Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology, Information Models and the 'Real World': C

["Azamat Abdoullaev" <abdoul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

 

The least i wish to do is to contribute to this lengthy formal logical disputations. But even at the peak of polemics, the eristics need to take an extreme caution against extreme views on natural language:

PH: But in any case, I also think, purely now as a matter of engineering, that to confuse natural language with
ontological formalisms is a serious methodological blunder.

JS: I agree.  I blame Montague for some of the worst excesses, which followed from his claim "I reject the contention that an important theoretical difference exists between formal and natural languages" (published in "English as a Formal Language", 1970). 

 

I am much surprised at John's being so inconsistent. I heard the quite opposite statements: ?natural language is the ultimate knowledge representation language? and that ?the richest source of ontological categories is the vocabulary of natural languages?. 

 

I found it as an intellectual deed to consider a formalized natural language as a formal (ontological) language to comprehensively and consistently describe the world and its domains.

Among the common misconceptions widely spread both in the KR communities and NLP interest groups are that a human?s knowing of the world is basically performed without natural language and that linguistic communication only marginally involves thinking, as J. McCarthy states: ?Language is froth on the surface of thought?. This view resounds another bad confusion: natural language can?t be knowledge and reasoning representation language, but only an interface, for it is non-algorithmic, ambiguous, vague and unsystematic. Or, that its consistent description, rigorous axiomatization and formalization as algorithmic program is open to question.

In contrast to such widespread misconceptions, the linguistic knowledge can be organized as a formal system of basic definitions, axioms, and rules so that to assure consistency of meaning, correctness of linguistic inferences and discovery of possible relationships among words and sentences (context). Let's remember that to achieve this goal is a basic task of real ontology targeting to build an integrative semantic framework permitting to avoid many (formal logical) misunderstandings about the nature and structure of natural language.

 

Azamat

 

----- Original Message -----

From: "John F. Sowa" <sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx>

To: "Pat Hayes" <phayes@xxxxxxx>

Cc: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Sent: Friday, June 01, 2007 8:30 AM

Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology, Information Models and the 'Real World': Contexts

> Pat,
> 
> I have no complaints about the IKL model 
theory, which I
> have found sufficient to support what I want to 
do.
> 
> Re contexts:  I agree that the word has been used in 
many
> confusing ways.  My definition is very simple and 
formal:
> in CGs, a context is a concept box that contains a 
nested
> conceptual graph.
> 
> Since concept nodes have type 
labels (the absence of a type
> label defaults to an untyped node that can 
accommodate any
> referent of any type), the type label of the context 
serves
> to "coerce" the interpretation of the nested CG:
> 
>  1. If the type label is CG, the nested graph is a 
literal,
>     which is effectively quoted by an 
ordinary quote.
> 
>  2. If the type label is Proposition, the 
nested CG states
>     the proposition (which I map to 
an IKL proposition).
> 
>  3. If the type label is anything 
else, the nested CG
>     states a proposition that 
describes some entity
>     of the given type.
> 
> So far, I have not found any common use of the word 'context'
> 
that cannot be mapped to one of these three options.  If the
> 
context is some linguistic _expression_, it maps to a proposition.
> If it 
is some nonlinguistic situation or whatever, it maps to
> a concept of the 
appropriate type that is described by a CG.
> 
> Some comments on 
selections from your note:
> 
> PH> I too [like Quine] find modal 
logics essentially meaningless,
> > I don't believe in possibilia 
(how many possible men are standing
> > in an empty 
doorway?)
> 
> I don't blame you (or Quine) for not believing in 
possibilia, but
> we constantly use modal talk in ordinary language, and I 
believe
> it is a legitimate object for further analysis and 
clarification.
> 
> One reason why I prefer Dunn's semantics to 
Kripke's semantics
> is that Dunn makes the laws that define any modality 
explicit.
> Whenever people say "you must ...", they implicitly 
intend
> some law(s) that determine why you must.  Those laws could 
be
> laws of logic, physics, economics (i.e., financial 
limitations),
> engineering (i.e., practical limitations), governments, or 
even
> your mommy (as in "because I told you to").  Anything 
implied
> by the laws is necessary (or obligatory, according to the 
mode),
> and anything consistent with the laws is possible.
> 
> This provides a very clear explanation of modality, which is
> 
completely formal and compatible with ordinary language.
> 
> PH> 
I think that natural language - *real* natural language, not
> > 
the prissified academic stuff that philosophers write and read
> > 
to one another - is beyond the pale of any attempt to 
formalize
> > its actual meanings. About half the stuff we say to 
one another
> > isn't even intended to convey meaning: its more 
like a kind of
> > verbal grooming. But in any case, I also think, 
purely now as
> > a matter of engineering, that to confuse natural 
language with
> > ontological formalisms is a serious 
methodological blunder.
> 
> I agree.  I blame Montague for 
some of the worst excesses, which
> followed from his claim "I reject the 
contention that an important
> theoretical difference exists between 
formal and natural languages"
> (published in "English as a Formal 
Language", 1970).
> 
> In the early 1970s, when I read Montague's 
papers, I was impressed
> by the technical virtuosity, but I couldn't 
believe that anything
> remotely similar to that could serve as the 
foundation for NLs.
> 
> JFS>> ... the semantics of NLs, for 
which many people would like
> >> to use IKL.
> 
> 
PH> Hmm. News to me. It wasn't designed with that purpose in 
mind,
> > for sure.
> 
> But that was one of the 
requirements laid down by people like
> Jerry Hobbs, etc.  Lenat had 
always said that he wanted to use CycL
> to represent NL semantics (or 
whatever he extracted from NL), and
> he said that the CG contexts were 
more suitable for that purpose
> than CL.  But he (and the other 
CycLers) agreed that they could
> use IKL to represent CycL.
> 
> PH> I really don't think we need to be this fussy about 
terminology.
> > IKL is a formal logic, and without the 
proposition names it really
> > is just common logic, which is FOL 
written in an unusually slack
> > syntax.
> 
> I 
agree, but that point about propositions is the thin opening wedge
> that 
pries open the floodgates to an enormous range of options.  When
> I 
had been working with Genesereth to develop ANSI standards for KIF
> and 
CGs, I mapped CG contexts to KIF statements in "backquotes".  I
> 
regard IKL propositions as a nicer notation for KIF backquotes (which
> 
very few people ever understood or used).
> 
> PH> So any 
discussion of propositions in English is really beside
> > 
the  point for IKL: it does not set out to capture all 
propositions
> > expressible in English (a tensed, modal, 
indexical, elliptical
> > language which evolved to convey speech 
acts in a social context)...
> 
> You can ignore them if you like, 
but IKL gives me the mechanisms to
> define the kinds of things I was 
doing in the following two papers:
> 
>    http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/laws.htm
>    Laws, Facts, and Contexts
> 
>    http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/worlds.pdf
>    Worlds, Models, and Descriptions
> 
> 
PH> And strictly speaking, there is no notion in IKL of a 
proposition
> > being 'inside' a context, or of contexts being 
'nested'.
> 
> As I said, I use the word 'context' for CG boxes that 
contain other
> CGs -- and I map those boxes to IKL that-clauses.  
The CG boxes
> can be nested in the same way as IKL that-clauses.  
That is all I
> need to define the structures I want to define.
> 
> John
> 
> 
> 
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