, but the
> >statutes that specify its contents are themselves concepts within a
> >conceptual system of laws. Even my height is specified in conceptual
> >units (has anyone ever seen the original foot?).
>
> I strongly recommend that you abandon the use of the word 'concept',
> here. There are sophisticated terminologies for the types of entities
> existing in institutional reality, which maintain a clear distinction
> between e.g. laws and our ideas (concepts, if you insist) of laws. (01)
Can I say I strongly agree with Barry on this point - I find making clear
what one means by concepts really important. (BTW aren't statutes usually
physical documents as well?) (02)
>
> But even leaving that aside, in:
>
> >[BS] I hope that we all agree that in major, critical, domains, such
> >as medicine or nuclear power generation a good strategy for creating
> >useful models is to seek to find out what the underlying reality is
> >like.
>
> I did not specify that 'reality' should be restricted to physical reality.
> BS
>
>
> >As a retired aircraft carrier pilot, I have more respect than most for
> >things that can hurt me in the real world. A failed arresting cable
> >meant I would go swimming via a (very) short ride on an ejection seat.
> >The seat, its occupant and the A-6 Intruder were certainly real.
> >Virtually everything else about how they were to be used were concepts.
> >
> >The ontologies I work on now try to describe the pertinent concepts for
> >its intended use. Only a small subset of the described conceptual
> >activities are expected to be realized as events in the real world.
> >
> >So 2/3 of the ontology set is concepts, and the last 1/3 physical things
> >and events that actually occur in the real world. And even those are
> >specifications of the perception of the actual thing and/or event.
> >
> >Don
> >
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: Kathryn Blackmond Laskey [mailto:klaskey@xxxxxxx]
> >Sent: Wednesday, June 13, 2007 12:00 PM
> >To: Smith, Barry; [ontolog-forum] ; sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx; Kathryn Blackmond
> >Laskey; Conklin, Don
> >Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Two ontologies that are inconsistent but
> >both needed
> >
> >At 9:39 AM -0600 6/13/07, Smith, Barry wrote:
> > >[BS] I hope that we all agree that in major, critical, domains, such
> > >as medicine or nuclear power generation a good strategy for creating
> > >useful models is to seek to find out what the underlying reality is
> > >like.
> >
> >Of course.
> >
> >In a couple of decades of building models of phenomena, many of them
> >in major, critical domains, I have come to the conclusion that the
> >underlying reality of the world we live in is such that the best,
> >most useful models of many phenomena are probabilistic.
> >
> >When I say this, I get nods from many engineers who have been in the
> >trenches building models. They want to know about technologies for
> >building interoperable models.
> >
> >But ontologists tell me it is a category error to put probability in
> >the ontology, because probability is epistemic and not ontological.
> >
> >IMO, is an example of counterproductive pedantry.
> >
> >Barry, you caricature Tom Gruber by saying he wants to build
> >ontologies of concepts while you're building ontologies of the world.
> >That ain't so. Anyone who builds an ontology is specifying a
> >conceptualization. A good ontologist specifies conceptualizations
> >that are as true to the structure of the world. But an ontology IS a
> >specification of a conceptualization. It is NOT a specification of
> >the reality. Only God can specify reality. We can describe reality
> >and act in it, but we can't specify it. We describe reality by
> >specifying our conceptualizations of it, arguing over them, refining
> >them, and hammering out consensus agreements on them.
> >
> >If we bite the bullet and admit that ontologies specify
> >conceptualizations [of a domain], then it's easy to argue that
> >conceptualizations should be allowed to have probabilities when we
> >don't have enough information for a complete specification. This
> >argument makes sense even if we don't think the probabilities
> >themselves are ontological.
> >
> >Kathy
>
>
>
> _________________________________________________________________
> Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/
> Subscribe/Config: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/
> Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/
> Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/
> To Post: mailto:ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> (03)
_________________________________________________________________
Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/
Subscribe/Config: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/
Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/
Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/
To Post: mailto:ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (04)
|