OK, I just have to bite on this one... (01)
Most of what we encounter in the "real" world are concepts. My driver's
license may be a physical artifact of the type document, but the
statutes that specify its contents are themselves concepts within a
conceptual system of laws. Even my height is specified in conceptual
units (has anyone ever seen the original foot?). (02)
As a retired aircraft carrier pilot, I have more respect than most for
things that can hurt me in the real world. A failed arresting cable
meant I would go swimming via a (very) short ride on an ejection seat.
The seat, its occupant and the A-6 Intruder were certainly real.
Virtually everything else about how they were to be used were concepts. (03)
The ontologies I work on now try to describe the pertinent concepts for
its intended use. Only a small subset of the described conceptual
activities are expected to be realized as events in the real world. (04)
So 2/3 of the ontology set is concepts, and the last 1/3 physical things
and events that actually occur in the real world. And even those are
specifications of the perception of the actual thing and/or event. (05)
Don (06)
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Blackmond Laskey [mailto:klaskey@xxxxxxx]
Sent: Wednesday, June 13, 2007 12:00 PM
To: Smith, Barry; [ontolog-forum] ; sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx; Kathryn Blackmond
Laskey; Conklin, Don
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Two ontologies that are inconsistent but
both needed (07)
At 9:39 AM -0600 6/13/07, Smith, Barry wrote:
>[BS] I hope that we all agree that in major, critical, domains, such
>as medicine or nuclear power generation a good strategy for creating
>useful models is to seek to find out what the underlying reality is
>like. (08)
Of course. (09)
In a couple of decades of building models of phenomena, many of them
in major, critical domains, I have come to the conclusion that the
underlying reality of the world we live in is such that the best,
most useful models of many phenomena are probabilistic. (010)
When I say this, I get nods from many engineers who have been in the
trenches building models. They want to know about technologies for
building interoperable models. (011)
But ontologists tell me it is a category error to put probability in
the ontology, because probability is epistemic and not ontological. (012)
IMO, is an example of counterproductive pedantry. (013)
Barry, you caricature Tom Gruber by saying he wants to build
ontologies of concepts while you're building ontologies of the world.
That ain't so. Anyone who builds an ontology is specifying a
conceptualization. A good ontologist specifies conceptualizations
that are as true to the structure of the world. But an ontology IS a
specification of a conceptualization. It is NOT a specification of
the reality. Only God can specify reality. We can describe reality
and act in it, but we can't specify it. We describe reality by
specifying our conceptualizations of it, arguing over them, refining
them, and hammering out consensus agreements on them. (014)
If we bite the bullet and admit that ontologies specify
conceptualizations [of a domain], then it's easy to argue that
conceptualizations should be allowed to have probabilities when we
don't have enough information for a complete specification. This
argument makes sense even if we don't think the probabilities
themselves are ontological. (015)
Kathy (016)
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