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Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology, Information Models and the 'Real World': C

To: "[ontolog-forum] " <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: "Schiffel, Jeffrey A" <jeffrey.a.schiffel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 30 May 2007 14:44:43 -0500
Message-id: <ECF42862FCA16D41BFA98F8C45F0955402E2701E@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

> Waclaw Kusnierczyk wrote:
> 
> John F. Sowa wrote:
> > Ingvar,
> > 
> > My position and Pat's position are compatible and for the same
> > reasons:  we both have propositions, but we admit that their truth 
> > values in different contexts can be different.
> 
> One could call it 'hard-headed language puristness', but it 
> seems to me that Ingvar makes a valid point (if I understand 
> him correctly);  to me, to say (as Pat did) that a 
> proposition has a fixed truth value, which is not a function 
> of anything (or is a nullary function), and then to say (as 
> Pat did) that a proposition may have different truth values 
> in different contexts is plainly confusing.
> 
> While in the case of multiple possible worlds -- which seem a 
> purely theoretic device that does not reflect the actual 
> reality we live in -- it does sound reasonable to say that a 
> proposition may have different truth values in different 
> worlds, as far as the worlds are truly different possible 
> worlds, rather than consequtive stages of the same actual 
> world (in which case we would have to admit that the truth of 
> a proposition is time-dependent).  But it does not seem to me 
> reasonable to say that a proposition may have different truth 
> values in different contexts in the same actual world -- 
> especially after having said it has a fixed truth value.  It 
> may be that a context considers, in any sense you like, a 
> proposition to be true or false, independently of its actual 
> truth or falsity, but the proposition does not thereby change 
> its truth value.  We end up saying that a proposition is 
> true, but (and?) false in some context, for example.  
> Awkward, as Ken says.
>     (01)

While the case of multiple possible worlds seems unlikely, a proposition
can nevertheless reflect some different future scenarios. Given the
propostion, "Waclaw watches soccer or eats ice cream, but not both," the
truth of the propostion is either of two outcomes. Are these not
different contexts?    (02)

-- Jeff Schiffel    (03)

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