Schiffel, Jeffrey A wrote:
>
>> Waclaw Kusnierczyk wrote:
>>
>> John F. Sowa wrote:
>>> Ingvar,
>>>
>>> My position and Pat's position are compatible and for the same
>>> reasons: we both have propositions, but we admit that their truth
>>> values in different contexts can be different.
>> One could call it 'hard-headed language puristness', but it
>> seems to me that Ingvar makes a valid point (if I understand
>> him correctly); to me, to say (as Pat did) that a
>> proposition has a fixed truth value, which is not a function
>> of anything (or is a nullary function), and then to say (as
>> Pat did) that a proposition may have different truth values
>> in different contexts is plainly confusing.
>>
>> While in the case of multiple possible worlds -- which seem a
>> purely theoretic device that does not reflect the actual
>> reality we live in -- it does sound reasonable to say that a
>> proposition may have different truth values in different
>> worlds, as far as the worlds are truly different possible
>> worlds, rather than consequtive stages of the same actual
>> world (in which case we would have to admit that the truth of
>> a proposition is time-dependent). But it does not seem to me
>> reasonable to say that a proposition may have different truth
>> values in different contexts in the same actual world --
>> especially after having said it has a fixed truth value. It
>> may be that a context considers, in any sense you like, a
>> proposition to be true or false, independently of its actual
>> truth or falsity, but the proposition does not thereby change
>> its truth value. We end up saying that a proposition is
>> true, but (and?) false in some context, for example.
>> Awkward, as Ken says.
>>
>
> While the case of multiple possible worlds seems unlikely, a proposition
> can nevertheless reflect some different future scenarios. Given the
> propostion, "Waclaw watches soccer or eats ice cream, but not both," the
> truth of the propostion is either of two outcomes. Are these not
> different contexts? (01)
I admit I do not get the point. (02)
Say, we have a proposition that WK will watch tv tomorrow. Sure, before
tomorrow comes, we don't know whether this proposition will be -- and
is! -- true or not. It may (where 'may' may have different meanings,
actually, depending on what your opinion on determinism of the world is)
be that WK will watch; them the proposition is true. It may be that WK
will not watch; then the proposition is false. In either case, it is
true or it is false. But the proposition is either already true or
false, or it is not yet determined, but as soon as it will be, it will
simply be true or false. (03)
The cases here might be seen as contexts, but again, the 'truth' of the
proposition in the case analysis is not the truth of the proposition in
the case that is the one the world will be or is. That a true
proposition would have been false had the world been different, or that
a true proposition would be false would the world be different in the
future (I may have misused English grammar, sorry) has nothing to do
with the truth of the proposition. (04)
If contexts are hypothetical scenarios, it is then better to say that
(ist c p) means that p would be true were c the case. Meanwhile, p
either is true or not; if c is the case, p is true (if (ist c p) is
true), if not, p either is true or not -- irrespectively of the
unrealized scenario c. (05)
I just object, in a hard-headed manner, to using the same form 'is true'
for both the actual truth and a hypothetical truth in a hypothetical
unrealized scenario. (06)
vQ (07)
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