John F. Sowa wrote:
> Ingvar,
>
> My position and Pat's position are compatible and for the same
> reasons: we both have propositions, but we admit that their
> truth values in different contexts can be different. (01)
One could call it 'hard-headed language puristness', but it seems to me
that Ingvar makes a valid point (if I understand him correctly); to me,
to say (as Pat did) that a proposition has a fixed truth value, which is
not a function of anything (or is a nullary function), and then to say
(as Pat did) that a proposition may have different truth values in
different contexts is plainly confusing. (02)
While in the case of multiple possible worlds -- which seem a purely
theoretic device that does not reflect the actual reality we live in --
it does sound reasonable to say that a proposition may have different
truth values in different worlds, as far as the worlds are truly
different possible worlds, rather than consequtive stages of the same
actual world (in which case we would have to admit that the truth of a
proposition is time-dependent). But it does not seem to me reasonable
to say that a proposition may have different truth values in different
contexts in the same actual world -- especially after having said it has
a fixed truth value. It may be that a context considers, in any sense
you like, a proposition to be true or false, independently of its actual
truth or falsity, but the proposition does not thereby change its truth
value. We end up saying that a proposition is true, but (and?) false in
some context, for example. Awkward, as Ken says. (03)
vQ (04)
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